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This thesis undertakes a sustained engagement with theoretical debates within 
and between the fields of human rights and environmental sustainability, which, it is 
argued here, inevitably come together in the context of globalisation. At issue in this 
thesis are questions about the nature of and rationale for human rights, the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of environmental sustainability, the impact of globalisation 
on human rights and environmental sustainability, and the interaction between them. 
The aim of the thesis is to interrogate a variety of arguments about human rights and 
environmental sustainability in order to assess their coherence and consistency, and to 
evaluate competing perspectives. The central questions animating this inquiry are, to 
what extent can environmental threats to human security be conceptualised as a 
human rights issue, and do human rights provide an adequate and appropriate 
framework   in   terms   of   which   to   respond   to   the   environmental   impacts   of 
globalisation? 
The thesis begins by examining the impact of globalisation on human rights 
and environmental sustainability. There follows, in chapter 3, a detailed analysis of 
possible justifications of support for universal human rights, looking at philosophical 
foundations, the idea that there might be an overlapping consensus on human rights, 
and the idea of human rights as a sentimental education. Chapter 4 focuses on 
criticisms that have been levelled at the contemporary human rights regime and 
evaluates a proposed alternative, Thomas Pogge’s idea of an institutional model of 
human rights. Thereafter the focus of the thesis shifts to environmental sustainability. 
Firstly, chapter 5 investigates definitions of environmental sustainability and proposes 
an evaluative framework for assessing different models of economic organisation. 
Secondly, chapter 6 looks at the political changes that might be appropriate to an 
environmentally sustainable society by examining green (re-)interpretations of the 
concepts of citizenship, democracy, and justice. In chapter 7 the two fields of inquiry 
are reintegrated, firstly by addressing the question of whether rights or sustainability 
can or should be prioritised at the expense of the other, and secondly by considering 
the plausibility and merit of the idea of claiming that there are environmental human 
rights. 
The conclusion advanced in the thesis is that human rights do not provide a 
sufficient framework in terms of which to respond to the environmental impacts of 
2globalisation, however, a renewed understanding of human rights, informed by a 
sense of the social and ecological embeddedness of human life, may be a fruitful 
feature of an environmentally sustainable society. Moreover, it is argued here that 
human rights and environmental sustainability share some illuminating features, in 
that support for each is most coherently justified in terms of a sentimental concern for 
the  fate  of  others,  though informed  by a sense  of  the  social  and  ecological 
embeddedness of human life. This informed sentimentalism is ultimately held to be a 
stronger motivation to act in defence of human rights or environmental sustainability 
than rational self-interest in the context of globalisation. 
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8Chapter 1: Introduction
It is now widely accepted within policy circles and academic discourse that the 
environment cannot long sustain the stresses currently placed upon it by the volume 
and   character   of   human   activity,   specifically   the   production   of   wastes   and 
consumption of natural resources. There is also widespread recognition that, despite 
more than fifty years of campaigning, legislating, and official affirmation, human 
rights remain systematically underfulfilled in many parts of the world. Human rights 
theorists and green political theorists alike have argued that globalisation exacerbates, 
and   indeed   causes,   serious   problems   in   the   fields   of   human   rights   and   the 
environment. However, few scholars in any field have paid detailed attention to the 
interaction between human rights and environmental sustainability in the context of 
globalisation. The focus of those who have has mostly been on empirical analyses, 
studying, for example, the extent to which economic globalisation prompts changes in 
industrial and agricultural priorities that simultaneously undermine human rights and 
environmental sustainability in a particular geographical area, or on the overlap 
between legal issues in human rights and environmental protection (see, for example, 
Agyeman et al 2003; Anderson and Boyle (eds) 1996; Bosselmann 2001; Johnston 
1995; Lowi and Shaw (eds) 2000; Picolotti and Tailant (eds) 2003; Zarsky (ed) 2002). 
In contrast, the aim of this thesis is to undertake a sustained engagement with 
theoretical debates within and between the fields of human rights and environmental 
politics, which, I argue, inevitably come together in the context of globalisation.  
The thesis has its genesis in a paradox, or what might be called a ‘trilemma’: it 
is   reasonable   to   suppose   that   individuals   are   more   likely   to   care   about   the 
environment if their human rights are secure, because, for most people, environmental 
issues are long-term rather than immediate problems, whereas human rights often 
refer to our immediate security. People rationally seek to secure their well-being in 
the short-term before they worry about long-term concerns. Therefore, it might be 
suggested that a useful step in working towards environmental sustainability would be 
to secure human rights for all. But human rights are widely perceived to be embedded 
in a liberal democratic framework that is itself frequently held to be inimical to, or at 
least   problematic   for,   the   project   of   realising   environmental   sustainability. 
Globalisation further complicates matters in that the globalisation of political norms, 
such as democracy and human rights, has been accompanied by, and some argue has 
9been dependent upon, the advancement of economic globalisation, which, to date, has 
had an adverse impact on the global environment. If this is the case, then, as 
globalisation  increasingly  undermines global  ecological  integrity,   environmental 
issues will come to be an element of the immediate concerns relating to human 
security, rather than an issue that can be deferred. Indeed, this is already the case for a 
substantial number of the global poor who live on land that is polluted, desalinated, or 
on flood plains. For such people, environmental problems are already a threat to 
human security.
At issue in this thesis, then, are questions about the nature of and rationale for 
human rights, the necessary and sufficient conditions of environmental sustainability, 
and the impact of globalisation. A further important focus of the thesis is the 
plausibility of the idea of environmental human rights. Environmental human rights 
have been proposed both by green theorists and human rights theorists in the past 
decade, but neither group of scholars has produced a persuasive synthesis of human 
rights theory and environmental theory. Instead, the tendency among green theorists 
has been to take human rights as they are and add environmental rights to the existing 
portfolio (see, for example, Eckersley 1996; Hancock 2003; Hayward 2005a), whilst 
human rights theorists proposing environmental rights have typically been those 
seeking to reconceptualise existing human rights without devoting detailed attention 
to what environmental sustainability would entail (see, for example, Langlois 2001; 
Stammers 1999). 
1.1 Why human rights, environmental sustainability and globalisation?
Throughout the thesis, I take the core issue of environmental politics to be the 
question of how to achieve environmental sustainability. There are many other 
questions within environmental politics that legitimately command the attention of 
green theorists – for example, what constitutes a just relationship between human and 
non-human nature? Do non-human beings have rights? What would be a just 
distribution of environmental goods and harms? Do states have rights to interfere in 
the domestic affairs of neighbours if shared environmental resources are threatened? 
Can future generations have rights? Some of these questions I touch upon in chapters 
5, 6, and 7. But I take environmental sustainability, rather than, say, environmental 
justice or environmental ethics, to be the central issue, because questions about a just 
distribution of clean water, or the ethical treatment of whales, cannot be resolved over 
10the long-term unless the question of how to live sustainably is addressed. Finding a 
sustainable way (or ways) to live is a precondition for all other pursuits, including 
protecting human rights.
Given that one of the aims of the thesis is to investigate the tensions between 
environmental sustainability and human rights, it is appropriate to focus narrowly on 
environmental sustainability,  rather than more expansive notions of sustainable 
development, which might reasonably be understood to incorporate a commitment to 
human rights. The focus here is on the mutual compatibility between human rights 
and environmental sustainability as normative values. Therefore, it is essential to the 
clarity   of   the   project   to   identify   key   features   of   environmental   sustainability 
independently of any conceptual interconnection with human rights as a starting point 
for analysis.
The   choice   of   examining   the   interaction   between   human   rights   and 
environmental   sustainability,   rather   than,   say,   democracy   and   environmental 
sustainability, or justice and environmental sustainability, is motivated by the fact that 
human rights encapsulate a notion of human well-being that is claimed to be 
universal, and because of the prevalence of human rights language in contemporary 
moral and political discourse, though, in chapter 6 I look at some of the different ways 
in which green theorists have interpreted the concepts of citizenship, democracy, and 
justice. Human rights represent a minimum conception of what is required for a life 
befitting a human being. Insofar as sacrifices are often called for in order to achieve 
environmental sustainability, within the framework of currently dominant norms, 
those   sacrifices   must   not,   in   principle,   impinge   upon   human   rights,   if   an 
environmentally sustainable life is to be a life befitting a human. If that is not 
possible, then two choices present themselves: either the goal of sustainability or our 
understanding of human rights is in need of re-evaluation. In the course of the thesis, I 
argue   that   neither   environmental   sustainability   nor   human   rights   have   fixed, 
universally agreed upon definitions. One aim of the thesis is therefore to explicate 
some of the various conceptions of each. The point to note here is that human rights 
are a valid and relevant starting point for discussion because they represent a more 
comprehensive notion of the minimum conditions for a fully human life, which is 
claimed to be universal, than the alternatives, such as democracy and justice. Rights to 
democracy and justice are parts of our human rights, they are thus facets of what any 
human should have, but they are not the whole package. This is not to say, however, 
11that the notion of human rights is necessarily valid or even coherent, as I will discuss 
in chapter 3. It is, nevertheless, a point of entry into the debate. 
Processes of globalisation, particularly economic globalisation, are taken here 
to frame the dynamic between human rights and environmental sustainability because 
I argue, in chapter 2, that economic globalisation has contributed to, and sometimes 
caused, environmental problems that have human rights consequences. The latter 
stage   in   this   causal   chain   –   environmental   problems   having   human   rights 
consequences – is fairly self-evident: if, for instance, global warming causes sea 
levels to rise, people living on low-lying land are likely to become environmental 
refugees. Environmental refugees typically face a number of human rights-related 
problems, regarding both socio-economic rights and political and civil rights. The 
former part of the causal chain – economic globalisation causing environmental 
problems – is an argument that continues to generate controversy, and will be 
explored in some detail in chapters 2 and 5. Globalisation is not, however, exclusively 
economic. Almost every state government in the world has made some degree of 
commitment to the norm of human rights. The globalisation of norms is therefore a 
further part of the picture. Indeed, it is argued that environmental sustainability, or 
more often the idea of ‘sustainable development’, is also coming to be a globally 
accepted norm. As will be discussed in chapter 5, much depends upon the ways in 
which sustainability is interpreted, that is, what, precisely, is being sustained. 
At this point, a further caveat should be noted. Economic globalisation is 
argued here to be at present set on an environmentally unsustainable trajectory, and 
for that reason raises problems for human rights. However, that is not to say that it is 
the only model of economic organisation that is problematic. Indeed, environmental 
conditions   in   many   former   Soviet   countries   suggest   that   Soviet-style   planned 
economies were also environmentally unsustainable. The selection of globalisation as 
a relevant field of study is a reflection of the dominance of the global economy. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis
The aim of this thesis is to interrogate a variety of arguments about human 
rights and environmental sustainability,  in order to assess their coherence and 
consistency, and to evaluate competing perspectives. The lack of consensus within 
each field means that no position argued for here would satisfy all advocates of 
12human rights, nor all proponents of environmental sustainability. Given the variety of 
positions and approaches within each of the fields that this project brings together, the 
approach taken here in drawing out debates within and between them is necessarily 
somewhat eclectic, a consequence of engaging with the multiplicity of positions 
within the literature. Though sympathetic to the green agenda, I recognise that green 
thought comes in many hues, and do, on occasions, where pertinent, make some 
distinctions, but the focus of this thesis is not an engagement with or assessment of 
green argumentation per se, but, broadly construed, of its bearing on the relations 
between human rights and environmental sustainability in the context of globalisation. 
As the thesis unfolds it will become apparent that I judge some facets of green 
thought to be more telling than that of others, but, for the most part, that judgment is 
incidental to my assessment of their contribution to the questions raised by my 
analysis.
The discussion is organised as follows: chapter 2 investigates the dynamic 
between economic globalisation, human rights, and the environment. I begin the 
chapter by looking at the ways in which human security is affected by environmental 
issues, then the dynamic between globalisation and human rights. Thereafter, I argue 
the case for the claim that economic globalisation has a destructive impact on the 
environment, and finally I suggest that current strategies of global environmental 
governance are inadequate to the task of limiting and redressing the ecological harm 
caused by economic globalisation. The question is therefore raised as to whether 
environmental threats to human security should be considered a human rights issue, 
and whether human rights provides an appropriate framework for dealing with the 
challenge of environmental harms associated with globalisation.
The next task of the thesis is therefore to evaluate that framework; specifically, 
whether human rights can constitute a universal norm. In chapter 3 I explore what is 
meant by the term ‘human rights’ and appraise competing justifications advanced in 
defence of human rights. I first consider arguments grounded in rationality, but find 
these unsatisfactory, in part because they depend upon an assumption that there is 
something morally significant about being human, a claim that is argued to be 
difficult to sustain unless underwritten by the idea of a higher being that created 
humans and therefore gives value to them. The universal appeal of such beliefs being 
questionable, I then consider the plausibility of a purported ‘overlapping consensus’ 
on human rights, but again find this problematic. Finally, I look at Richard Rorty’s 
13post-modern account of human rights that seeks to circumvent what he calls ‘appeals 
to foundationalism’, by means of a ‘sentimental education’, but this, too, proves 
flawed, because (as widely acknowledged) it provides only a weak grounding for 
human rights. 
In chapter 4, I look at the contemporary international human rights regime, 
considering some criticisms and evaluating an alternative. The criticisms hinge on the 
purported universalism of human rights, which is found to be problematic in several 
respects. Firstly, the so-called ‘Asian values’ debate highlights tensions that exist over 
the content of human rights. Secondly, the ambivalence of human rights with respect 
to power is discussed, both in terms of the state-centrism of human rights and the idea 
of using human rights as a ‘standard of civilisation’, that is, a means powerful states 
might use to judge the legitimacy of other governments, a practice which could be 
said to undermine the norm of self-determination. Finally, I consider Pogge’s 
proposed ‘institutional’ model of human rights, and conclude that, although Pogge at 
times seems to adopt a ‘standard of civilisation’ perspective, his strategy of taking as 
a benchmark the ‘underfulfilment’ rather than the ‘violation’ of human rights has 
merit,  and  is particularly  appealing  when trying  to theorise  the  link  between 
environmental sustainability and human rights. 
Following this analysis of what human rights are, and what they might be, 
chapter 5 attempts to define environmental sustainability, focusing first on whether an 
ecocentric   or   an   anthropocentric   framework   is   appropriate   for   theorising 
sustainability, and then considering alternative ways of explicating the conditions for 
sustainability. A typical response to the challenge of environmental sustainability is to 
juxtapose future generations’ needs with present generation wants, as, for example, in 
the influential Brundtland report of 1987. However, I argue that such a strategy 
obscures more than it clarifies, and instead propose taking ecosystem integrity as a 
starting point for conceptualising environmental sustainability. In the latter half of the 
chapter I develop a framework for analysis of competing models of a sustainable 
economy. The conclusion advanced is that the ecological economics approach 
provides the most robust and appealing model of environmental sustainability. 
Chapter 6 then turns attention to the political conditions for sustainability. The 
argument presented does not offer a utopian vision of the sustainable society, but 
instead   considers  possible  green  interpretations   of  three  foundational  norms   – 
citizenship,   democracy,   and   justice   –   which   are   necessarily   interlinked.   One 
14conclusion which emerges from this discussion is that the methods greens might adopt 
for instituting citizenship, democracy, and justice may well require the recognition of 
fundamental rights on the part of individuals if they are to avoid being vulnerable to 
oppression or injustice, even in an environmentally sustainable society. 
In response to this, chapter 7 first rebuts the argument that rights and 
sustainability are mutually exclusive, and then looks at the idea of environmental 
human rights. While green theorists have engaged critically with almost every other 
aspect of liberal democratic politics, human rights have often been endorsed by green 
theorists with a view to promoting environmental human rights. However these are 
built upon the foundation of existing human rights which, in chapters 3 and 4 of this 
thesis, is found to be flawed. I conclude that a critical engagement with existing 
models of human rights is a necessary condition of any attempt to foster the idea of 
environmental human rights. 
Finally, chapter 8 summarises the argument presented and assesses what 
conclusions can be reached on the extent to which human rights offer an appropriate 
framework for addressing the challenge of environmental sustainability in the context 
of globalisation. I argue that human rights may not be a sufficient condition for 
environmental sustainability, but that a sentimental concern for the fate of others, 
informed by knowledge of both the social and ecological embeddedness of human 
life, provides a coherent link between environmental sustainability and human rights 
in the context of globalisation.  
15Chapter 2: Globalisation
It is the contention of this thesis that issues in human rights and environmental 
sustainability inevitably come together and impact on one another in the context of a 
globalised or globalising world. The purpose of this chapter is to ask how and why 
this happens, or, what difference globalisation makes with respect to issues in human 
rights and environmental sustainability. Globalisation has been defined in a number of 
ways. For some it is purely economic, for others predominantly so, for others still it is 
a set of intrinsically linked and equally important processes of economic, political and 
cultural phenomena. One straightforward definition is:
Fundamentally, [globalisation is] the closer integration of the countries 
and peoples of the world which has been made possible by the enormous 
reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking 
down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, 
knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders. (Stiglitz 
2002:9)
I   am   concerned   here   primarily   with   economic   globalisation   and   the 
implications that this has for the environment, and thus for human rights. Defining 
globalisation principally in economic terms allows me to focus in this chapter on the 
relationship between the globalisation of the world’s economy and environmental 
problems related to unsustainable patterns of production and consumption, and the 
consequent relationship between environmental problems and issues in human rights.
1 
Economic globalisation is generally recognised as being driven or promoted by 
neoliberal economic policies. In some writing on globalisation these are responsible 
for all the evils of the world. For instance, in a polemical article, human rights theorist 
Adamantia Pollis asserts that, ‘globalization […] is underpinned by the ideology of 
neoliberalism, which is devoid of any normative principle of justice and humanity; it 
is market driven’ (Pollis 2004:343). Though Pollis is justified in some of her concerns 
about the neoliberal model of economic globalisation, it is misleading to suggest that 
neoliberalism has no normative principles of justice. To be clear, neoliberalism is 
1 It should be noted that focusing on the interaction between environmental sustainability and human 
rights does not presuppose an anthropocentric ethic with respect to the environment. Rather, identifying 
the problem of environmental unsustainability as a consequence of patterns in the human economy 
affirms that humans are at the centre of the problem, but not the centre of the universe. An ecocentric 
approach is not thereby excluded. Nevertheless, I argue in chapter 5 that a weak anthropocentrism is 
the most tenable ethical basis from which to approach the question of how to achieve environmental 
sustainability.
16understood here as an economic theory which can be most simply characterised in 
terms of promoting the idea that the economy should be freed from government. 
Adherents of neoliberalism hold that government regulation or other interference in 
the market place (such as state ownership or provision of goods) should be minimised, 
so as to maximise efficiency. Success is measured in terms of overall increases in 
economic activity. Neither justice nor humanity are absent from this theory – agents 
should receive the fruits of their own labour, and should not be arbitrarily deprived of 
them by government (by way of taxation), and wealth is expected to ‘trickle down’ 
through society, and improve thereby the general welfare. At the global level, 
neoliberal economic policies seek to facilitate world-wide ‘free trade in goods and 
services, freer circulation of capital, and freer ability to invest’ (Martinez and Garcia 
1997). Insofar as economic globalisation impacts on political issues I will address 
them.   Thus   I   consider   human   rights   and   globalisation,   global   environmental 
governance, and the human rights and environmental impacts of the purported 
weakening of state sovereignty in the context of globalisation. 
Assertions of undeniable links between human rights and the environment are 
easy  to   find   in   academic   discussion,   NGO   campaigns,   and   intergovernmental 
initiatives concerning the environment, sustainable development, and development 
projects more generally. A crude explanation of this interconnection might make 
reference to the global nature of environmental problems – the global environment is 
everyone’s home, and while there are highly localised instances of environmental 
degradation, there are also global problems, such as climate change, ozone depletion, 
loss of biodiversity, and so on, which would seem to demand global cooperation to be 
solved. Human rights are held to represent a global standard – almost all states have, 
at least formally, signalled their endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) – and so one might expect a global problem to be met with a global 
solution. Starting from the environment side of the equation, greens often argue that a 
‘clean’ or ‘decent’ environment is an essential precondition for the realisation of 
human rights (see, for example, Sachs 1995; Picolotti 2003; Hancock 2003). Starting 
from  the  human  rights  side,  however,  there  is  less  evidence  of  an  unfailing 
commitment to environmental issues on the part of human rights activists and 
scholars.   Amnesty   International,  for   example,   explicitly   reject   the   idea   of   an 
‘environmental human right’ (Hancock 2003:56). Prominent human rights theorists 
such as Jack Donnelly (2003) and Michael Freeman (2002) mention environmental 
17issues as a contemporary concern relevant perhaps to human rights theorising, but the 
purported ‘indivisibility of human rights and the environment’ (Picolotti 2003:49) is 
undermined somewhat, or at the very least requires explication, in view of the 
substantive exclusion of environmental issues from most human rights theory. 
One way of approaching such an explication is to consider the importance of 
environmental sustainability for human security.
2  If human rights are claimed in 
defence   of   human   security,   and   that   security   is   threatened   by   environmental 
degradation resulting from unsustainable economic practices, then there would seem 
to be a prima facie case for considering the environment to be a human rights issue. 
There is a great deal to be unpacked in this proposition; here I deal with only part of 
it. In section 1 I seek to show a link between human security and the environment. In 
section 2 of this chapter I discuss globalisation and human rights, but postpone until 
chapters 3 and 4 a detailed inquiry as to what exactly human rights are, and why 
people may be said to have such rights. In section 3 of this chapter I illustrate some of 
the ways in which the globalisation of the economy has contributed to environmental 
degradation, but I postpone until chapter 5 a substantive demonstration of the ways in 
which contemporary economic practices are unsustainable from an environmental 
point of view. In section 4 I offer a brief discussion of global environmental 
governance. 
2.1 Human security and the environment
As noted above, almost every state has formally endorsed the UDHR. Article 
3 of the UDHR asserts that all persons have the right to ‘life, liberty and security of 
person’. Steve Lonergan notes that ‘[i]nitially, human security was interpreted as 
meaning threats to the physical security of the person’ (Lonergan 2000:69). But 
security of person can also be threatened by a number of environmental factors. 
Firstly, environmental degradation and resource depletion are a potential cause of, or 
contributory factor in, violent conflict (Lonergan 2000:68; Neefjes 1999; Page 
2000:34-36 Redclift 2003). Secondly, access to clean air and water is crucial for 
human life, and it has been argued that the right to water can be regarded as a human 
right (Alvarez 2003). Similarly, access to food is dependent on the environment in 
important ways and can clearly be regarded as crucial to human security and to the 
2 What I have in mind here is security of person, which, though not insulated from national security, is 
nonetheless a distinct field of inquiry.
18fulfilment of human rights. As Vandana Shiva (1999) argues, the human right to 
freedom of speech can be undermined by hunger as well as by political repression. 
Thirdly, human security is threatened when people are removed from their land 
because of environmental threats, whether these threats be pollution, such as oil spills, 
other chemical spills, or radioactive contamination, or from flooding and rising sea 
levels or landslides and soil erosion. Another relevant consideration here is the 
removal of people from their lands to make way for development projects, such as 
mining and dams. 
There is a vast literature on the ways in which human security has been 
threatened and compromised in the context of activities associated with globalisation 
and   the   degradation   of   the   environment.   Joan   Martinez-Alier’s   work   on   ‘the 
environmentalism of the poor’ is often cited in this regard. In the face of development 
strategies   to   exploit   minerals,   oil   and   timber   resources,   ‘the   poor   often   find 
themselves fighting for resource conservation and a clean environment even when 
they   do   not   claim   to   be   environmentalists’   (Martinez-Alier   2003:201).   The 
environmental justice movement, most often associated with the USA and South 
Africa, emerged largely in response to localised threats to environmental security 
arising from corporate externalities, that is, the ecological costs that are not included 
in the market price of a given commodity (because the producer does not have to pay 
for the costs). For instance, the effects of oil production in the Niger Delta and the 
struggle of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People have been much 
publicised since the death of environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 (Sachs 
1995; Robson 1999). Similar examples have been documented in relation to gold-
mining in Peru (Martinez-Alier 2003:210-11) where indigenous and tribal people 
have suffered pollution and deforestation of their (claimed) lands, and in Suriname 
(MacKay 2002), where forced relocation of communities was avoided only by a drop 
in the world market price of gold, making mines in the interior of richly biodiverse 
tropical rainforest commercially unviable. The reprieve may be temporary, depending 
on the market price of gold. Many more such stories could be told. 
These particular stories, I hope, point towards a general conclusion; that 
humans cannot be said to enjoy security of person when preponderant patterns of 
production and consumption, both in local communities and globally, are ecologically 
unsustainable. While it is clear from these cases that there are localised problems, my 
primary concern is with the global picture. Indeed, these local stories indicate a global 
19interconnectedness – the oil companies operating the Niger Delta, say, supply oil to 
petrol stations in Europe and North America – such that they may be said to be 
indicative of a more general problem of ecologically unsustainable patterns of 
production and consumption. The global picture is also an appropriate level for 
analysis because environmental problems, particularly if air or water-borne, do not 
necessarily stay local. Pollution does not respect state borders, as demonstrated by 
acid rain in Scandinavia generated by Eastern European industry in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Similarly, rivers flowing through more than one country take wastes 
from each community downstream, and therefore require regional rather than national 
management. Some important features of the environment, such as breathable air, 
oceans, and seas, as well as less obvious resources such as the life-support facilities 
afforded by biodiversity, constitute a global commons, the preservation of which 
requires coordinated effort. 
Looking at the global level, Alan Carter (1999:ch1) details the many ways in 
which our ability to feed ourselves is being seriously compromised. Firstly, global 
warming is contributing to changes in weather patterns that are likely to mean the loss 
of productivity in Europe because of a drop in temperatures with the disruption of the 
Atlantic gulf stream. At the same time, productivity in the American mid-west, the 
country’s ‘bread basket’, is predicted to fall because rising temperatures there are 
drying out the land, increasing desertification. Secondly, the increasing dominance of 
large agricultural business enterprises, which typically harvest monocultures, are 
undermining biodiversity and leaving crops vulnerable to disease, disease that is 
likely to be made worse by the increasing use of pesticides. Thirdly, intensive farming 
methods are depleting topsoils and contributing to an overall loss of bioproductive 
material in soils, particularly in Europe and the US. Finally, as freshwater supplies 
dwindle globally, we are using more water for crop irrigation than at any time in 
human history. All this is happening against a backdrop of exponential population 
growth that is not expected to level out until the end of the twenty-first century, at 
around 10 billion people, up from 1 billion at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Carter’s depressing analysis is indicative of a range of discussions that 
conclude that an ever-increasing percentage of humans will face environmental 
threats to their security of person if unsustainable practices are allowed to continue. 
The focus of this thesis is not specific practices and their consequences, but rather, the 
theoretical underpinnings of the social, political and economic structures that maintain 
20these practices. To that end, in section 3 I discuss the ways in which the globalisation 
of the economy contributes to the maintenance of unsustainable patterns of production 
and consumption. In the next section, I look at the globalisation of human rights. 
2.2 Globalisation and human rights
The study of globalisation and human rights has several dimensions to it. 
Firstly, there is tension between what might be called the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
aspects of the globalisation of human rights – that is, between government-created 
international human rights frameworks and global civil society networks campaigning 
for governments to honour (and sometimes broaden) their human rights commitments. 
Secondly, there is the question of whether human rights represent the globalisation of 
Western norms, and the additional question of whether they should be rejected on that 
basis. These questions I address substantively in chapter 4, though they surface briefly 
in what follows. My concern here is to address two other recurrent questions in the 
literature on human rights and globalisation – firstly, the importance and alleged 
vulnerability of state sovereignty, and secondly, whether globalisation promotes or 
undermines human rights.
2.2.1 Globalisation and sovereignty
Globalisation is in some respects not new. A commentator writing in 1912 
noted the ‘incredible progress of rapidity in communications’ and increasing financial 
interdependence (quoted in Woods 2000:2). Yet many argue that the pace of change 
today is more rapid than it has been in previous periods of intensive economic driven 
social and political change, such as during the industrial revolution, or the period of 
European colonialism.
3 Moreover, it is reasonable to argue that the world operates as 
a single economic system to a greater extent than ever before – neoliberal economic 
policies have integrated almost every national economy into the world market system, 
and there are global ‘regimes’, in the form of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), for regulating that system. Rare exceptions 
survive, North Korea, for example, remains isolated, but the majority of states that 
were identified as communist during the cold war have made, or are in the process of 
3 The industrial revolution in Europe and North America took 200 years or so, while the period of 
colonialism began in the 1500s and continued until the late 1900s. Globalisation, by contrast, if dated 
to the aftermath of the Second World War, has been a period of massive change in 50 or 60 years 
(Howard-Hassmann 2005:8-13).
21making,   a   transition   to   a   capitalist   economy.   Countries   that   still   identify   as 
communist, such as China and Laos, whilst retaining one party systems, have 
introduced capitalist enterprise (Pollis 2004:347-50). 
The extent to which this assimilation into a global capitalist economy is 
chosen or forced is a matter of some debate. Some scholars assert that state 
sovereignty is significantly weakened by the pressures of globalisation:
[T]here can be little doubt that economic globalization – particularly 
developments   in   the   financial   and   commodity   markets   and   the 
consolidation of global production capacity by transnational corporations, 
supported by an extremely pervasive ideology of global neoliberalism – is 
significantly weakening the capacity of even the most powerful states to 
regulate economic and social affairs within their territorial boundaries. 
(Stammers 1999:1001)
Such weakened capacity has important implications for both human rights and 
environmental sustainability. In particular, economic and social rights are said to be 
undermined by neoliberal economic policies that have led to the contraction of social 
welfare budgets as well as the removal of jobs from high-wage countries. State 
sovereignty is important here because the international human rights framework is 
inherently state-centric. States are responsible for protecting citizens’ human rights, 
states are the agents who create whatever international or regional human rights 
instruments may be available, and states have recourse to the principle of sovereignty 
enshrined in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter in defending any action they take 
(or fail to take) that might be criticised by outside parties as violating human rights 
(Donnelly 2003:ch2). If it were true that sovereignty is being eroded by processes of 
globalisation, then this would have serious implications for the protection of human 
rights. Similarly, protection of environmental standards would also be threatened if 
state capacity and authority were undermined by globalisation. 
Yet other scholars present a slightly more nuanced picture. Linda Weiss 
suggests that, while globalisation affects all countries, the impacts differ depending on 
the existing capacities of the state and the way in which integration into the global 
economy is managed (Weiss 1998:4).  Ngaire Woods concurs, arguing that:
[T]he impact of globalisation varies, and one particular determinant is 
state strength. All states are affected by globalization, insofar as it alters 
their possibilities and opportunities. However, a much greater erosion of 
22autonomy is occurring in respect of weak states than strong. (Woods 
2000:10)
The prevalence of the idea that globalisation has left all or nearly all states powerless 
is explained by Weiss and others as emerging in part from the tendency of national 
governments to blame unpopular policies on globalisation (Weiss 1998:14-16). But 
this perhaps overstates the extent to which governments are free to reject the 
globalisation of the economy. As discussed below in relation to the impact of 
economic globalisation on the environment, it is certainly the case that the IMF has 
forced neoliberal economic agendas on states as a condition of receiving loans. 
Insofar as states can decide that they do not need the loans after all, they may be said 
to be free not to accept these conditions. States may also accept the conditions and not 
implement them. But it is clear that there have been pressures on poorer states to 
accept neoliberal economic reform, particularly in the aftermath of the debt crisis of 
the 1980s (Woods 2000:11). The bargaining power of states in the WTO is similarly 
limited.
4 Thus there is merit in Weiss’ vision of a dichotomy between weaker and 
more powerful states, whereby weaker states experience some degree of loss of 
autonomy, whereas more powerful states play a role in facilitating global and regional 
economic integration (Weiss 1998:17-18). 
2.2.2 The global economy and human rights
Tony Evans’ and Jan Hancock’s assessment of the impact of globalisation on 
marginalized communities, particularly the rural poor and subsistence farmers, is 
consistent with Weiss’ model and suggests the further dimension that experience of 
globalisation is differentiated within as well as between states: ‘[G]lobalisation 
suggests simultaneous processes of integration and disintegration: integration of 
capital and economic relations and disintegration of traditional values that define 
society and community’ (Evans and Hancock 1998:9). Drawing heavily from Karl 
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, Rhoda Howard-Hassmann finds that the erosion 
of traditional values, and with them community-based social and welfare support 
systems, has been a feature of previous economic-driven large scale social and 
cultural transformations, such as the industrial revolution. On the basis of this 
evidence,   Howard-Hassmann   argues   that   ‘whether   globalization   improves   or 
undermines human rights is not a matter that can be observed in the short term’, and 
4 The IMF and the WTO are discussed in more detail below, in section 3. 
23that while short-term effects may be negative, particularly for the poor and for those 
in predominantly rural or subsistence economies, the medium to long-term effects 
‘may well be positive’ (Howard-Hassman 2005:1). 
Howard-Hassmann is not insensitive to current human rights abuses, but 
simply points out that the transformation observed today has parallels with previous 
ones that have led to what are now viewed as positive outcomes. One example is that, 
whereas feudal landlords were once responsible for providing a minimum of social 
welfare in rural Britain, as peasants were moved from the land and migrated to cities, 
looking for jobs in the newly emerging industries, the certainty of social welfare was 
lost, but rights and freedoms were gained. The idea of social inequality has lost its 
former legitimacy, and steps have since been taken to secure social welfare for all 
(Howard-Hassmann 2005:6-9). Globalisation, it is argued, may be effecting a similar 
shift – as people’s economic security is undermined by globalisation, ‘globalization 
has spread the idea of human rights world wide’ (Howard-Hassmann 2005:39). 
While her analysis is in places perceptive, there is an important element 
missing from Howard-Hassmann’s argument. At no point does she discuss the 
environmental implications of a globalised economy. Her work is typical of a rather 
simplistic   approach   to   globalisation   and   the   environment   which   observes   an 
improvement in some environmental quality indicators correlated with increased 
wealth (Conca 2000:490). From this observation it is concluded that increased citizen 
wealth leads to improved environmental standards. Such a conclusion is all the more 
attractive as it appears to fit with Ronald Inglehart’s notion of ‘post-materialist 
values’ and is confirmed by a parallel observation that the very poor in rural areas in 
developing countries often have a devastating impact on their environments at a local 
level, because they overuse environmental resources such as water and pasture in 
order to survive (Carter 1999:25). 
Ken Conca points out the mistake in supposing that increased citizen wealth 
will inevitably improve environmental quality – some immediately identifiable 
environmental problems do improve with increases in citizen wealth, most notably air 
quality (Conca 2000:490), but this is often at the expense of poorer communities 
elsewhere,   as   polluting   industries   relocate   to   countries   with   lower   regulatory 
standards. Less visible problems, such as the depletion of soils and forests, and 
stresses on global life support services afforded by the environment, are not generally 
improved by increases in per capita income. Moreover, McLaren (2003) rejects the 
24identification of over-use of environmental resources by those living in extreme 
poverty as a cause of environmental problems, and suggests instead that this should 
be seen as an effect of broader unsustainable patterns in the global economy. Failure 
to take note of the environmental problems associated with globalisation invalidates 
Howard-Hassmann’s assertion that globalisation on its current path may have a 
positive long-term effect on human rights, because the long-term prospects for 
environmental sustainability on current trends are bleak. Indeed, as suggested above, 
we can reasonably expect to see environment-related threats to human security, and 
thus human rights, increasing in the medium to long-term, if the globalisation of the 
economy continues on its present unsustainable path.
Woods points to the important role played by powerful states, particularly the 
USA,   not   only   in   creating   rules   regulating   economic   globalisation,   but   more 
fundamentally in legitimating the ideas that underpin these rules: ‘[T]he role of such 
powerful states lies not just in enforcing rules, but also in generating and forming 
ostensibly ‘universal’ ideas and consensus about what international rules should be’ 
(Woods 2000:9). Donnelly (1998) has suggested that the global consensus on human 
rights norms is so pervasive that human rights can now be considered a ‘standard of 
civilisation’, whereby compliance with human rights norms is the price of a seat at the 
table of international politics. Donnelly’s proposal is problematic for two reasons.
5 
Firstly, a backlash against coercing human rights compliance through such measures 
as bilateral aid and loan conditionality has emerged (Balasubramaniam 1998; Hussein 
2001). This questions not only the purported consensus on human rights but also the 
legitimacy of powerful countries setting a global moral standard. The issue is further 
complicated by the possibility of the global standard changing (say from compliance 
with human rights to cooperation in a war on terror). Secondly, it is difficult to 
reconcile the apparent global consensus on human rights with the numerous, well-
documented violations of human rights that persist in the context of globalisation, 
some instances of which activists attribute to globalisation (in particular, of social and 
economic rights). Indeed, Donnelly elsewhere describes human rights as a necessary 
defence against the power of markets and states (Donnelly 2003:40). 
5 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see chapter 4.
252.2.3 Human rights, globalisation, and social change
Human rights can be said to exist on two different levels: firstly, human rights 
in their institutionalised form, affirmed by states and identifiable in treaties and 
positive law (what may be called the contemporary international human rights 
‘regime’), and secondly, human rights as moral rights, justified by reference to norms 
that are said to be universal, rather than positive law. The content of these two levels 
of rights does not necessarily correspond, for example, claims emerging in the last ten 
years or so for recognition of an environmental human right have not yet been created 
in positive law in most countries, and have not yet been the subject of international 
agreement. Indeed, it is possible that the former category of positive rights can be 
used to impede claims presented in terms of the latter category of human rights 
(Evans and Hancock 1998; Stammers 1999). Thus there can be an ambivalent 
relationship between human rights and social change. The globalisation of neoliberal 
economics, strongly supported by the USA and other Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, presents a significant obstacle to 
those who argue for alternative models of rights (and duties), such as Thomas Pogge’s 
institutional model of human rights (see chapter 4), and the accounts of duties 
typically attributed to environmental citizens in green theory (see chapter 6), and 
indeed alternative models of economic organisation (see chapter 5), at the same time 
as the globalisation of human rights proceeds. A key question to be addressed in this 
thesis is whether human rights, as a global framework for addressing threats to human 
insecurity, can be an adequate and appropriate framework for responding to the 
environmental challenges attendant upon globalisation. It is to the impact of economic 
globalisation on the environment that I now turn.
2.3 The environmental impact of the globalisation of the economy 
Ngaire Woods offers a succinct summary of the processes of economic 
globalisation:
Technological change and government deregulation have permitted the 
establishment of transnational networks in production, trade and finance. 
[…] The new ‘production’ network describes firms and multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) who use advanced means of communication, and 
new, flexible techniques of production so as to spread their activities 
across the globe. In trade, globalization refers to the fact that the quantity 
26and speed of goods and services traded across the globe has increased, and 
so too has the geographical spread of participants, the strength and depth 
of institutions which facilitate trade, and the impact of trade on domestic 
economic   arrangements.   Finally,   in   finance,   globalization   has   been 
facilitated by new financial instruments which permit a wider range of 
services to be bought and sold across the world economy. (Woods 2000:3)
These processes of economic globalisation are held to have had a positive impact on 
people’s lives for two reasons. Firstly, globalisation makes available a greater variety 
of goods and services, at cheaper prices, to consumers in all corners of the globe, in 
every season (Stiglitz 2002:ch1). Secondly, consequent upon the growth in the world-
wide economy that follows from the expansion of markets, world-wide prosperity is 
increased because of the ‘trickle-down’ effect, which can be explained with reference 
to Adam Smith’s idea that a rising tide lifts all boats.
6 Indeed, former US President 
George Bush claimed that ‘[g]rowth is the agent of change and the friend of the 
environment’ (quoted in Doyle 1998:773). Both these arguments can be shown to be 
misleading. Firstly, while the economic cost of numerous goods has fallen, the 
ecological costs are often not counted, rather, they are ‘externalised’, but nevertheless 
accrue, with significant repercussions for the health and integrity of our global 
ecosystems (Jacobs 1991; Conca 2000; Speth 2003). Moreover, the ecological costs 
of globalisation generally affect the poor first, if not most. Secondly, while total 
global wealth has been increasing in recent decades, the gap between rich and poor 
has also been increasing, both between North and South, and within countries (Woods 
2000; Shiva 2003; Pollis 2004). 
Some researchers have suggested another potential benefit of globalisation, in 
the form of an environmental Kuznets curve, ‘whereby environmental damage starts 
to decrease as a country becomes rich enough’ (Andersson and Lindroth 2001:113). 
Yet this too is misguided, as evidence from the analysis of ‘ecological footprints’
7 
suggests that richer communities displace their environmental costs onto poorer ones, 
both within and between countries. Environmental damage does not disappear, it 
simply disappears from the sight of wealthy consumers, as was seen in relation to air 
pollution in section 2. Increasing disparities between rich and poor thus present an 
6
 Though Smith envisaged capital staying within the community, whereas today capital is rather more 
mobile (Mander 2003:113).
7 For an explanation of ‘ecological footprints’, see section 4.
27ecological problem as well as a social one. The globalisation of the economy is, then, 
a complex matter. I propose to examine it by answering two questions: What drives 
globalisation and how it is managed? What effects does it have on the environment?
8 
In the next section I go on to consider what means exist for controlling these effects. 
2.3.1 Bretton Woods Institutions
One possible starting place is the globalising agenda promoted by the Bretton 
Woods Institutions, in particular the IMF and the WTO. This is an appropriate 
beginning because, while globalisation is often (rightly) associated with advances in 
technology that facilitate communication and transport at faster and cheaper rates than 
at any time in history, commentators from the political economist Ngaire Woods 
(2000:3-4) to the anti-globalisation campaigner Jerry Mander (2003:109-110) note 
that globalisation is also made possible by policy choices. Globalisation is neither 
natural or inevitable. It is artificial, in the sense of being human-made, and it is driven 
not (only) by technological developments nor inexorable market forces, but by human 
choices about how to respond to these. The Bretton Woods Institutions were 
established in the aftermath of the Second World War with the aim of financing the 
reconstruction of countries devastated by the war and of stabilising the global 
economy following the destructive effects of the global depression of the 1930s. 
Former World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz records that the character and remit of 
the IMF changed somewhat in the 1980s with the adoption of a neoliberal outlook – 
promoting a global free market – which also came to dominate the WTO and to a 
lesser extent the World Bank (Stiglitz 2002:ch2). Certainly, the IMF and the WTO 
have been at the centre of debates and public demonstrations expressing concern and 
anger   about   the   negative   effects   of   globalisation   since   the   well-publicised 
demonstrations at the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999. 
Criticism of the IMF centres on the fact that states receiving development 
loans from the World Bank have, since the 1980s, been required by the IMF to 
implement Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), designed by IMF economists, 
intended to stimulate economic growth, stabilise the national economy, and reduce 
government debt. SAPs typically entail significant cuts in public spending and the 
8 Note that I do not assume that environmental problems are unique to a globalised economy. The pre-
industrial economy of Easter Island was clearly environmentally unsustainable. My interest in the 
environmental problems associated with economic globalisation is due to the contemporary dominance 
of neoliberal economics and the environmental problems that these policies currently cause.  
28deregulation of agriculture and industry to facilitate the integration of a particular 
country into the world economy and attract foreign investment (Bryant and Bailey 
1997:60). In particular, poor and developing countries have been strongly encouraged 
by the IMF to welcome foreign direct investment (FDI) and to invest in export-
oriented industries where they have a competitive advantage in the global market. 
Export-led growth has been key to the success of many ‘winners’ in the game of 
globalisation, such as South Korea and Singapore. 
The environmentalist objection to SAPs is three-fold. Firstly, and most 
obviously, deregulating has an adverse effect on the environment where it involves 
reducing environmental standards. Moreover, some analysts suggest that deregulating 
does not, in fact, play a central role in attracting foreign investment, and that the so-
called ‘race-to-the-bottom’ is, if not a myth (Conca 2000), no more necessary than it 
is desirable (Weiss 1998:10-12; Woods 2000:7; Porter 1999). Secondly, cutting 
public spending has typically meant cutting environmental protection budgets (which 
is fine if there are no longer any standards to police) as well as those of other public 
services such as health, education, and welfare. This impacts on human rights as well 
as the environment. Thirdly, in agriculture – a key component of the national 
economy for most poor and developing countries – pursuing a competitive advantage 
in the global market has often meant abandoning subsistence crops in favour of cash 
crops, reducing or eliminating crop rotation, increasing pesticide use, and increasing 
pressure on irrigation sources. This has the effect of reducing the quality of soils and 
contributing to desalinisation, as well as making the country dependent on imports of 
foods, which in turn is dependent on the success of the SAP. In countries where SAPs 
have failed to deliver the hoped-for economic growth, rural farmers who previously 
ate what they grew have gone hungry (Shiva 2003). Raymond Bryant and Sinéad 
Bailey   sum   up   the   problem   thus:   ‘[S]tructural   adjustment   programmes   often 
simultaneously reduce the ability of states to respond to environmental problems and 
increase  the  seriousness   and  intensity  of   those  problems’  (Bryant   and  Bailey 
1997:61).
The IMF is also criticised for being undemocratic, at the national level, in that 
SAPs may include measures, such as deregulating, that do not respect the will of the 
government receiving the loan, even where that government has been democratically 
elected. This can be seen as a further example of the ways in which globalisation 
undermines state sovereignty. Additionally, at the global level, loans must be 
29endorsed by 85% of contributing countries, and, as votes are weighted according to 
contributions   and   the   USA   contributes   17.5%   of   IMF   coffers,   the   American 
government has an effective veto on all IMF-approved loans. Strom Thacker (1999) 
demonstrates that a government’s failure to comply fully with IMF conditions on one 
loan has not generally been a barrier to receiving subsequent loans. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that the pressure on poorer states to adopt a programme of neoliberal economic 
reform is considerable. 
The dominance of neoliberal economic ideas is also said to be evident in the 
activities of the WTO. The WTO, successor to the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT) established in the Uruguay Round of GATT talks, is the forum in 
which global trade rules are agreed. The raison d’être of the WTO is to facilitate trade 
across the globe. Thus when Shiva (2003) criticises the WTO for its emphasis on 
‘barriers to trade’ rather than ‘barriers to justice’, she is criticising the WTO for doing 
exactly what it is supposed to do. Conca argues that the neoliberal agenda pursued in 
the WTO ‘promises the trade-based dismantling of three decades of environmental 
rule making and the selling of important dimensions of the global commons’ (Conca 
2000:492). These are strong claims. In assessing the impact of the WTO on the 
environment there are two questions to be asked. One concerns the way that the WTO 
contributes to the management of the global economy – are the WTO’s rules sensitive 
to environmental concerns? The other question to be asked is more fundamental – is 
global trade good for the environment? 
The WTO’s environmental record is much disputed. While Conca (2000) is 
scathingly critical of the WTO, and Robyn Eckersley (2004a) finds the WTO guilty of 
encouraging a ‘regulatory chill’ – that is, a reluctance on the part of governments to 
impose or enforce environmental regulations on private enterprise – others are more 
circumspect. Examining the track record of WTO decisions in disputes between 
member states over environment related restrictions on trade, Eric Neumeyer finds 
that   ‘WTO   jurisprudence   has   become   increasingly   environmentally   friendly’ 
(2004:1). Alasdair Young goes so far as to claim that environmental activists who 
claim that WTO rules are anti-ecological ‘may be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy 
and contributing to a so-called “regulatory chill”’ (Young 2005:47). Both Neumeyer 
and Young have (independently) studied WTO rulings on disputes between member 
states relating to measures designed to protect the environment. Where the WTO has 
found that such measures have constituted unfair barriers to trade, the ruling body has 
30done so not because it challenges the right of states to protect the environment, but 
rather because the particular measure has been applied arbitrarily or inconsistently 
(Neumeyer 2004:1-4; Young 2005:50-62). Indeed, it is claimed that,
[t]he reason that the WTO, and the GATT before it, usually ruled against 
regulations that claimed environmental exceptions to international trade 
rules is that the regulations were not particularly good; they were either 
clear attempts at industrial protection dressed up in environmentalist 
clothes, or they were poorly thought through and inappropriate tools for 
the environmental management needed. (DeSombre and Barkin 2002:18)
Young (2005:53) also notes that GATT Article XX explicitly recognises the 
right of governments to set standards of environmental protection above those 
internationally agreed, both in terms of consumption (where products to be imported 
are feared to have polluting effects or to be damaging to human health, such as 
genetically modified organisms, or beef containing growth hormones), or production 
(where products have been produced in ways that are particularly damaging to the 
environment, such as dolphin un-friendly tuna, or unsustainably harvested wood). The 
WTO   has   affirmed   this   principle   also.   Neumeyer   has   further   suggested   that 
governments need not comply with WTO rulings if they do not wish to, they simply 
have to put up with sanctions. ‘But this is not really an option for poor and small 
developing countries’ (Neumeyer 2004:4), an important point, one would think. 
Finally, while Eckersley (2004a) fears that the possibility of a clash with WTO rules 
inhibits the creation of strong Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), 
Neumeyer, taking a different view, argues that, ‘it is important to note that no 
provision contained in any MEA or any trade restriction undertaken in (alleged) 
compliance with any MEA has ever been disputed at the WTO’ (Neumeyer 2004:4). 
Nevertheless, Neumeyer is pessimistic about the future of environmental standards at 
the WTO. He laments the fact that WTO rules do not fully incorporate the 
precautionary principle,
9  and that the Committee for Trade and the Environment 
established by the GATT and continued in the WTO has proven to be ‘a forum for 
rather fruitless discussion’ (Neumeyer 2004:6). The balance of evidence here suggests 
that the primary obstruction to increasing environmental protection in the WTO is 
lack of political will on the part of governments and the absence of leadership. Shiva 
9 The precautionary principle, briefly stated, is the idea that given a product or development should be 
proven to be safe before it can be licensed, and that where there is scientific uncertainty, approval 
should not be granted.
31(2003:142)   is   scathing   of   the   Indian   government’s   retreat   from   its   erstwhile 
enthusiasm for resisting global trade deals that undermined environmental protection. 
Neumeyer also touches on the troublesome issue of developing nations’ opposition to 
international   environmental   regulations:   ‘[D]eveloping   country   opposition   to   a 
greening of the WTO rules is rooted in a much deeper frustration with the distribution 
of  benefits from  the WTO  agreements,  which are regarded  as biased toward 
developed country interests’ (Neumeyer 2004:7).
One particularly notorious example of WTO rules that are unlikely to benefit 
all equally, and that has been criticised by both environmental and human rights 
activists, is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). The rationale behind TRIPS is that it in order to encourage investment in 
Research   and   Development,   and   thus   innovation   that   will   ultimately   benefit 
consumers, private enterprises must be assured that their ideas will be protected from 
theft and exploitation by others. Several commentators have noted the prominent role 
played by American business interests in the development of the TRIPS agreement 
(Conca   2000;   Matthews   2002;   Shiva   2003).   According   to   Duncan   Matthews, 
pharmaceutical companies and copyright industries were particularly active in this 
‘because these sectors had relatively low entry barriers and consequently high 
exposure  to  piracy’  (Matthews  2002:5).  The  final  agreement  was  a  result  of 
negotiation and compromise, but succeeded in creating internationally binding rules 
regarding the recognition of copyright. 
Some activists are sceptical of the likelihood of the public interest winning out 
given the apparent close relationship between big business and government in the 
creation of this agreement (Shiva 2003). What can be stated as fact, however, is that 
the TRIPS agreement allows for (among other things) the patenting of plant varieties 
and microbiological processes (FOEI 2005). This outcome has been widely attacked. 
In August 2000, the UN Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights unanimously passed a resolution expressing concern about the human rights 
implications of the TRIPS agreement  (Singh 2000). Conca argues that, ‘[t]he 
enforcement of multinational property rights to biodiversity threatens to strip access 
from the communities around the world that previously had a stake in promoting 
biological conservation’ (Conca 2000:490). Conca here picks up on a broader theme 
in debates about economic globalisation. As governments seek to attract FDI, they are 
often   guilty   of   excluding   their   own   local   communities   from   decision-making 
32processes about the development of natural resources. In studies of conflicts between 
the norms of neoliberal driven economic globalisation on the one hand, and human 
rights and the environment on the other, Lynda Zarsky (2002) and others present 
numerous cases of World Bank and IMF-backed development programmes that have 
threatened access of communities to lands that they occupied but that have been 
earmarked for development.
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Returning to the question of intellectual/biological property, Matthews (2002) 
argues that the consensus between the EU and the US that was crucial in achieving 
the TRIPS agreement is now eroding as the implications of this far-reaching 
agreement become clearer, particularly in developing countries, but that substantive 
revision of the agreement is nonetheless unlikely. To date, there has been an 
amendment to the agreement to allow developing countries to import generic versions 
of some patented drugs, and Brazil and India are leading the efforts of a group of 
developing countries calling for a further amendment to TRIPS to require private 
enterprises to disclose the origin of plant ‘inventions’, or plants to be patented, 
thereby ensuring that the country of origin ‘received prior informed consent’ and  ‘fair 
and equitable benefit sharing’ would follow (WTO 2005). 
2.3.2 Environmental impacts
The second question to be asked in relation to the WTO, as one of the primary 
institutions for managing global trade, is whether such trade is good for the 
environment.  Trade  is  an  appropriate focus  for  investigating  the  impact  of  a 
globalising economy on the environment because other factors in the global economy 
are linked to trade. The impetus for FDI follows from enterprises trying to find a 
competitive edge in the global market. Globalised production networks are similarly a 
consequence of the drive to reduce production costs so as to increase competitiveness. 
Sari lists three ways in which trade and FDI can affect the level of pollution in a given 
territory:
10 For instance, Philip Hirsch (2003) discusses the World Bank funded Nam Theun II dam project in 
Laos PDR. Hirsch contends that, because Laos is a one party state, civil society is particularly 
underdeveloped and so consultation on the dam project has been ineffective. On the other hand, Fergus 
MacKay (2002) finds that Canadian mining companies operating with contracts granted by the 
government  of Suriname  have been  unwilling  to  engage  in  substantive  discussion  with  local 
communities, and that the mining companies have had the active assistance of the Suriname 
government in excluding local people from their (claimed) former lands.
33[1] if trade and investment liberalization cause an expansion of economic 
activity, and the nature of that activity remains unchanged, then the total 
amount of pollution must increase.
[2] [the] composition effect, the effect derived from different comparative 
advantages [where] some sectors in different economies will expand, 
while others will contract. […] If the comparative advantage is derived 
largely from lower environmental standards, then the composition effect 
will be damaging to the environment.
[3] the efficiency effect, resulting from different technologies utilized in 
the   production   system.   Some   technologies   may   reduce   both   input 
requirements of environmental resources and the pollution produced, but 
others may not have this effect. (Sari 2002:128)
Perhaps most interesting of these is the composition effect. This is where the interplay 
between   countries’   different   comparative   advantages   often   serves   to   displace 
environmental costs. For instance, where particularly polluting or resource intensive 
industries become more expensive in developed countries because of the cost of 
meeting increasing environmental standards, they may be relocated to developing 
countries where the costs are less because of lower standards. Sari cites the example 
of the steel industry. The drive to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in OECD countries 
is pushing up energy prices, therefore the cost of producing steel – an energy-
intensive process – is also increasing. According to Sari (2002) steel production 
increased by 15% in the Asia Pacific region in the early 1990s. Carbon dioxide 
emissions from Indonesia, the subject of Sari’s case study, are expected to rise as a 
consequence. 
The globalisation of the economy not only displaces environmental costs, it 
also creates new ones. A Danish government study that showed that ‘1 kilogram of 
food traded globally generates 10 kilograms of carbon dioxide’ (Shiva 2003:146). 
Given that countries like Britain typically export almost as much butter, for example, 
as is imported, the inefficiency of (at least some) global trade seems obvious (Shiva 
2003:147). A point that is made repeatedly in the literature on environmental politics 
and economics is the ecological absurdity of exporting a resource from one country, 
processing that resource in another, and exporting the product back to the original 
country   (see,   for   example,   Dobson   2000:89-90;   Mander   2003:117).   Yet   it   is 
economically efficient because of the income generated through exports (in the case 
34of European and North American agricultural exports, of products that are highly 
subsidised). The ecological cost of such economic benefits is too often overlooked. A 
study published in 2003 under the title ‘The Counter-Intuitive Relationship between 
Globalization and Climate Change’, found that the impact of globalised trade on the 
environment in terms of carbon emissions and other greenhouse gases depended on 
the mode of transportation used. Barkin, quoted above defending the record of the 
WTO, argues that, because the same amount of fuel will take a given cargo far further 
by sea than by rail, and further by rail than by road, it is more ‘cost-effective’ to ship 
beef from Brazil to the east coast of the United States, rather than from the Midwest 
by land (Barkin 2003:12). Barkin’s specified aim is to point out the complexities of 
policy-making with respect to the environment, yet he does not draw attention to the 
fact that beef raised for export in Brazil is often farmed on land that has been cleared 
of rainforest. This example is symptomatic of arguments that isolating one aspect of 
the processes involved in global trade rarely reveals the total ecological cost.
The globalisation of the economy is also credited with exacerbating the 
problem of global insecurity because of competition for crucial environmental 
resources. This applies not only to commodities such as oil, which has long been a 
factor in security studies, but also resources that have previously been part of the 
global   commons,   such  as   water.  Competition   over  access  to  water  is  widely 
recognised as a factor in conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia (Lowi 2000; 
Dolatyar and Gray 2000). The pressure on global freshwater supplies from increased 
use by industry, agriculture, and in human consumption has prompted widespread 
concern about its potential commodification, concerns that seem well founded given 
that   ‘NAFTA   and   the   WTO   already   have   provisions   that   define   water   as   a 
“commodity” and a “tradeable good”’ (Mander 2003:122-3). The potential global 
commodification   of   water   has   significant   human   rights  implications.  The   UN 
estimates that 1 billion people world wide currently do not have access to clean 
drinking water (Alvarez 2003:71). Ignacio J. Alvarez argues that governments whose 
citizens lack such access are failing to fulfil their obligations to comply with 
international human rights agreements. Without such protection, there is reason to 
fear that the poor, in particular, would face greater hardship. Looking more generally 
at the use of ecological resources, it is also argued that market-driven economic 
growth necessarily leads to political as well as economic competition: ‘The more 
35resources one agent can master, the more resources competitors must acquire just to 
preserve their relative position’ (Andersson and Lindroth 2001:117).
However, it should be noted that, from an environmental point of view, the 
problem identified here is not just the globalisation of the economy, it is firstly the 
nature of the economy that has been globalised – a market economy that is neither 
completely free nor sufficiently regulated in ways that protect the environment (and 
so is criticised by free market environmentalists as well as by those who would 
advocate substantive interference in the market to protect the environment). Secondly, 
the problem is, most acutely, one of scale. As Speth (2003) notes, human population 
is estimated to have increased four-fold in the past century, and is expected to level 
out at 10 billion towards the end of the twenty-first century. ‘Since 1960, the size of 
the world economy has doubled and then doubled again’ (Speth 2003:2). In ecological 
terms, these developments represent a massive and rapid increase in the consumption 
of resources and production of wastes. On current trends, the global economy is not 
sustainable.
In summary, the globalisation of the economy has serious implications for 
environmental sustainability. Globalisation, though neither natural nor inevitable, 
brings significant pressures, particularly to weaker states, which, often at the IMF’s 
insistence, have had to adopt neoliberal economic policies that have served to 
undermine environmental protection. The scale of the global economy is also a 
significant concern since the rate at which environmental resources are currently 
being used, and the volume of wastes being produced, is now widely recognised to be 
unsustainable. Global trade patterns contribute to this problem in a number of ways, 
firstly, by increasing transport use; secondly, in some cases by reducing the control 
local communities have over their ecological resources; thirdly, by undermining 
biodiversity and threatening the commodification of the natural environment, as seen 
in   initiatives   like   the   TRIPS   agreement   and   in   the   increasing   prevalence   of 
monocultures in agribusiness; fourthly,  by increasing global insecurity through 
competition for control of resources and by undermining food security in many poor 
and developing states; fifthly, by displacing ecological costs, a problem compounded 
by the increasing inequalities that have accompanied globalisation; and finally by 
inhibiting environmental protection, as seen in the ‘race to the bottom’, and in the 
WTO’s lukewarm approach to such environmental principles as the precautionary 
36principle. As noted above, the evidence on this last point was mixed, however, in that 
it is clear from the analysis of a number of commentators that political will on the part 
of states is an important factor in the lack of enthusiasm for environmental protection 
at the WTO. While the autonomy of some poorer states is clearly compromised by 
their relatively weak position in the global economy, Neumeyer attributes developing 
countries’ resistance to environmental agreements at the WTO to a suspicion of richer 
countries’ motives, and in particular a desire to see Northern agricultural subsidies 
cut, rather than a lack of capacity or autonomy in the face of globalisation. Yet the 
dominance of neoliberal norms in the global economy may also inhibit environmental 
protection in that trade is prioritised, arguably at the expense of pursuing human rights 
and environmental sustainability. However, recent efforts in global environmental 
governance have affirmed the need to pursue policies of ‘sustainable development’. In 
the next section, I consider the effectiveness of such initiatives in the context of a 
global economy driven by neoliberal economic norms. 
2.4 Global environmental governance
Sustainable development is a much contested concept. It has been circulating 
in green political and development theory since at least 1987, when the former 
Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, in the report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), called for a strategy 
integrating environment and development. The strategy proposed was sustainable 
development, defined as, ‘development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 
1987:24).  The report of the WCED was the principal inspiration for the United 
Nations Conference on the Environment and Developed (UNCED), popularly known 
as the Earth Summit, held in Rio in 1992, which produced Agenda 21, a global plan 
of local action to realise sustainable development, and ten years later world leaders 
reconvened, this time in Johannesburg, to discuss the implementation of Agenda 21. 
The report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in 
Johannesburg   in   2002,   affirmed   the   need   to   ‘delink   economic   growth   from 
environmental degradation’ and ‘promote economic development within the carrying 
capacity of ecosystems’ (WSSD 2002:21). Some greens (see Dobson 1998) reject the 
principle of a growth-driven market economy altogether, and are deeply suspicious of 
sustainable development as a normative concept, located, as it clearly is, within an 
37anthropocentric view of environmental ethics. I reflect on competing visions of a 
green economy, and varying interpretations of the principle of sustainability, in 
chapter   5.   Here   I   assess   the   prospects   for   delinking   economic   growth   from 
environmental degradation by means of global environmental regimes, the tools that 
are commonly recognised in international political forums such as the WSSD – that is, 
tools accepted, created and authorised by states. However, I first look at the problems 
of the state-centric approach, in view of the concerns of a number of green theorists 
who question the ecological appropriateness of nation-states as a model of political 
organisation.
2.4.1 The state and environmental protection
State-centric environmental regimes share some formal characteristics with 
human rights regimes:
the state is both the subject and the object of most environmental regimes. 
National governments as agents of states are taken as authoritative 
subjects   of   regimes,   their   bargaining,   concurrence,   and   ratification 
determine   whether   a   legitimate   regime   exists,   and   they   assume 
responsibility for compliance. States are also the primary objects of 
regimes:   governmental   compliance   is   the   presumed   key   to   regime 
effectiveness, and governmental implementation is the regime’s primary 
task as a means to that end. (Conca 2005:188)
As with human rights regimes, it is the acceptance of norms of sovereignty that 
legitimates   states’   ability   to   participate   as   the   only  authoritative  actors   in 
environmental regimes, and it is the principle of sovereignty that also confers on 
states   the   right   not   to   participate   in   cooperative   regimes   to   resolve   global 
environmental problems.
11 The much discussed weakening of sovereign autonomy in 
the context of globalisation is a factor in environmental problems insofar as the 
pressure to adopt neoliberal economic policies is widely seen as undermining 
environmental protection, but it is not necessarily a lack of agency that impedes 
global efforts towards sustainability. The recent reluctance of the USA, the most 
powerful nation on earth, and in the 1970s a global champion of environmental 
causes, to engage in global environmental regimes or even to accept need for 
11 Though other actors may have a role in advising, agenda setting, lobbying, etc.
38substantial change of our environmentally-damaging economic practices, is well 
known and much lamented.
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Studies focussing on the civil society actors often over-emphasise the power 
that they have (Conca 2005; Vogler 2005). While states rely on now well-established 
international   networks   of   physical   scientists   for   assessments   of   environmental 
problems, state governments choose which scientists to listen to. NGOs, who perhaps 
listen to different scientists, typically call on  governments  to take action. Indeed, 
‘NGOs in practice and in theory remain in a highly symbiotic relationship with state 
governments and international institutions, working to improve and redirect rather 
than supplant the latter’ (Vogler 2005:281). That said, non-state actors are far from 
incidental to environmental regimes. Edmondson thinks it ‘unlikely that the IPCC 
[International Panel on Climate Change] would have been formed without the 
initiatives of experts and scientists’ (Edmondson 2001:47), a finding consistent with 
Conca’s assertion that ‘there has been a palpable loss of agenda-setting power’ on the 
part of states involved in environmental regimes (Conca 2005:202). Moreover, in a 
study of participation in 22 environmental treaties, Roberts et al (2004) found a strong 
statistical relationship between the existence of vocal and active domestic NGOs and 
a willingness on the part of governments to sign and ratify environmental treaties. 
However, Roberts et al record another finding, less cheering for environmental 
NGOs: ‘[T]he strongest predictor by far of likelihood to sign [environmental treaties] 
is the narrowness of a nation’s export base which directly and indirectly explained 
nearly sixty percent of the treaty ratification rates’ (Roberts et al 2004:45). They 
therefore conclude that ‘OECD nations must help poor countries diversify their export 
profiles’ (2004:45). Roberts and his colleagues may be correct in surmising that such 
a   step   might   improve   poor   countries’   willingness   to   sign   up   to   and   ratify 
environmental treaties, but a narrow identification of the specific problem to be 
solved limits the scope of the answer that Roberts et al are able to arrive at, as well as 
neglecting the laggard status of the most wealthy country on earth, the USA, in 
environmental regimes. 
If the problem is simply described in terms of how to increase willingness to 
sign up to environmental treaties, and most countries who are most willing to do so at 
present are in general wealthier and have a diverse export base, then it follows that 
12  It is possible that this is beginning to change. In February 2007 the American government 
participated in a multilateral forum on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol (Bhat et al 2007), however, 
generally speaking, the USA has not been a champion of environmentalism in recent years.
39environmentalists should try to diversify the export bases of poorer countries as a 
means to increasing their wealth and decreasing their vulnerability to suffering 
economic downturn as a result of treaty ratification. But the broader question is why 
environmental treaties are valued – they are endorsed by environmentalists insofar as 
they are aimed at achieving some degree of environmental sustainability. The 
question looked at from this perspective is not, then, how to broaden the export bases 
of poorer countries, but how to move all countries, rich and poor, from currently 
unsustainable   patterns   of   production   and   consumption,   to   environmental 
sustainability. The analysis of Roberts et al points in the direction of altering the 
behaviour of poorer states, whereas, in view of massive over-consumption on the part 
of wealthier states, a more critical analysis suggests that a change in the behaviour of 
wealthier countries is also urgently needed.
2.4.2 The ecological footprint and global environmental regimes
  John Vogler has highlighted what he regards as a somewhat fruitless debate 
within   green   theory   as   to   the   proper   attitude   to   take   towards   the   state   and 
environmental sustainability:
For   theorists   of   radical   political   ecology,   the   state   and   interstate 
institutions   are   indissolubly   bound   up   with   processes   of   capitalist 
accumulation and domination. […] The state is not irrelevant to global 
environmental degradation; it is necessarily an agent of that degradation. 
This   constitutes   an   axiomatic   point   that   non-Marxist   international 
relations scholars will simply deny. (Vogler 2005:236)
Vogler is aware that debate conducted in these terms can lead to ‘a situation where 
adherents simply “talk past each other”’ (Vogler 2005:234). One possible route into 
the debate that need not rely on Marxist assumptions about the state as agent-of-
capital is to explore the idea of ecological footprints. Simply put, the ecological 
footprint is the total ecological impact of a given thing, be it a consumable product, an 
individual,   a   family,   or   a   nation.   It   is   a   particularly   appealing   concept   in 
environmental politics because it demonstrates, in a way that market values do not, 
the full ecological cost of whatever is being measured, and, in sophisticated models, 
can illustrate the distribution of that cost. The idea was originally put forward by 
Mathis   Wackernagel   and   William   Rees   to   measure   the   ‘area   of   ecologically 
productive land (and water) […] required on a continuous basis to (a) provide all the 
40energy/material resources consumed, and (b) absorb all the wastes discharged […] 
wherever that land is located’, by a given population (Andersson and Lindroth 
2001:114). Such measurements enable researchers to identify countries that run an 
ecological deficit – that is, use up more ecological space than is available within their 
territory. Two thirds of OECD countries run an ecological deficit, including the UK, 
the USA, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (Earth Council 1997). Among non-
OECD countries, the worst offenders are Singapore, Hong Kong and Israel. 
  Assessing global environmental regimes by means of the ecological footprint 
approach can reveal serious flaws in their rationale. One example, the Kyoto Protocol, 
according to some environmental campaigners, looks less like a solution to global 
warming and more like an opportunity to increase the commodification of the 
erstwhile environmental commons (Mander 2003). Agreed in 1997, the Kyoto 
Protocol aims to cut the emission of greenhouse gases by creating a scheme that 
allocates a given country a right to pollute up to a certain level, and allows those 
countries who pollute less than that level to sell their surplus allocation. It also 
includes a credit scheme for carbon sinks, chiefly forests. It has been criticised for not 
doing enough to avoid the threat of climate change – even if the aimed for reduction 
of 5.2% of 1990 levels of global greenhouse gas emissions is met, a drop in global 
temperatures is not predicted. Indeed, it is far from clear that global greenhouse gas 
emissions at the rate of 98.4% of 1990 levels are ecologically sustainable without a 
significant increase in carbon sinks. There are further problems, for example, relating 
to the USA’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto agreement.
13 But most troubling to some is 
the very idea of a right to pollute, or to trade in clean air. The commodification of the 
natural environment represented by this system is anathema to some greens:
The basic concept – to solve the problem wherever it is cheapest to reduce 
emissions – closely tracks the logic of comparative advantage. […] That 
the debate has moved so quickly to this techno-managerial level illustrates 
13 The USA, the single largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, responsible for about 23% of 
emissions on 2003 figures, is widely criticised for having failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol – indeed 
the regime would have collapsed had the Russian government not decided to ratify the treaty in late 
2004. The USA, however, points to the exclusion of China, the second largest polluter, and other 
rapidly developing countries, such as India, from the provisions of the Kyoto agreement as a crucial 
flaw, and indeed this represents a significant obstacle to using the Kyoto Protocol to ensure that global 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions are sustainable. But American president George Bush has made 
clear that his opposition to the Kyoto agreement is in large part due to the cost to American business 
(White House 2001). Nevertheless, as noted above, the American government has signalled its 
tentative support for a successor to the Kyoto regime which will include China and India.
41the power of the neoliberal logic within which environmental regime 
formation processes are increasingly ensnared. (Conca 2000:490-91)
Moreover,   the   Kyoto   agreement  does   not  challenge,   but  rather   reaffirms,   the 
legitimacy of a country running an ecological deficit, so long as it has the economic 
resources to pay other countries whose share of ecological resources the offending 
country is using (see chapter 5). This is objectionable to some because it does not 
reflect a genuine effort to foster global environmental sustainability, but rather 
maintains an unequal distribution of environmental costs and benefits.
The Kyoto Protocol is essentially a single-issue agreement. Agenda 21, a 
blueprint of action to be taken globally to manage human impacts on the environment, 
agreed at the UNCED in 1992 and reaffirmed at the WSSD in 2002, represents a more 
comprehensive attempt to manage the global economy so as to reduce environmental 
degradation. Indeed, the report of the WSSD explicitly recognised a need to ‘delink 
economic growth and environmental degradation’ (WSSD 2002:14). Yet Agenda 21 
is also criticised by environmentalists for a variety of reasons. As Picolotti observes, 
‘[t]he main concern of Agenda 21 is to meet the basic needs of human beings, such as 
nutrition, health preservation, decent housing, and education, each of which has a 
corresponding human right’ (Picolotti 2003:49). Ecocentrists will identify this as an 
obviously anthropocentric set of concerns. Even for those who reject ecocentrism as a 
basis for environmental ethics, this is not a trivial point. A model of environmental 
sustainability built upon preserving the environmental only insofar as it is necessary 
to meet human’s basic needs is potentially a very weak model of sustainability (see 
chapter 5). Indeed, the weakness of the vision of sustainability implicit in Agenda 21 
is roundly criticised by some environmentalists. Timothy Doyle (1998) claims that 
Agenda   21   presents   a   vision   of   sustainable   development   that   ‘constructs   all 
environmental problems as ‘efficiency’ issues’, and thus does not question the logic 
of equating human development with economic development, nor of prioritising 
economic growth over other goals. 
Many environmentalists are sceptical more generally of the genuine benefits 
that accrue to the environment from massive intergovernmental conferences on the 
scale of UNCED and WSSD. Seyfang (2003) notes the dismay of many activists at 
the lack of any substantive new agreements at the WSSD, while Vogler wryly 
remarks   that   the   results   of   an   ecological   impact   assessment   on   international 
environmental diplomacy since 1992 ‘would no doubt be shameful in terms of the 
42contribution  to  global   warming  of  the  millions   of   air  miles  travelled  and  to 
deforestation of the mountains of paper consumed’ (Vogler 2005:237). Vogler 
nonetheless applauds the success of some international cooperative efforts, such as the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and the Basel Convention 
on Hazardous Waste, as vindicating state-centric environmental regimes. Eckersley 
(2004a) however, argues that prospect of similarly groundbreaking initiatives being 
successfully negotiated in the near future is bleak. This she attributes to the 
‘regulatory chill’ described above. While it may be accurate to say that fears of WTO 
rulings that would undo the good work done by environmental regimes may be ill-
founded, it is also the case that actors’ perceptions do not always match realities, and 
that in any case there is good reason to perceive obstacles to environmental regimes. 
It is appropriate to return again to a theme raised in the discussion of human rights, 
the idea of a global standard based on a particular norm, whether it be Donnelly’s 
human rights based standard of civilisation or the global dominance of neoliberal 
economics, Woods pointed to the role played by the most powerful countries in 
legitimating and forming consensus around dominant norms. It is clear, not only from 
the failure to ratify the Kyoto treaty, but also from the fact the USA was one of the 
few countries not to send its President or Prime Minister to the 2002 WSSD, but 
rather send a deputy, that the USA does not offer leadership on environmental issues. 
There is some sense that the EU has sought to fill the gap, but this effort is hampered 
by lack of consensus within the EU, and by conflicting messages in terms of EU 
policy on issues such as fisheries and agriculture (Jokela 2001). The dominance of 
neoliberalism in economic policy presents a serious challenge to environmental 
sustainability, a challenge that there is apparently little appetite for at the level of 
global governance.
2.5 Conclusion
Economic globalisation, driven by a neoliberal economic agenda, is causing 
and exacerbating environmental degradation, whilst the globalisation of human rights 
proceeds. At the same time, environmental issues impact on human security and thus 
present a challenge for human rights. The dominance of neoliberal norms, which 
underwrite   policies   promoting   globalisation,   weakens   the   autonomy   of   poorer 
countries. Donnelly’s research suggests that the autonomy of states to resist at least 
formal acceptance of internationally recognised human rights standards has also been 
43weakened, insofar as compliance with such standards has been made a condition of 
bilateral trade and aid deals. The autonomy of states to resist global environmental 
governance is not, however, the most significant obstacle to achieving global 
environmental   sustainability.   Lack   of  strong   leadership  and  the  challenge  that 
environmental sustainability presents to prevailing norms are more substantial and 
immediate problems. Just as human rights are seen by some to be threatened by 
economic globalisation, it is similarly difficult to envisage compatibility between 
economic globalisation pursued in terms of the neoliberal model and environmental 
sustainability pursued in terms advocated by most greens.
14 Advocates of ‘sustainable 
development’ claim that economic growth can be ‘delinked’ from environmental 
degradation. In chapter 5 I explore some of the strategies that have been proposed for 
doing so, and suggest that the most robust definition of environmental sustainability is 
incompatible with currently dominant economic norms. The fundamental question at 
issue in this thesis is whether human rights, as a framework for addressing threats to 
human   security,   can   ground   an   adequate   and   appropriate   response   to   the 
environmental problems associated with globalisation. In chapter 4 I consider some 
doubts   about   the   contemporary   international   human   rights   regime.   However, 
problems with the contemporary human rights regime do not necessarily indicate 
problems with human rights  per se; it may be that human rights in national and 
international   law   and   politics   could   be   reformed   so   as   to   better   facilitate 
environmental sustainability. Therefore, in chapter 3 I look at the plausibility of the 
justifications offered for supporting human rights as universal morals. 
14  Free market environmentalists are an exception here, but in chapter 5 I reject free market 
environmentalism as a viable strategy for achieving environmental sustainability.
44Chapter 3: Justifying universal human rights
What human rights are and what it means for us to have them are important 
questions. The answers to these questions not only tell us what our human rights 
obligations are, but also help us to understand whether or not the institution of human 
rights is up to the job of protecting individuals from the negative impacts of 
environmental problems.
15 The question animating this chapter is why we have human 
rights, but as Charles Beitz (1979:53) notes, addressing this question also entails some 
engagement with the issue of what human rights are.
One answer to the question ‘what are human rights’ can be obtained by 
looking at documents of international law, such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). Understood in these terms, human rights are whatever 
governments collectively and individually proclaim them to be in acts of parliaments 
or international covenants. But this is not ordinarily thought to be an adequate 
explanation of what human rights are, for human rights are also moral claims about 
the rights that persons should have. Indeed, Chris Brown argues that legal rights are 
not,   strictly  speaking,  human  rights:   ‘Rights  associated  with   positive  law  are 
associated with particular jurisdictions and thus are not, as such, human rights – but, 
on the other hand, their ontological status is secure’ (Brown 1997:45). It is the moral 
character of human rights that is at the root of their controversy. The existence of 
human rights in positive law gives them a solid foundation that human rights as moral 
claims lack. These moral claims are said to be fundamental in that they are justified 
regardless of whether they are recognised by those in authority within the state or 
internationally. Indeed, historically, human rights have evolved as a set of rights the 
individual can claim by way of protection against the power of the state (Donnelly 
1999a, Freeman 2002:167-8). But the idea that we have these rights simply in virtue 
of being human, and that their denial or modification is beyond the legitimate 
authority of governments (elected or otherwise), continues to be controversial.
This chapter therefore explores some of the ways in which political theorists 
have sought to justify support for human rights. Reasons for supporting human rights 
are important if we are to decide whether or not the idea of environmental human 
rights is a promising one. If human rights represent a universal truth, then justifying 
environmental sustainability in human rights terms might be more of a vital task than 
if human rights are held to be historically constructed. On the other hand, if measures 
15 For a discussion of the kind of environmental problems referred to, see chapter 2.
45deemed necessary to ensure environmental sustainability are seen to conflict with our 
human rights, we need to know how strong our commitment to human rights should 
be. Finally, if, as is often thought to be the case, human rights are understood to be 
the authoritative medium for making moral claims in local and global politics, then 
we will want to know if the human rights framework is hospitable to the normative 
claims made with respect to environmental sustainability. 
Justifying support for human rights continues to be a contentious enterprise. 
Jacques Maritain’s story of UNESCO delegates who could agree on a list of human 
rights, so long as they were not asked why they agreed (Maritain 1949:9), might 
easily have been the story of contemporary theorists. In this chapter I compress the 
range of contemporary debate to three positions: firstly, I consider the possibility of 
elaborating a philosophical foundation for universal human rights, starting with the 
work of Alan Gewirth; secondly, I discuss an attempt to bypass philosophical 
foundations by positing an overlapping consensus (in the Rawlsian sense) on human 
rights, as proposed by Jack Donnelly; thirdly, I look at Richard Rorty’s ‘postmodern 
liberal’ defence of human rights, whereby human rights are regarded as a culture to be 
promoted by means of a ‘sentimental education’. Clearly, this discussion is not 
exhaustive; many more theorists have attempted to justify support for human rights.
16 
The three approaches considered here nonetheless cover significant contributions to 
human rights theory in recent years, and the debate that can be drawn out between 
them is illustrative of the validity of Anthony J. Langlois’ (2003) contention that we 
are   some   considerable   distance   from   finding   a   universally,   or   even   broadly, 
persuasive reason for supporting the idea of universal human rights. 
One final note of introduction. In the course of this chapter and the remainder 
of the thesis I will make reference to various documents of international law, such as, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (1966), which together form what is commonly called ‘The 
International Bill of Rights’. It would be possible and perhaps plausible to defend the 
idea of human rights whilst regarding this particular statement of them as seriously 
flawed. But it is this statement of them, and especially the UDHR version, to which 
16 I make brief reference, in footnotes, to some of these, where they share features with the approaches 
discussed in detail here.
46reference is most commonly made in the various attempts to justify support for human 
rights. For the most part, I follow this convention.
17  
3.1 A philosophical foundation for human rights
Alasdair MacIntyre, who is hostile to the idea of universal human rights, 
nonetheless praises Gewirth’s account of the justification for claiming that there are in 
fact universal human rights as one of the clearest and most analytically rigorous 
available   (MacIntyre   1994:66).   Gewirth’s   account   is   grounded   in   analytical 
philosophy, and aims to demonstrate that because the right to two fundamental goods 
– freedom and well-being – is a necessary truth, these rights are universally valid and 
thus must, on pain of self-contradiction, be accepted by all humans. Though other 
approaches could be studied here,
18 Gewirth thus seems a good candidate to examine 
as an influential example of the attempt to justify support for universal human rights 
by means of appeal to philosophical foundations.
MacIntyre’s best known objection to the idea that there are universal human 
rights is that the institution of rights is historically specific. Thus he argues that one 
reason Gewirth’s defence of universal rights fails is because the means of recognising 
rights to freedom and well-being have not been universally available:
One reason why claims about goods necessary for rational agency are so 
different from claims to the possession of rights is that the latter in fact 
presuppose, as the former do not, the existence of a socially established 
set of rules. […] (As a matter of historical fact such types of social 
institution or practice have not existed universally in human societies.) 
Lacking any such social form, the making of a claim to a right would be 
like presenting a check for payment in a social order that lacked the 
institution of money. (MacIntyre 1994: 67)
17 Obviously, ‘environmental human rights’ do not feature in the UDHR, but even where environmental 
human rights are under discussion the UDHR is frequently a reference point, for example, in Hancock 
(2003).
18 See, for example, John Finnis’ (1980) account of ‘natural rights’ derived from natural law, which has 
been influential in some circles and clearly meets the criterion of attempting a philosophical foundation 
for human rights that would insulate rights from the doubts of relativists and other sceptics. However, 
Finnis’ reliance on a particular religious framework potentially limits his appeal, and while his seven 
categories of ‘intrinsically valuable basic goods’ rely to some extent on intuition to prove their appeal, 
Gewirth’s approach aims to be universally valid and demonstrable by rational thought alone. More 
influential has been H.L.A. Hart’s (1967) answer to the question, ‘Are there any natural rights’, in 
which Hart posits an underlying equal right of all to liberty, from which further rights can be derived. I 
suggest below, however, that the idea of  all  persons having an  equal  right to liberty is in fact 
historically peculiar, and that reasons in support of the idea are thus at the very least desirable.
47So, the claim of universal human rights runs aground on the fact that the institution of 
rights is a peculiarly modern and Western invention. It cannot be denied that the idea 
that all humans everywhere are morally equal has not universally been endorsed 
throughout human history. But to say that the existence of universal rights depends 
upon the existence of institutions to recognise those rights, as the ‘presupposition 
argument’ suggests, is to mischaracterize rights. As Donnelly (2003:8) notes, rights 
are claimed not when they are protected by courts and other institutions, but precisely 
when they are denied. Rights are claims about how societies should be organised, or 
more specifically about how individuals should be treated by those in authority in a 
society. It is only when rights are threatened that individuals have need of their rights. 
In this respect, rights are very different from cheques and money. Moreover, 
MacIntyre’s argument does not preclude the possibility that human rights, as an 
institution, could become universal, nor that the institutional forms the recognition of 
rights takes could vary. Indeed, with the advent of globalisation and the apparent 
acceptance of human rights regimes both at the global and regional level, it would 
appear to some that we now inhabit a world where the institution of human rights is 
universally acknowledged, if not adhered to. But this remains a controversial claim, 
which will be investigated further in chapter 4.
3.1.1 Rational agency
A more telling objection to Gewirth’s theory relates to his argument that as a 
matter of logical necessity, individuals have universal rights. The dialectically 
necessary method that Gewirth employs is intended to prove that it follows from an 
individual’s conceptual need of certain conditions for action that there are human 
rights to which all persons are entitled, a claim which Gewirth argues cannot be 
denied without self-contradiction or logical error (Gewirth 1982:46). These are rights 
to freedom and well-being, which Gewirth holds to be the necessary conditions for 
action. From this basis it would not be difficult to draw up a list of rights that would 
not be significantly divergent from those found in the International Bill of Rights.
19 
On the other hand, given that the capacity for rational agency is central to his 
argument, it is plain that Gewirth’s thesis cannot support rights for children and the 
19 It does seem unlikely, however, that Gewirth’s theory would support the full list of rights found 
there. As Maurice Cranston (1967) scathingly suggested, the right to ‘periodic holidays with pay’ 
(proclaimed in Article 24) may not, in fact, be fundamental and inalienable, at least not within 
Gewirth’s scheme.
48insane, a point he concedes himself (Gewirth 1982:55). This exclusion does not 
preclude persons having duties of care or respect towards children and the insane, but 
it does suggest that they are not morally equal to ‘purposive agents’, as Gewirth terms 
rights bearers.
20 
It might be asked, at this point, what is meant by ‘the capacity for rational 
agency’. Implicit in this is a putative theory of human nature, whereby to be human is 
to identify purposes and pursue them in a rational fashion. Clearly, this putative 
theory of human nature excludes from the status of rights bearers those who are not 
capable of rationally pursuing their purposes. Insofar as this applies to people who 
may be thought incapable of caring for themselves, this is perhaps a relatively 
uncontroversial step. But it is more problematic than Gewirth would appear to 
acknowledge, since, as Rorty argues (see section 3 below), oppression of one people 
by another has often been justified in terms of the oppressed persons not being fully 
rational and thus not being seen to be fully human. On Gewirth’s model, identifying 
someone as a fellow human being entails making a judgment about the rationality of 
their conduct in pursuit of defined goals. Thus, it may be thought, Gewirth does not in 
fact offer a defence of rights that persons have simply in virtue of being human, as 
there is a further ‘capacity’ that persons must possess in order to qualify as a bearer of 
universal rights. This is not to say that Gewirth would wish his work to be used to 
justify the denial of rights to a group of persons who were deemed to be irrational, but 
there is, nonetheless, scope for such a strategy within his argument. 
A further problem arises in the links between steps in his argument; from the 
logical necessity of the individual agent asserting that he has need of certain 
conditions for action to the agent having rights to freedom and well-being. He sums 
up his argument in seven steps, quoted here in full:
[I]f any agent denies that he has rights to freedom and well-being, he can 
be seen to contradict himself. For, as we have seen, he must accept (1) 
“My freedom and well-being are necessary goods”. Hence, the agent must 
also accept (2) “I, as an actual or prospective agent, must have freedom 
and well-being”, and hence also (3) “All other persons must at least 
refrain from removing or interfering with my freedom and well-being”. 
20  Jeremy Waldron also identifies this problem in Hart’s theory: ‘Hart’s analysis is in principle 
incompatible with the attribution of rights to beings incapable of exercising powers, such as babies…’ 
(Waldron 1984:12). One of the attractions of Rorty’s theory (see below, section 3), is that it does not 
fall foul of this problem. 
49For if other persons remove or interfere with these, then he will not have 
what he has said he must have. Now suppose the agent denies (4) “I have 
rights to freedom and well-being”. Then he must also deny (5) “all other 
persons ought at least to refrain from removing or interfering with my 
freedom and well-being”. By denying (5) he must accept (6) “It is not the 
case that all other persons at least ought to refrain from removing or 
interfering with my freedom and well-being”, and hence he must also 
accept (7) “Other persons may (are permitted to) remove or interfere with 
my freedom and well-being”. But (7) contradicts (3). Since, as we have 
seen, every agent must accept (3), he cannot consistently accept (7). Since 
(7) is entailed by the denial of (4), “I have rights to freedom and well-
being”, it follows that any agent who denies that he has rights to freedom 
and well-being contradicts himself. (Gewirth 1982:50-51)
The problem arises between points (2) and (3). It only follows from “I, as an actual or 
prospective agent, must have freedom and well-being” that “All others persons must 
at least refrain from removing or interfering with my freedom and well-being” if there 
is something special about purposive agents (myself included) that means they are 
entitled to what they need for action. It may be that there is some special quality that 
so distinguishes purposive agents, but Gewirth has not specified it. Argument is 
needed here, as MacIntyre (1994:66-70) has complained. 
Gewirth has amplified his argument elsewhere:  
[T]he agent is saying that because freedom and basic well-being are 
necessary goods for him, other persons strictly ought to refrain from 
interfering with his having them. And this is equivalent to saying that he 
has a right to them, because the agent holds that this strict duty of 
noninterference by other persons is owed to him (Gewirth 1976:291).
However, this thesis remains unsatisfactory because the equivalence Gewirth asserts 
is not self-evident. Joseph Raz has complained that Gewirth ‘misconceives the 
relation between value and rights’ (2006:4), in that he assumes that something that has 
crucial value for a person must be the subject of a right that person holds. Raz, on the 
other hand, argues that there may be necessary goods that persons would not 
necessarily have rights to. Another problem is that a person does not automatically 
have a right to those conditions which are necessary for agency without the further 
criterion that he ought to have those things which are necessary for agency, because 
50he has some special status which means that his agency has intrinsic moral value. This 
point can be better understood if a person is substituted for another living being, say, a 
shark. It is not usually argued, even by ecocentrists, that individual sharks should all 
have rights to the necessary conditions for pursuing their chosen purposes.
21 Thus it 
can be seen that a moral significance is being attached to the agency of humans in 
Gewirth’s theory that is not generally held to be true of other beings. 
The question at issue is then what is the source of that moral significance. 
Gewirth’s argument would seem to suggest that rationality is the determining factor, 
but, as argued above, making rationality the determinant of special status may be 
problematic, in that this sort of standard has been used to justify the oppression of 
non-Western peoples, and women everywhere, in the past. What is implicit in 
Gewirth’s theory here is a notion of what it is to be human, whereby humans are 
definitionally understood to be rational agents pursuing individual goals. But this 
rational, individualistic notion of what it is to be human is not universally assented to. 
What is needed, then, is an alternative explanation of what it is that makes humans, 
whether as purposive agents or any other notion of human nature, special, such that in 
virtue of X persons have rights to what they need to pursue their purposes.
The difficulty here has been summed up by Michael Freeman; ‘the theory of 
human rights presupposes a moral ontology in which human persons not only exist 
but have special value. Such an ontology is not universal’ (Freeman 1994:510). Not 
only is it not universally agreed that humans have special value, rather than, say, male 
humans, or white humans, or French humans, or any number of versions of ‘these 
particular humans’, the reasons for claiming that all humans have special value that 
have been put forward have tended to be based on a religious worldview. Even where 
this is not the case, as in Gewirth’s theory, a particular notion of what it is to be 
human   is  implicitly  described.   What   is  problematic   here  is  that  people  have 
competing visions of what it is to be human. As Langlois argues, 
it is not clear, and it has never been clear, how authoritatively to give 
content to subjective rights simply on the basis of their claim to derive 
from our humanity, while providing a  cordon sanitaire  between this 
humanity and any substantive human tradition or conception of the good. 
(Langlois 2003:511)
21 For a brief discussion of ecocentrism, see chapter 5, section 1.
51  The International Bill of Rights sets out in international law the position that 
human beings are special, (that is, they are ‘sacred’, ‘inviolable’, ‘endowed with 
dignity’   and   so   on)   and   that   they   therefore   have   certain   universal   human 
(‘inalienable’) rights. These are two separate claims: (1) that humans are special, and, 
(2) that it follows from this that they have rights. Michael J. Perry (1998:58) holds 
that there are two possible challenges to the claim that human beings are special, 
sacred, inviolable, etc.
(1) There are no persuasive reasons why any human beings are sacred.
(2) Only some human beings are sacred (those of the agent’s own tribe, community, 
etc.).
Clearly, the second claim would not be endorsed by human rights advocates, but it is 
asserted by cultural relativists, or at least, the universality of human rights is 
sometimes denied on the basis that morality makes sense only within the context of 
the cultural community which gives it meaning. A common response to this type of 
argument is to point out that cultures are not static, and that it is therefore possible 
that cultural traditions that appear to be incompatible with human rights can, in fact, 
develop towards a convergence with human rights norms. Abdullahi A. An-Na‘im 
foresees just such a development with regard to Islam: ‘It may take some innovative 
reinterpretation of traditional [Islamic] norms to bring them into complete accord with 
the present formulation of the international standards, but the essence of these 
standards is already present’ (quoted in Caney 2003:87).
The   idea   that   conflicting   cultural   (or   ethical,   to   use   Simon   Caney’s 
terminology) traditions contain within them an essence or core of norms which are in 
fact universal has also been suggested, for example by Bhikhu Parekh (1999:135). 
Parekh, however, thinks the list of such values is very short – human unity, human 
dignity,   human   worth,   promotion   of   human   well-being,   and   equality   (Parekh 
1999:149-150). Taking a more pessimistic view, Peter Jones doubts the worth of any 
common values that could be identified, claiming that, ‘[e]ven if we could find values 
that have been endorsed by everyone everywhere, these are likely to be so meagre, so 
denuded of content, that they will provide a set of human rights that is hardly worth 
having’ (Jones 2003:35). But others find the empirical case persuasive. Ken Booth 
(1999) points out that all cultures have a notion of such virtues as hospitality, civility, 
right behaviour, and so on. Thus he endorses Donald Puchala in claiming that ‘at a 
fundamental level, moral behaviour is not a cultural trait but a human predeliction’ 
52(quoted in Booth 1999:59). The argument here is that relativists mistakenly fail to 
recognise these values that find (differing) expression in all cultures. Insofar as these 
values are common to all cultural or ethical traditions, universal values are certainly 
possible. 
This is persuasive as far as it goes, but the fact that all cultures share the concept 
of moral behaviour does not prove that all cultures share the same notion of what 
constitutes moral behaviour, that is, that all cultures interpret and express these virtues 
in  the same  way.   Illustrating this  point, Micheline  R.  Ishay  (2004:365)  cites 
Herodotus’ tale of the Persian king Darius, highlighting the different ways in which 
Greeks and Indians honoured their dead; though both recognise the  value  of 
honouring their dead, each community found the others’ practices offensive. Ishay 
nonetheless rejects relativism, but a significant obstacle to universalising respect for 
human rights as practice is the range of persons towards whom virtuous conduct is 
held to be appropriate or requisite. Parekh claims that, insofar as we can identify 
human values, ‘it is self-contradictory to say that we should respect the dignity of our 
fellow-citizens but not that of outsiders’ (1999:150). But fear of self-contradiction 
does not appear to have inhibited the violation of human rights. What should be noted 
here is that the idea of treating all humans equally and endowing them with rights 
simply in virtue of their being human, rather than in virtue of some cultural, national, 
or other status, is historically peculiar, and it is precisely this peculiar idea that the 
concept of human rights is invoked to universalise. 
3.1.2 Human dignity
Turning to Perry’s first claim (that there are no persuasive reasons why any 
human beings are sacred), to describe human beings as sacred obviously introduces a 
religious terminology, but it captures the sense of moral significance that is evidently 
attributed to humans both in Gewirth’s attempt to find philosophical foundations for 
human rights, and in existing international human rights covenants such as the 
International Bill of Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights talks in its 
preamble of ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family’ as ‘the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world’ (in Brownlie 1995:256). In the Vienna Declaration of 1993, the 
latter is entailed upon the former: ‘all human rights derive from the dignity and worth 
inherent in the human person’ (UN 1993). Perry’s question, then, is, what is this 
53inherent worth? Clearly, religious belief could supply an answer. If we are God’s 
creation, and God has endowed us with dignity, as the Christian faith holds, then we 
each have inherent dignity, and, from that, in Christian terms duties follow (love one 
another) and in the terms of the International Bill of Rights, rights follow (a 
considerable list). These duties and rights apply universally because we are all, 
equally, God’s creations, all children of God, all part of the same family. Taking God 
out of the picture, however, opens the way to the now familiar Nietzschean riposte 
that Christian morality is nothing more than a plea from the weak for equal treatment 
from the strong, a plea that ceases to be compelling in the absence of a God to 
sanction it. As will be discussed in section 3 of this chapter, Rorty is impressed by the 
Nietzschean critique, yet in his project of a sentimental education, seeks to find a 
means to bypass it. (It is not immediately clear that the idea of equal human worth is 
readily intelligible in terms of all faiths – Hindus and Buddhists, for example, do not 
hold that we are all of equal worth, though a system of duties is nevertheless intrinsic 
to each religion.)
If we are to embrace a universal set of rights entailed upon inherent human 
dignity, however, there must be intelligible reason(s) for accepting that humans do 
possess such a quality. Langlois (2004) bemoans the lack of engagement, on the part 
of contemporary philosophers and political theorists, with this difficult question. 
Freeman’s recent work (2004) aims to sketch the role that religious belief might play 
in this, suggesting that different religious beliefs might simultaneously but separately 
sustain support for universal human rights, but Freeman has no answer to the problem 
of secularism. Yet the (Western) culture that inspired the human rights project we 
now find gaining credence throughout the world has become secularised to a 
considerable degree. Thus, in addition to religious understandings of the special status 
of human beings, secular conceptions of human sacredness are necessary (Freeman 
2002:55). 
A point often glossed over, though, is that neither secular nor religious 
understandings   of   human   sacredness   are   ‘neutral’,   nor   necessarily   compatible. 
Freeman describes Gewirth’s thesis as ‘resolutely secular’. Indeed, Freeman finds 
Gewirth’s logically necessary method of rationally defining human rights so hostile to 
a religiously based defence of human rights as to be ‘an implausible solution to the 
problem   of   diversity’   (Freeman   2004:395).   Instead,   Freeman   begins   to   look 
approvingly towards the work of John Rawls for a means to support human rights 
54whilst accommodating diversity of belief.
22 He concludes by endorsing Peter Jones in 
saying that, ‘It is not the task of human rights theory to determine ultimate religious or 
philosophical truths, but to identify the rules that ought to govern the relations among 
persons with different beliefs’ (Freeman 2004:400). This seems to endorse something 
like   the   Rawlsian   conception   of   ‘justice   as   fairness’,   whereby   fundamental 
philosophical and religious beliefs are a private matter, and only political questions 
are a matter of public concern (Rawls 1985). Freeman’s apparent acceptance of a 
reduced role for philosophy in providing justifications for human rights would seem 
to contradict some of his earlier work – as recently as 2002 he claimed that, 
[w]e need reasons to support our human-rights actions, both because it is 
often not clear which actions human-rights principles require and because 
opponents of human rights can support their opposition with reasons. We 
must understand whether our reasons are superior, and, if so, why. 
(Freeman 2002:56)
It is difficult to reconcile this need with the modest understanding of the role of 
philosophical foundations in justifying human rights expressed in the conclusion of 
Freeman’s 2004 article. 
Nevertheless,   Freeman’s   retreat   from   philosophical   foundations   may   be 
prudent in view of Perry’s conclusions regarding the possibility of finding a secular 
basis on which to justify the claim that human beings have a special status in virtue of 
which they have inalienable rights. Discussing Ronald Dworkin’s response to the 
question of what a secular notion of inherent human dignity might look like, Perry 
(1998:ch1) argues that something more is inferred in the quality of being sacred, 
inviolable, etc., than can be supplied in a secular cosmology. A secular notion of 
inherent human dignity would have to assert that there is meaning and worth in 
humanity in the context of a view of the universe as meaningless or a view that is 
agnostic about the possibility of meaning. Humanity, then, is the only solid reference 
point. For Perry, Dworkin’s argument rests on the ‘two combined and intersecting 
bases of the sacred: natural and human creation’, that is, natural evolution and the 
development of social institutions (Perry 1998:27) – human beings are seen to 
embody the pinnacle of both, thus human beings inspire unique awe in themselves. As 
Perry notes:
22 Given that Rawls explicitly excludes religious reasons from the range of acceptable justifications for 
endorsing a given conception of justice in the context of an overlapping consensus, it is not clear that 
an overlapping consensus based on competing religious doctrines is entirely coherent. 
55Dworkin seems to be using “sacred” in what we can call a weak, or 
“subjective”, sense – something (e.g., a human life) is sacred because, or 
in the sense that, it inspires awe in us and we attach great value to it – 
rather than in the strong, or “objective”, sense – something is sacred and 
therefore  it inspires awe in us and we attach great value to it (Perry 
1998:28).
The idea that beings that inspire awe in us should be protected by special rights is 
something  that ecocentrists could  easily  endorse, but it  would  be unclear, to 
ecocentrists at least, why humans should have rights and animals not. Indeed, on the 
basis of something inspiring awe in us, it is not clear why the Great Wall of China, 
and other inanimate objects, should not have rights. The majority of ecocentrists do 
seek to differentiate between the moral status of humans and other beings. Robyn 
Eckersley (1992) explains one ecocentric approach, ‘autopoietic intrinsic value 
theory’, wherein value is ascribed to ‘self-generating living things’, which can 
encompass species, ecosystems, or individuals. This approach still requires human 
judgement about what counts as a self-generating living thing (amoeba? humans in 
catatonic states?) and is therefore worthy of the respect consistent with intrinsic value, 
and there is still the issue of differentiation with respect to (potentially competing) 
degrees of value accorded to different species or individuals in a particular context. 
What is problematic here for human rights advocates is the degree of the subjective 
element involved. It is further complicated by the variety, not necessarily overlapping, 
indeed often differing, of things in which human beings find awe. Relying on ‘awe’ to 
ground a commitment to the intrinsic value of beings in a lexical order determined by 
human judgment is a considerable distance from Gewirth’s hoped for logically 
necessary standard of universal human rights. 
But such a standard may not ultimately be available. By Perry’s logic, if the 
idea of human dignity is central to human rights, and is inescapably religious, then the 
idea of human rights is itself inescapably religious. In the context of a multi-cultural 
world, that would seem to be a singularly unhelpful attribute for a system of universal 
rights. Equally unhelpful is Freeman’s conclusion that Gewirth’s attempt to provide a 
secular justification for support for human rights is logically compelled to assert that, 
‘[a]ll cultures that seem to lack the concept of human rights must either have it 
implicitly or they are in a state of logical and moral error’ (Freeman 2004:394). It may 
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of a (hopefully) loving God is what underwrites our ‘human’ rights. There again it is 
equally possible that cultures that do not accept a given conception of human rights 
(whatever that may be) are indeed in logical and moral error. But neither argument 
seems useful to the champion of human rights in a multi-cultural, post-colonial world. 
Wars have been fought over claims similar to the former, and the latter claim is 
patronising or insulting. Neither claim seems likely to cut much ice in contemporary 
political debate. We would seem, then, to have reached an impasse. Like Freeman, 
Perry is nevertheless committed to the idea of human rights. Unlike Rorty (see section 
3 below) he thinks it matters that human rights may be inescapably religious, but he 
finds the argument for human rights compelling nonetheless. Perry finds himself 
caught between his conviction that the justification for human rights is inescapably 
religious, and his conviction that, despite the lack of agreement in religious belief, 
there   must   nevertheless   be   universal   human   rights.   Given   that   an   appeal   to 
philosophical foundations, such as that attempted by Gewirth, seems unable to 
advance us beyond this problem, the latter two sections of this chapter are devoted to 
two theorists whose arguments begin with the premise that philosophical foundations 
for human rights are unavailable, and attempt to find ways around this problem. 
3.2 An overlapping consensus on human rights
Jack Donnelly has written extensively on human rights theory and practice. Of 
interest here are the arguments he has proposed in justifying the idea of universal 
human rights. These are two-fold. Firstly, Donnelly understands human rights as a 
necessary tool of the weak in protecting themselves against the strong in the context 
of a globalised world. Human rights are therefore necessary not in the logically true 
sense that Gewirth describes, but rather in the contingent sense of being an essential 
feature of modern social relations that enables persons to protect themselves from the 
excessive power of others in the context of a particular model of political and 
economic organisation. It follows from this that human rights are not to be ‘found’ by 
means of rational thought, but instead are socially ‘constructed’ in response to 
specific threats (Donnelly 1999a). They are nonetheless universal, Donnelly argues, 
insofar as the threats they combat, ‘modern markets and states’, are now universal, or 
near-universal (Donnelly 2003; 2007).
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overlapping consensus, whereby human rights are a moral standard that is almost 
universally assented to, and as such is morally persuasive. Neither of these arguments 
appeals to philosophical foundations, indeed, Donnelly regards such appeals as 
misguided because of the contested nature of philosophical beliefs, but argues that 
this is not unique to human rights: 
Like all social practices, human rights come with, and in an important 
sense   require,   justifications.   But   those   justifications   appeal   to 
“foundations” that are ultimately a matter of agreement or assumption 
rather than proof. Problems of “circularity” or “vulnerability” are common 
to   all   moral   concepts   and  practices,   not   specific   to   human   rights. 
(Donnelly 2003:21)
It follows, according to Donnelly’s argument, that where there is evidence of 
agreement, then that is sufficient reason to consider as valid a moral concept or 
practice, such as human rights. Such agreement need not be absolute; instead, it can 
take the form of an ‘overlapping consensus’, as Rawls proposed in regard to 
establishing a shared conception of justice on ‘political, not metaphysical’ grounds. 
At the heart of Donnelly’s approach, then, is a rejection of the ideas put forward by 
both Gewirth and Perry. 
Donnelly claims there is a ‘remarkable international normative consensus on 
the list of human rights contained in the Universal Declaration and the International 
Human Rights Covenants’ (Donnelly 2003:17). Although Donnelly does not offer 
much in the way of empirical evidence for this claim, it would be easy enough to find 
evidence in terms of the overwhelming number of countries that have signalled their 
endorsement of the UDHR and that have ratified the two International Covenants.
23 
Similarly, the proliferation of regional human rights agreements over the latter half of 
the twentieth century points to broad support for human rights at the level of 
governments at least.
24  But others have come to probe the depth of this apparent 
consensus on human rights and in particular to explore what motivates governments 
to accept and adhere to (or not) human rights agreements. These arguments will be 
considered in chapter 4. In this chapter, I take Donnelly at his word in claiming there 
23 For instance, as of December 2006, the ICCPR has 67 signatories and 160 parties, and the ICESCR 
has 66 signatories and 155 parties. (OHCHR 2006)
24 Examples include the European Convention on Human Rights (1953) and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981). 
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said about the normative status of human rights on the basis of them being widely 
endorsed. 
Donnelly argues that the consensus on human rights circumvents the need for 
a substantive theory of human nature on which to ground human rights. In this way, 
Donnelly hopes to outline a theory that provides conceptual support for human rights 
whilst avoiding claims about the special status of human beings. This is fortunate, 
because ‘[g]iven that philosophical anthropologies are so controversial, there are great 
dangers in tying one’s analysis of human rights to any particular theory of human 
nature.’ (Donnelly 2003:17) Clearly, if human rights are linked to a particular 
understanding of what it is to be human, such as the individual as rational agent, as in 
Gewirth’s theory, or as adherent of a particular religious faith, then the appeal of 
human rights may be undermined in the eyes of those who do not share that particular 
view. This much is implicit in Freeman’s concern that Gewirth’s resolute secularism 
is problematic in the context of cultural pluralism. So Donnelly’s strategy of avoiding 
philosophical and religious justifications for human rights has much to recommend it. 
But there is a problem in the way that Donnelly uses the idea of an 
overlapping consensus, for he seems to want this device to do two things. Firstly, the 
idea of overlapping rather than complete consensus is invoked to explain how 
agreement on a given list of human rights is possible in the context of cultural 
pluralism. Addressing Rawls’ question, how can there be ‘a stable and just society 
whose   free   and   equal   citizens   are   deeply   divided   by   conflicting   and   even 
incommensurable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’, Donnelly claims 
that the idea of an overlapping consensus ‘offers a plausible answer’ which ‘has an 
obvious extension to international society, particularly a culturally and politically 
diverse pluralist international society’ (Donnelly 2003:40). However, Caney has noted 
that Rawls thought that an overlapping consensus on justice could hold in pluralistic 
societies that shared political institutions and had some degree of history of working 
in concert, factors which would inspire persons of differing fundamental beliefs to see 
the benefit of reaching a less deeply held political agreement about how society 
should be organised so as to facilitate justice. ‘The problem with the idea of a global 
overlapping consensus’, Caney concludes, ‘is that these factors (such as a shared 
political system with its dynamics encouraging convergence) are absent at the global 
level’ (Caney 2003:54). Indeed, Rawls himself specified a number of conditions that 
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ground a political conception of justice, all of which apply, in Rawls’ scheme, within 
societies (Rawls 1985:225; Hampton 1989:795-6). 
Donnelly accepts that Rawls intended the idea of an overlapping consensus as 
a solution to pluralism within states, but Donnelly nonetheless believes that it can be 
applied   beyond   the   domestic   sphere,   because,   he   argues,   in   the   context   of 
globalisation, modern markets and states have spread around the globe and are now 
near-universal (Donnelly 1999b:69; 2003:57-60). In a footnote he recognises modern 
markets and states as ‘contingently Western’ in the sense of having originated in the 
West, but as these means of economic and political organisation have ‘spread, in very 
similar forms, throughout the globe’ (Donnelly 2003:59), they can be taken to be 
universal. Human rights have often been described as having evolved in the West as a 
means of protecting the relatively weak individual, wrenched from earlier social 
relations of family and community that were more fixed and enduring, against the 
power of the state and the market in the post-industrial world, an assessment with 
which Donnelly would appear to concur (Goodhart 2003:943). Thus Donnelly 
construes human rights as a necessary response to the problems associated with the 
power of the modern state and the modern market. Freeman takes a complementary, if 
not identical, line when he writes,
[a]ll human societies have power structures, and many of them have 
throughout history had some conception of the abuse of power. The 
concepts of  natural rights  and  human rights  are particular ways of 
expressing this concern about the abuse of power. (Freeman 2002:167-8)
The spread of the modern state around the globe is, by Donnelly’s reckoning, a 
response to Western colonialism, while the spread of international markets, the 
processes of globalisation in general, has been led by Western economic expansion. 
(Donnelly notes in passing that, in a world of sovereign states, ‘markets... are an 
obvious choice’ (Donnelly 2003:68), but he does not say what makes this obvious.) 
So, the (Western) human rights regime that is necessary to protect individuals from 
the potential excesses of markets and states have become a necessary universal feature 
in virtue of the fact that the Western models of political and economic organisation 
have been exported around the globe. This process of export would presumably not 
have been possible without the attendant Western supremacy in matters military and 
economic. The point to be made here is that the export of human rights, even as a tool 
60to protect the weak from the excesses of power made possible by the export of 
Western models of economic and political organisation, is not morally neutral, as 
Donnelly seems to imagine it is. The closest he comes to responding to this criticism 
of human rights is this:
There is no doubt that human rights are more individualistic than many 
other social and political practices. But to rail against it in the absence of 
an  alternative solution  to the very real  problems  of protecting the 
individual and human dignity in the face of modern markets and states is, 
at best, utopian or short sighted. (Donnelly 2003: 114) 
It may be that to attack the only tool available to do an important job is foolish and 
short-sighted. But it does not follow from this that one must subscribe to the 
consensus on human rights, rather than looking  for an alternative solution. In his 
discussion of globalisation as a background condition against which human rights are 
necessary, Donnelly comes close to reifying the globalisation of markets and states. 
Yet Donnelly is also critical of an ‘unthinking acceptance of a world of sovereign 
states’ (Donnelly 2003:66). As noted in the previous chapter, globalisation is neither 
natural nor inevitable. It is the consequence of policy choices. Donnelly seems at 
times to foreclose the possibility of making alternative choices about both the manner 
of economic or political organisation a society might adopt, and whether to endorse 
universal human rights as articulated in the UDHR. Green theorists, on the other hand, 
point out that alternative models of economic and political organisation are not only 
feasible but also desirable (see chapters 5 and 6).  
3.2.1 Human rights as practice, human dignity as value
The second problem with the way in which Donnelly uses the idea of an 
overlapping consensus on human rights is indicated in the preceding argument. 
Consensus is held to be a persuasive reason to endorse human rights. In short, the fact 
of consensus proves the moral worth of human rights. Donnelly is not alone is 
subscribing to such a view. In proposing a ‘non-ethnocentric universalism’, Parekh 
also makes reference to the ‘moral authority based on the consensus of world opinion’ 
(1999:140). But, as Freeman observes, this appeal to consensus as proof of moral 
status does not stand up: ‘It [Donnelly’s thesis] is unconvincing, however, not only 
because it is not clear that a sincere consensus exists, but also because consensus is 
factual not moral, and therefore, in itself, justifies nothing’ (Freeman 2002: 64). 
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well as in practice) it cannot by itself be sufficient or be a substitute for other theories 
[…] which provide the materials from which the consensus is drawn’ (Dower 
1997:95). An example here would be the prevalence in Europe for many years of the 
view that Jews were inferior to other persons. The appalling treatment of Jews by the 
Nazi regime during the Second World War was one of the key factors that inspired 
the revival of the idea of human rights in the aftermath of that war (Donnelly 
1999a:72; Langlois 2001:80). This example illustrates two points. Firstly, consensus 
on a particular idea does not demonstrate its moral or right or just character. Secondly, 
consensus on a given idea now does not guarantee that the popularity or acceptability 
of the idea will persist. It is therefore apparent that consensus rests on something else, 
a point Rawls himself understood – one of the purposes of introducing the idea of an 
‘original position’ into the reasoning process for deciding principles of justice is to 
eliminate the potential for power relations to influence outcomes. The absence of such 
constraints in the real world is at the root of a significant criticism of human rights, 
which will be discussed in chapter 4. 
In a recent article clarifying his position on human rights universalism, 
Donnelly describes human rights as a ‘social practice’, not a value, and justifies 
human rights as a universal practice in the following terms: 
The functional universality of human rights depends on human rights 
providing attractive remedies for some of the most pressing systemic 
threats to human dignity. […] Whatever our other problems, we all must 
deal   with   market   economies   and   bureaucratic  states.   Whatever   our 
religious, moral, legal, and political resources, we all need equal and 
inalienable universal human rights to protect us from those threats. 
(Donnelly 2007:288) 
The argument here seems to be that human rights as a practice are universally 
accepted insofar as they provide effective defence against the threats to human dignity 
posed   by   two   institutions   (markets   and   states)   which   happen   to   have   been 
universalised. If that is the case, then the value at the core of human rights as a 
practice is human dignity. This much is perhaps uncontroversial. But it does not 
necessarily follow from there being the same threats to human dignity in places A and 
B that the same practices are appropriate in defending human dignity in A and B, 
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in both places. 
Donnelly deals with this point by suggesting that human rights are ‘relatively 
universal’, that is, they are universal at the conceptual level, but can be implemented 
and interpreted in different ways. This point is perhaps intelligible in the abstract, but 
the examples he offers suggest a more universalistic than relativistic understanding of 
human dignity. These include the possibility of designing electoral systems differently 
in different countries (which presupposes democracy) (Donnelly 2007:299), tolerance 
of a prohibition on apostasy as long as it is not incompatible with human rights (a 
position that renders ambiguous as much as it clarifies) (Donnelly 2007:301). Such 
examples do little to combat the argument of opponents such as Brown, who claims 
that ‘the contemporary human rights regime is in general, and, for the most part, in 
detail, simply a contemporary, internationalised and universalised, version of the 
liberal position on rights’ (Brown 1997:43). This is perhaps a bolder claim than can 
easily be sustained. As Jeremy Waldron (1987:ch1) has argued, there is more than one 
liberalism. Criticism of human rights as a liberal discourse fails to recognise that 
liberals, such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, have been among the 
strongest critics of the idea of natural or human rights. But many have concurred with 
Brown in highlighting the individualism, secularism and rationalism inherent in 
human rights as articulated in the UDHR (see, for example, Pollis and Schwab 1994). 
The historical constructedness of human rights identified by both Donnelly 
(1999a) and Freeman (2004) suggests that a reconstruction of human rights is 
possible, but it is not obvious how universal human rights could be reconstructed so 
as to avoid entirely the charge of favouring liberalism without them losing their 
coherence. One possible answer is suggested by Rowan Cruft (2005a), who explores 
the idea that human rights should be justified individualistically. In such a scheme, 
religious and moral beliefs, at both an individual and a community level, would play a 
central part in justifying human rights, but they would not be deterministic: 
Both a person’s society and a person’s own choices can influence the 
features that justify human rights for that person, but this influence is not 
inevitable.   It   follows   that   a   person’s   individualistic   right-justifying 
features can be fairly epistemologically inaccessible. (Cruft 2005a:81)
Cruft’s proposal would presumably not be endorsed by Donnelly, since it leads to the 
conclusion that human rights are to an extent non-universal, in the sense that different 
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epistemologically inaccessible) features of their interests are said to justify their 
specific human rights. It is also unclear how such rights might be institutionalised. 
The legal interpretation of rights has often been undertaken with regard to relevant 
precedents, but Cruft’s scheme would render the authoritative status of precedents 
unclear   at   best.   Cruft’s   argument   is   instructive,   though,   in   recognising   the 
implausibility of either cultural influence or reason exercising a determining influence 
in support for human rights at an individual level. In view of this, and absent from the 
domestic conditions that Rawls thought would encourage convergence around an 
overlapping consensus, it seems doubtful that the idea of an exclusively ‘political’ 
overlapping consensus of the type Donnelly envisages would spontaneously ground 
support for human rights.
25 The idea of separating our political (public) beliefs from 
our religious or philosophical (private) convictions is itself a liberal idea and is not a 
strategy that all people will find appropriate when agreeing common standards of how 
individuals should be treated. Donnelly (2003:50) explicitly supports liberal neutrality 
as an appropriate strategy to adopt, because, he argues, in absence of ‘knowing’ what 
the good life should be it is prudent to be tolerant of competing visions of how one 
should live. But this liberalism is itself insensitive to the complexity of conceptions of 
human dignity as described by Cruft.  
This   is   not   to   say   that   political   agreement   across   cultural   or   ethical 
perspectives is not possible. For instance, research on tension over water resources in 
the Middle East has yielded some potentially encouraging results. A number of 
academics and politicians have maintained that, in recent history, water scarcity has 
been a source of tension in the region, to the extent that it has been a cause of war. On 
the basis of their analysis of conflict in the Jordan River Basin, the Euphrates-Tigris 
Basin, and the Arabian Peninsula – three areas that have seen exponential growth in 
demands on water resources in the past 100 years – Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim Gray 
test a different hypothesis. They find that while the scarcity of water resources has 
raised tensions, it has not been sufficient to spark conflict in the absence of other 
factors leading to war, such as, in particular, antithetical ideologies. Importantly, they 
present a further finding that, in some instances, the scarcity of water seems to have 
been a crucial factor in motivating actors to put aside ideological differences and to 
25 Yet there is clear evidence of international support for human rights, as Donnelly claims. However, I 
argue in chapter 4 that there are plausible grounds for claiming some of this support is coerced. 
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water is too vital a resource to be put at risk by war; increasing water scarcity 
generally concentrates the minds of decision-makers to find sustainable solutions by 
means of co-ordinated, co-operative and conciliatory arrangements’ (Dolatyar and 
Gray 2000:67). In short, it seems that environmental security as a factor in practical 
reasoning could legitimate (even necessitate) the exclusion of fundamental beliefs 
from questions of politics, especially the distribution of common goods, as Rawls 
envisages in his idea of an overlapping consensus. 
But there is an important difference between this example and the debate over 
human rights, and indeed, the debate about environmental sustainability. What is 
distinctive about the situations that Dolatyar and Gray studied is that the participants 
in the negotiating process shared a common understanding of the problem to be 
addressed. In these circumstances, practical reasoning – reasoning about what to do 
with regard to a given problem – is possible even in the presence of divergent 
fundamental beliefs. What is missing from some discussions about human rights, and 
many debates about environmental sustainability, is a common understanding of the 
problem to be addressed. In short, the problem is not ‘given’, but is itself contested. 
Fundamental (metaphysical) beliefs play a role in shaping people’s understanding of a 
particular   problem.   For   ecocentrists   the   problem   of   realising   environmental 
sustainability is not simply a matter of reorganising our economy in a way that limits 
environmental damage. Rather, it is also a matter of recognising the inherent value in 
the natural environment and modifying our behaviour accordingly. A substantial 
element of achieving environmental sustainability from an ecocentric point of view 
therefore entails enlarging our moral community to include within the scope of moral 
concern non-human animals, plants, and even sand and stones (see Eckersley 1992; 
O’Neill 1993). 
Similarly,   fundamental   beliefs   reflecting   metaphysical   commitments 
contribute to the kind of non-universal human rights Cruft envisages. Cruft considers 
it possible that allowing ‘cultural’ practices, such as female genital mutilation, is a 
human rights violation for some women, but, on the other hand, banning such 
practices could be a violation of human rights for others. Which of these is the case 
depends upon the interplay between the women’s own sense of their cultural and 
individual identity and the interests that their human rights should therefore protect 
(Cruft 2005a:280-1). A comparable argument is found in Talal Asad (1997), a study 
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‘cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’ (Article 5 of the UDHR) is held to be 
‘universal in scope, but particular in prescriptive content’ (Asad 1997:111), and the 
difficulty Asad finds in identifying a dividing line between some aspects of torture 
and   (consensual)   sado-masochist   practices   again   highlights   the   problem   of 
epistemological accessibility. 
Some feminists would certainly be sceptical of the evident conservatism of 
such arguments, particularly the specific example advanced by Cruft, which is neither 
defended   nor   disputed   here.  It  is,  however,   illustrative  of   the  way  in   which 
fundamental beliefs – religious, moral, the type of beliefs excluded from playing a 
justificatory role in an overlapping consensus – may well influence the ways in which 
problems are understood.
26 Yet Donnelly would argue that Cruft and Asad here make 
the mistake drawing normative conclusions from the fact that cultural practices differ. 
Cultural   relativism,   Donnelly   argues,   is   an   ‘important   antidote   to   misplaced 
universalism’ (Donnelly 2007:296). But he remains committed to human rights as a 
universal practice able to defend individuals from the threats to human dignity 
inherent in modern markets and states, and is not too troubled by the idea that, since 
human dignity could be understood in different ways, human rights, as a universal 
practice, may presuppose a conception of human dignity that is not, in fact, 
universally shared. In this respect he comes close to Rorty, who is unapologetic in his 
defence of liberalism as the best set of values currently available, and whose 
justification for human rights is considered in the next section. 
 
3.3 Human rights as a ‘sentimental education’ 
Like Donnelly, Richard Rorty does not offer a defence of human rights based 
on philosophical  foundations. Instead,  he argues that human  rights should be 
understood as a ‘culture’, a culture that is perhaps inevitably liberal. However, where 
liberalism is ascribed to in a ‘contingent’, ‘ironic’, and ‘post-modern’ way, rather than 
a more solidly committed way, Rorty believes that human rights proponents need not 
26  A complementary argument is developed by Brian Feltham (2003), who argues for allowing a 
persons’ values to play a role in practical reasoning. The merit of this, he claims, is ‘the value of being 
able to take a certain attitude towards one’s own life, to be able to endorse it as a life well lived, […] 
this value can ground reasons that bear on what we ought to do’ (Feltham 2003:28-29). To fail to 
recognise the values that people have and their relevance to practical reasoning, on Feltham’s 
argument, is to invite frustration and resentment – clearly this is not an ideal outcome if one is 
concerned to promote universal human rights. 
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liberal rights theorists such as Hart or Gewirth or Thomas Pogge,
27 in that he insists 
that human rights do not rely on the typically liberal appeal to rationalism, but are 
instead the product of what he calls a ‘sentimental education’. He therefore rejects 
appeals to what he calls ‘foundational truths’. A sentimental education proceeds by 
the telling of sad and sentimental stories that invite the listener to imagine what it is 
like to be in the victim’s position, and therefore inspire sympathy. He shares 
Donnelly’s belief that the existing consensus on human rights makes enquiry into 
their philosophical foundations redundant, but is nevertheless concerned to point out 
the error of philosophers in searching for such foundations because the rationalism 
that has characterised such endeavours has led to the belief that human rights can be 
promoted by pointing out that those who fail to support them are irrational. On the 
contrary, Rorty argues that what opponents of human rights typically lack is not 
reason, but rather sympathy and security. The project of increasing support for human 
rights is therefore advanced by increasing these two vital commodities. 
3.3.1 Suffering as a transcultural fact
Rorty has explicitly called on human rights theorists to abandon their search 
for philosophical foundations, not least because he regards the types of answers that 
have thus far been advanced as not being terribly useful. Hence, he endorses Eduardo 
Rabossi   in   saying   that,   ‘the   human   rights   phenomenon   renders   human   rights 
foundationalism outmoded and irrelevant’ (quoted in Rorty 1993:116). There are two 
purported reasons for this. First, the manifest consensus on human rights belies the 
need for philosophical defences – we are already agreed that human rights are 
contingently a good thing; we need not waste our time squabbling with philosophers 
over why they are so good. In discussing Donnelly’s reliance on consensus, above, it 
became apparent that consensus in itself tells us little about the (potential) value of the 
thing at issue. This same criticism applies to Rorty’s use of the consensus argument in 
support of human rights. However, there is a second and more important claim in 
Rorty’s work: he agrees with Rabossi in asserting that there are no ‘morally relevant 
transcultural facts’ (Rorty 1993:116). What he means by this is that the various 
attempts adherents of human rights have made to ground human rights in ‘facts’ about 
27 Pogge’s account of human rights, though intended as a critique of, and alternative to, ‘mainstream’ 
approaches, is nevertheless clearly rooted in a liberal, rationalistic approach to rights theorising. His 
‘institutional’ model is discussed in chapter 4.
67human nature, such as humans’ inherent rationality, or their status as the creation of a 
particular God, cannot be universally supported in the context of a plural world. It 
follows that the spread of the idea of human rights to the point of there being the 
consensus he and Donnelly now herald, has not been consequent upon appeal to such 
‘transcultural facts’. That being the case, the debate about transcultural facts has no 
practical value: ‘Since no useful work seems to be done by insisting on a purportedly 
ahistorical human nature, there probably is no such nature, or at least nothing in that 
nature that is relevant to our moral choices’ (Rorty 1993:119).
However, Rorty in fact smuggles both a ‘transculturally relevant fact’ and an 
implicit theory of human nature into his defence of human rights. The appeal to 
sympathy suggests that there is something all humans are capable of: suffering. 
Because all humans can suffer, all humans can, in theory, imagine what it is like to 
experience a particular manifestation of suffering that another person experiences, and 
that, in theory, should elicit sympathy. Animals also suffer, but Rorty suggests that 
the most useful way to differentiate animals from humans is to say that ‘we can feel 
for each other to a much greater extent than they can’ (Rorty 1993:122, emphasis in 
original). This sounds suspiciously like a tentative theory of human nature, something 
Rorty has unequivocally denounced as not having any analytical value (Hayden 
1999:61). Indeed, Christopher Berry suggests that, where Rorty posits sympathy as a 
device that facilitates the identification of sufferers as ‘one of us’, it seems that, ‘after 
all, some standard notion of human nature does have some work to do by rendering 
identification possible’ (Berry 1986:129). Furthermore, Rorty’s comparison of human 
rights with aspirin – both are remedies to common problems, and no-one who has 
known their benefits would subsequently refuse them – not only simplifies to a degree 
that might discount the need for local variations in the interpretation of human rights, 
it also seems to presuppose some degree of universality, the possibility of which in 
moral or cultural terms Rorty denies (Rorty 2000, Peerenboom, 2000). 
Rorty would perhaps respond that the ‘inevitable’ preference for liberalism is 
contingent upon it being the best idea around at present – this is not a universalist 
position because the argument is not that liberalism will always be the best option. 
But there are further problems in Rorty’s work that result from his commitment to 
liberalism, however ironic or contingent. Richard Bernstein has complained that, 
[s]ometimes Rorty concedes that there are important differences among 
the   varieties   of   liberalism,   but   these   differences   are  political  not 
68philosophical... [but] he does not clarify what constitutes “the political” or 
how one is to evaluate critically competing political arguments. (Bernstein 
1987:547)
In an essay written by way of response to Bernstein, Rorty tells us that philosophers 
are ‘useful for, roughly, private rather than public purposes’ (Rorty 1987:572). 
Elsewhere, however, he endorses Rawls’ ‘Difference Principle’ as an example of 
what philosophy can ‘hope to do’, which is, ‘summarize our culturally influenced 
intuitions about the right thing to do in various situations’ (Rorty 1993:117). There is 
clearly some ambiguity in Rorty’s separation of public and private, political and 
philosophical. The separation of the public from the private is a familiar liberal 
strategy which has stimulated an established body of criticism, some of which leaves 
Rorty’s theory looking rather vulnerable. Rorty may feel that no particular work is 
needed to demonstrate why philosophers should address some questions rather than 
others, but he is misguided if he thinks that this also applies to political agents. As Jo 
Burrows   rightly   points   out:   ‘Often   political   issues   cannot   even   be   identified 
pragmatically, that is non-ideologically’ (Burrows 1990:328). Indeed, Nancy Fraser 
attacks Rorty’s liberalism on the grounds that,
[Rorty’s theory] stands or falls with the possibility of drawing a sharp 
boundary between public and private life. But is this really possible? [...] 
the social movements of the last hundred or so years have taught us to see 
the power-laden and therefore political character of interactions which 
classical liberalism considered private. (Fraser 1990:312)
3.3.2 The failure of reason
Despite this, Rorty’s theory of human rights is instructive because he offers a 
convincing explanation of the failure appeals to respect human rights as the rational 
thing to do. Rorty points to the example of Thomas Jefferson:
The founder of my university was able both to own slaves and to think it 
self-evident that all men were endowed by their creator with certain 
inalienable rights … Like the Serbs, Mr. Jefferson did not think of himself 
as violating human rights. (Rorty 1993:112)
The simplistic character of some of Rorty’s comments about the Balkan conflict 
notwithstanding, Rorty here makes the important point that the problem for human 
rights activists is not the rare case of the psychopath who treats ‘human beings’ in an 
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people who are not members of his or her (self-defined) community as ‘human 
beings’. Justifications of human rights that rely on accepting our common humanity 
on the basis of our rationality (such as that espoused by Gewirth) are bound to fail, in 
Rorty’s view, because, ‘everything turns on who counts as a fellow human being, as a 
rational agent in the only relevant sense – the sense in which rational agency is 
synonymous with membership in our moral community’ (Rorty 1993:124). The same 
holds true for religious based defences of human rights, or any other defence of 
human rights that rests on a truth claim – human rights are violated not because the 
(universal) truth is repudiated, but because the validating characteristic of humanity is 
used as a tool for exclusion. Thus it is possible for persecutors to think of themselves, 
like Jefferson, as not violating universal rights. 
In responding to proponents of such arguments, Rorty finds it instructive to 
think of them as deprived, not of rationality, but rather: ‘It would be better – more 
suggestive of possible remedies – to think of them as deprived of two more concrete 
things: security and sympathy.’ (Rorty 1993:128) It can be noted that this hardly 
applies to Rorty’s chosen example – Jefferson – who does not seem to have lacked 
either sympathy or security, but these two values are at the heart of Rorty’s 
understanding of human rights as a ‘human rights culture’, and furnish an answer to 
the second question proposed above, namely, what does Rorty think does the work of 
expanding our moral community and bolstering our support for human rights, if 
philosophical or religious foundations are doomed to failure. 
The example of Jefferson clearly needs to be explained, but it is first worth 
pursuing Rorty’s argument further. He amplifies his argument against an appeal to 
philosophical or religious foundations by identifying an alternative strategy he thinks 
more likely to be effective. If, he claims, saying that ‘our little differences are 
insignificant compared to the one big commonality of a universal truth’ has no impact 
on the moral choices people make, then the best strategy is to hope that a ‘sentimental 
education’   can   ‘redescribe’   the   little   differences   in   a   way  that   renders   them 
insignificant (Rorty 1999:86). Thus, rather than suggesting, with Immanuel Kant or 
Gewirth, that our rationality can ground a universal morality, Rorty proposes that we 
should look to David Hume’s notion of the human capacity to experience cruelty and 
sympathy.   Quoting   Annette   Baier,   he   explains,   ‘Hume   held   that   “corrected 
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moral capacity”’. (Rorty 1993:129)
Patrick Hayden has claimed that Baier’s work on Hume, one of the sources 
from   which   Rorty   derives   his   thesis,   does   not   support   Rorty’s   conclusions. 
Specifically, Hayden points to the fact that Hume thought that ‘“artificial” rules of 
justice [are required] to lead our sentiments beyond their local partiality’ (Hayden 
1999:62). But Rorty clearly acknowledges here Hume’s belief that rules might of 
necessity play a part in guiding sentiment. Nevertheless, the emphasis in Rorty’s work 
is on a sentimental education, not the development of rules, though perhaps human 
rights could be interpreted as the sort of rules a sentimental education might inspire 
people to adhere to. A sentimental education proceeds by way of hearing sad and 
sentimental stories that encourage sympathy for the victims. Such an education 
encourages individuals to see the (little) differences between themselves and the 
victims of the stories as less significant than the (equally little) similarities between 
us, ‘such little, superficial, similarities as cherishing our parents and our children – 
similarities that do not interestingly distinguish us from many nonhuman animals’ 
(Rorty 1993:129). According to Rorty, while little progress has been made by those 
who tell us that ‘kinship and custom are morally irrelevant’, the telling of such stories 
has encouraged us in the West to enlarge our moral community. Thus, the success of 
the international human rights regime, to date, is held to owe more to ‘agents of love’ 
(anthropologists, artists and journalists) than to ‘agents of justice’ (judges, theologians 
and philosophers) (Rorty 1991). 
There is a clear debt to Christianity in Rorty’s thinking: Implicit in the 
sentimental stories he appeals to is the universal Christian command ‘love thy 
neighbour’, which Rorty (1993:122) describes as Christ’s fundamental message, a 
message he explicitly hopes to secularise. As well as being aware of the debt to 
Christianity   in   his   proposed   human   rights   culture   Rorty   also   notes   Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s contempt for its message of brotherly love. Acknowledged, too, is ‘our 
sense that sentiment is too weak a force’ and that we resist this as a basis for morality 
largely because it follows that the fate of those whose human rights are not secure 
rests in the hands of those who already enjoy security. In order for those currently 
threatened to have a better, more secure future, it depends upon the powerful taking 
the trouble to care (Rorty 1993:129-30). This fits the story of Jefferson’s apparently 
hypocritical behaviour better than Rorty’s suggestion that people who disrespect 
71human rights are in some way deprived. It also suggests that something more is 
needed than security and a capacity for sympathy in order for a sentimental education 
to be effective. 
Rorty’s reading of the history of the concept of human rights would seem to 
suggest that the limits of liberal tolerance are enlarged each time a given community 
learns to think of some new group of outsiders as within the scope of moral concern, 
and therefore being due the courtesy of being treated with dignity and respect. But the 
question   of   what   determines   the   location   of   that   boundary   requires   further 
investigation. Rorty hopes a sentimental education will push it ever wider, but 
‘harder’ contingencies, such as the material conditions in which people live, equally 
play a role. Rawls cites the example of the European wars of religion, whereby 
religion shifted from being a matter of public policy to being a private concern, 
primarily because it was too costly to pursue disagreements over religious differences 
at the state level (Rawls 1985:225). For Rorty, it is no coincidence that the West, the 
most industrialised and technologically advanced culture in history, is also the 
historical home of the concept of human rights and the most promising candidate for 
adopting a human rights culture. As Rorty explains: ‘Security and sympathy go 
together. […] Sentimental education only works on those who can relax long enough 
to listen’ (Rorty 1993:128).
There are obvious parallels here with the difficulties for Donnelly’s argument 
from consensus on human rights to a justification for human rights. Consensus on a 
given norm is contingent, as Rorty readily accepts, but given that contingencies can 
be ‘hard’ as well as ‘soft’, there are reasons to suspect that the consensus on human 
rights would not be so strong if human rights had not found their way into the foreign 
policies of many of the most powerful governments in the world today. Moreover, the 
problem   of   human   rights   being   contingent   upon   ‘security’   demonstrates   that 
continued or growing consensus is not inevitable. Just as the boundary between those 
within and outwith the scope of equal moral concern expands, it can also retract (as it 
did in 1930s Germany), and this is most likely to be correlated with a decrease in our 
sense of our own security. As discussed in chapter 2, the increasing likelihood of 
environmental   threats   to   human   security   that   are   caused   by   environmentally 
unsustainable patterns of economic globalisation are therefore, on Rorty’s reading, 
likely to undermine the purported consensus on human rights. This is not a problem 
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conclude, Rorty’s proposed sentimental education is ultimately too weak to provide 
the kind of intellectual defence for human rights that many activists would hope for.
28 
This leaves the advocate of human rights seeking to justify support for human rights 
in philosophical terms at an impasse: Rational justifications fail; the purported 
consensus on human rights does not in itself furnish reasons to support them; a 
sentimental education is too weak to withstand a decrease in our security, which is 
precisely the point when human rights are vulnerable. Freeman concludes that the 
only option left is to make ‘a nonrational decision either to accept or reject solidarity 
with humanity’ (Freeman 1994:514), which, despite Freeman’s doubts about Rorty’s 
approach, clearly echoes the latter’s conclusions.  
3.4 Conclusion
Of the three possible routes to justifying universal human rights considered 
here; firstly by means of rational enquiry, secondly by means of an overlapping 
consensus, and thirdly by means of a sentimental education; none of proved entirely 
satisfactory. Rational approaches such as Gewirth’s presuppose something that cannot 
be rationally proven and moreover is to some extent at odds with the secularism of a 
rational approach; that is, that humans beings have some inherent, intrinsic worth. 
Moreover, the secularism of Gewirth’s approach, which is said to be characteristic of 
the contemporary human rights regime in general, is offensive to some people whose 
world view is fundamentally religious. 
The   overlapping   consensus   model   proposed   by  Donnelly   failed   largely 
because consensus in itself does not indicate that the subject of the consensus is good 
or bad or desirable or not. In the next chapter, I also discuss some doubts about the 
empirical claim that there is an overlapping consensus on human rights. A further 
28 Langlois (2001) also finds Rorty’s theory too weak, and proposes an alternative based on Cass 
Sunstein’s   idea   of   ‘incompletely   theorised   agreements’,   which   are   supposed   to   represent   an 
improvement on the consensus model that Donnelly proposes in that the incompletely theorised 
agreement allows for metaphysical beliefs to play a part in justifying commitments. Support for human 
rights on the basis of an incompletely theorised agreement, according to Langlois, would be contingent 
upon individual beliefs, so that those who found rights to religious freedom, say, contrary to their 
position, could essentially derogate from that aspect of the overlapping agreement on human rights. 
Beliefs would also be expected to change over time. This basis for universal human rights seems to me 
to be even weaker than Rorty’s proposed sentimental education, which Langlois attacks, and, as 
Langlois himself concedes, ‘[a]n incompletely theorised agreement is inadequate, however, for the 
important question of dissent from the dominant human rights discourse’ (Langlois 2001:123), which 
Rorty finds the most difficult problem that human rights advocates confront.
73difficulty in Donnelly’s argument arose in relation to his understanding of the 
universalism of human rights, which was contingent upon the globalisation of markets 
and states. Human rights were understood to be the best tool available to protect 
human dignity in the face of the threats presented by markets and states. Implicit in 
this account is a relatively universalistic account of human dignity, one in which to be 
a flourishing human being is to exercise autonomy, self-determination, democratic 
self-expression, and so on. Absent, however, from Donnelly’s understanding of the 
threats posed by markets and states are the environmental problems argued in chapter 
2 to be attendant upon economic globalisation.
The final approach discussed above was Rorty’s idea of human rights as a 
sentimental education. Rorty accepts that human rights are inherently liberal, but 
argues that a contingent commitment to liberalism should not deter adherents from 
asserting the universal value of human rights. Rorty is convincing in his claim that 
human rights advocates who appeal to what he calls ‘foundational truths’, such as 
God, or reason, cannot provide a persuasive answer to the question of why someone 
should care about the human rights of a stranger unless they share those particular 
foundational truths. The better strategy, Rorty concludes, is to appeal to sentimental 
stories that invite imagination and sympathy. Given that sympathy, in Rorty’s view, is 
to some extent contingent upon security, the probability of increasing environmental 
problems and the attendant threat to human security discussed in chapter 2 indicates 
that there is reason for concern about future levels of support and respect for human 
rights. In view of these and other threats, it is not surprising that most commentators 
find Rorty’s prescription of a sentimental education too weak a basis for justifying 
human rights. 
On the other hand, Freeman’s conclusion that individuals must choose (or not) 
a nonrational commitment to solidarity with humanity is arguably also weak. But it is 
not necessarily liberal, as Rorty avowedly is. Indeed, as will be discussed in chapter 6, 
the notion of solidarity has also been a feature of green communitarian writing. The 
commitment to solidarity, however, does not necessarily entail a commitment to 
human rights as the best means of acting on this value. The next chapter explores 
some of the criticisms that have been levelled at the contemporary international 
human rights regime, and considers a possible alternative.  
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Some criticisms and an alternative
In the previous chapter, I raised doubts about the purported international 
consensus on human rights. This is not to suggest that human rights are not widely 
endorsed by governments, intergovernmental organisations such as the African 
Union, the European Union, and the United Nations, and by non-governmental 
organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as the 
Red Cross. However, when looking at support for human rights professed by 
governments, it is claimed that some of this support is a matter of realpolitik rather 
than spontaneous endorsement, particularly in non-Western states. On this reading, a 
degree of support for human rights is in fact coerced. A framework for understanding 
and examining this claim is provided by Jack Donnelly’s work on the idea of human 
rights as a ‘standard of civilisation’. Donnelly argues that support for human rights is 
coming to be seen by the international community as the price of a place at the table 
in international politics. In the final section of this chapter, I suggest a similar idea 
plays a role in Thomas Pogge’s thinking about human rights. While human rights 
advocates might welcome the scope for encouraging greater compliance with human 
rights norms, towards the end of the chapter I argue that using human rights as a 
standard by which to judge others can be problematic.
  Moving away from state elites to the grass roots level, it has also been claimed 
that the purported consensus on human rights is less evident than adherents would 
wish. But many commentators attribute some of this apparent resistance to the 
contemporary human rights regime not to the idea of human rights per se, but rather, 
to human rights as they tend to be interpreted and implemented in contemporary 
world politics. Critics in this debate point to the state-centrism of human rights, and to 
what has been called the ‘ambivalence with respect to power’ that has been 
characteristic of human rights practice. Commentators such as Abdullahi An-Na‘im 
conclude that, in view of these criticisms, a reconceptualisation of human rights is 
needed. One possible candidate for a new way of understanding human rights that 
could address the problems of state-centrism and ambivalence with respect to power 
is proposed by Pogge. Pogge’s ‘insititutional’ model of human rights aims to 
demonstrate how the chronic ‘underfulfilment’ of human rights, particularly socio-
economic rights, in developing countries, could be addressed if human rights were re-
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that this new orientation towards the chronic underfulfilment of human rights is better 
equipped to address the kind of human rights issues likely to arise as a consequence of 
environmental degradation than the contemporary international human rights regime. 
Before discussing Pogge’s institutional model, I consider two kinds of criticisms 
about the contemporary human rights regime; firstly, doubts about the consensus that 
is claimed to endorse the International Bill of Rights, and secondly, the ambivalence 
of human rights with respect to power.  
4.1 Doubts about consensus
One oft-studied field that may shed light on doubts about consensus is the so-
called ‘Asian values’ debate. The Asian values debate began in the aftermath of the 
Asian economic boom of the late 1980s and 1990s, and though it has died down a 
little since the 1997 economic collapse, it is nevertheless instructive to consider some 
of the arguments presented in that context. Public and academic attention was 
particularly sparked by the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, made by a group of Asian 
leaders by way of prelude to the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. The 
‘debate’ responds to the claims made in that document and in public statements by a 
number of Asian government officials, notably from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia 
and Thailand, that there are specifically Asian values, and that these values are 
distinct from and (in some versions) incompatible with the UDHR model of human 
rights (Bauer and Bell 1999:3-23; Othman 1999:171; Langlois 2001:12-45). Anthony 
J. Langlois summarises these values as broadly concerning culture, economics, and 
the role of the state, with the arguments being used by Asian state leaders to 
‘legitimate a soft-authoritarianism style of leadership in which the individual is 
subservient to the good of the community’, and where civil and political rights are 
held to be depend upon social and economic rights, therefore legitimising policies that 
prioritise economic development at the expense of civil and political rights (Langlois 
2001:24). Hence Vitit Muntarbhorn’s finding that, while remarkable consensus exists 
over economic and social rights in Asia, with considerable attention paid to a ‘right to 
development’, recognition of and subscription to the ‘universal’ rights to such goods 
as freedom of thought, expression and association, and freedom of religion, is far less 
certain in the region (Muntarbhorn 2001:81-92).
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values debate is not new. To give only one example, Malaysian politician and human 
rights scholar Hishammuddin Tun Hussein enumerates seven points of contention 
with respect to the ‘North’s’
29 understanding of universal human rights (2001:76-79). 
(1) Diversity is not taken seriously. (2) The South is blamed for problems for which 
the North is at least in part responsible, for example, drug trafficking (when it is 
people in the North who do the majority of the drug consuming). (3) Human rights do 
not take into account the place of community. Human rights are secular, yet the 
majority of the world’s inhabitants profess a religion. These religions generally 
promote ethics of duties or the right, rather than rights. (4) Human rights are unevenly 
upheld by the international community. The example given relates to the very 
different international welcomes received by Myanmar and Israel. Human rights 
should not be a matter of ‘realpolitik’ (2001:77). (5) Nations of the South require time 
to develop their own (appropriate) institutions − ‘Abrupt transplants never work’ 
(2001:77). (6) The North focuses on civil and political rights, whereas, ‘imperilled by 
the twin forces of globalisation and liberalisation’, Asian people ‘are more concerned 
with the right to food, the right to shelter and the right to work’ (2001:79). (7) Linking 
human rights to aid, trade and foreign direct investment undermines the alleged 
universalism − ‘If the right to development is to be truly inalienable and fundamental, 
there cannot be conditionalities’ (2001:79).
There are broadly two types of criticism here – one relates to hypocrisy or 
double standards on the part of the West, (points (2), (4), and (7)), – the other relates 
to the claim that there are distinctly Asian values that are not recognised, and are 
undermined by the supposedly universal doctrine of human rights. In response to this 
latter charge, it is worth noting that many of the problems raised have in fact been 
highlighted before by Western critics of human rights. Waldron’s (1987) review of 
the arguments Jeremy Bentham, Edmund Burke and Karl Marx advanced against the 
idea of natural rights reveals a long history of intellectual concern over the concept of 
inalienable rights of man qua man, many of which are echoed in more recent debate. 
Hussein’s first complaint, that the doctrine of human rights does not take the fact of 
diversity seriously, is an echo of Burke’s complaint that the French revolutionary idea 
of the natural rights of man abstracted from one circumstance to another, thus failing 
29 I take those Hussein identifies as ‘the North’ to be roughly synonymous with ‘the West’, though both 
these terms are inadequate.
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Hussein raises is compatible with much of Marx’s critique of the rights of man as the 
rights of the bourgeois liberal
30 (Waldron 1987:126-30). Similarly, the individualism 
of natural rights, attacked differently by Marx and Burke (Waldron 1987:184-90), 
finds a fellow critic in the third point of Hussein’s attack on human rights. This 
demonstrates, if nothing else, that neither ‘Western values’ nor ‘Asian values’ will be 
subscribed to by all those who are thought to be ‘Western’ or ‘Asian’. Indeed, 
scholars have pointed out that those who claim to defend particular cultural values 
against the universalism of human rights have often been guilty of oppressing the 
people they claim to represent, whereas the language of human rights has been taken 
up by oppressed peoples in countries where elites have rejected it (see, for example, 
Wilson 1987a:8-10). Cultural relativism, it is argued, goes hand in hand with political 
conservatism. 
To test the idea that some state leaders have used the purported Asian values 
to defend their own positions, rather than their people, Langlois (2001:46-72) studied 
grass roots support for human rights (as defined in the UDHR model) in South-East 
Asia. He conducted fifty interviews with academics, activists, NGO staff and think-
tank members from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. The questions posed included 
‘are there human rights, how do we know, and which rights are they?’ For many 
interviewees, religion played a major part in their worldview, such that God (Allah, in 
fact) supplied the answer to these questions. According to Langlois (2001:63-65), 
discussions of such varied issues as women’s rights, gay rights
31, and most strikingly, 
religious freedom, revealed that, where people’s understanding of the world is 
religious − that is, people support human rights because those rights specify standards 
of behaviour that it is one’s religious duty to uphold; one knows this because of 
revelation; the content of these rights is knowable because religious texts and their 
interpreters can explicate them − then human rights are not universal, because 
different rights are specified. This finding is to some extent in harmony with the 
argument in the previous chapter regarding the role that fundamental religious or 
philosophical beliefs play in shaping beliefs about human rights.
30 That said, Waldron argues that Marx’s view of these rights as the rights of citizens, rather than of 
man, was more ambivalent (see Waldron 1987:158).
31 The right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is not included in the 
International Bill of Rights. Langlois nonetheless documents hostility to gay rights on the part of his 
interviewees, and notes their identification of gay rights as ‘Western’.
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in the interpretation of rights can be accommodated if rights are universally endorsed 
at the conceptual level. But Langlois believes that the differences he finds at the level 
of interpretation cast doubt on the plausibility of consensus on the concept. This 
argument can be illustrated with reference to Langlois’ (2001:67-72) discussion of 
rights to religious freedom. In a study focused on Islam as practised in South-East 
Asia, and its compatibility with the UDHR, he finds that, ‘there is not, within Islam, 
latitude such that people are ‘free to get free’ as they are in the West. On the contrary, 
the only freedom to be legitimately had is freedom within the ethics of Islam’ 
(Langlois 2001:68). In the opinion of a number of interviewees, Islam is not 
conceptualised as a religion that one can choose to ‘give up’, in the way that one can 
choose to change job, or house. This is not to say that all South-East Asians, or even 
all Muslim South-East Asians, do not accept a human right to religious freedom. 
However, it is to say that the interpretations here are so radically different that these 
rights to religious freedom can be described in the same terms if, and only if, one 
chooses not to examine the contested meaning of the terms. Religious freedom 
understood as the freedom to practice a religion is quite different from the freedom to 
choose not to practice a religion, and is something different again from the freedoms 
granted by a given religious code. 
But others remain critical of this sort of argument. Norani Othman (1999), 
studying the possibility of grounding human rights in Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia 
– two of Langlois’ test cases – argues that ‘although Islam may be as culturally 
contingent as its Western counterpart, it nevertheless has the capacity to yield a notion 
of universal human rights’ (Otham 1999:170). Othman acknowledges that there are, 
those Muslims who claim outright that current human rights concepts and 
standards (especially those incorporated within prevailing international 
human rights documents) are completely alien to Islam and incompatible 
with Islamic law as they interpret it. (Othman 1999:171)
But she points to struggles for women’s rights in Malaysia as evidence of people 
challenging the particular interpretation of Islam that opposes human rights. Neither 
Islam nor human rights emerge from this process of challenge and re-interpretation as 
the previously ‘fixed’ concepts that were held to be antithetical. This idea of re-
interpretation of human rights through challenges from different social movements is 
also present in the recent work of a number of Western scholars. Those who highlight 
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(2002) demonstrate that the focus and content of human rights has evolved over time 
and is unlikely to remain as it is. Approaching the debate from the other side, 
Raimundo Panikkar (1982) and An-Na‘im (1999; 2001) argue that cultural or 
religious doctrines such as Islam are also not static. Moreover, resigning oneself to the 
belief that human rights and particular world views are incompatible offers little by 
way of constructive practical advice on how to respond to the fact of human rights 
abuses or underfulfilment. Notwithstanding Asad’s (1997) point that what constitutes 
suffering is culturally and even individually variable, there are, as Freeman (1998) 
argues, nonetheless instances of practices that seem intuitively to be wrong to the 
extent that no-one should be subjected to them. The epistemic difficulties raised by 
Asad and Cruft, as discussed in the previous chapter, suggest that it may sometimes 
be difficult to determine whether or not a practice that seems intuitively to be a human 
rights violation should in fact be so understood. But sometimes it may not. In neither 
case does it straightforwardly follow that no action should be taken. Similarly, the 
claim that different values are held by those responsible for, or complicit in, practices 
that are judged to be human rights violations does not unproblematically provide 
grounds for inaction by others. As Andrew J. Nathan observes:
To refrain from intervening is to side with those on top. Given the 
ubiquity of power, between and within cultures, there is no option of a 
power-free discourse over values. One way or another, moral choice is 
unavoidable. (Nathan 2001:358)
Doubts about consensus, then, are no more a guide to (in)action on human rights than 
is consensus. 
4.1.1 Human rights as a ‘standard of civilisation’
Donnelly thinks the unavoidable choice is in favour of human rights, not 
because of power relations within cultures, but because of the power of markets and 
states. Thus, he responds to the claimed particularity of Asian values by reiterating his 
commitment to the view that the fallout from the globalisation of markets and states 
makes human rights universally necessary, even if they are not universally supported: 
‘[C]ontemporary Asian individuals, families, and societies face the same threats from 
modern markets and states that Western societies do, and therefore need the same 
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critical of Donnelly, reaches a very similar conclusion: 
[I]t   is   not   necessary   to   accept   the   legitimacy   of   a   teleological 
modernization thesis to recognize the extent to which the globalizing 
dynamics   of   political   and   economic   power   have   created   powerful 
tendencies towards universalization and homogenization. So, even if it 
were true that peoples of particular cultures did not need human rights 
before, a good case may be made that they certainly need them now! 
(Stammers 1999:993)
But Donnelly (1998) has also described human rights as a nascent ‘standard of 
civilisation’, whereby respect for human rights is the price to be paid for a place at the 
table in international politics.  Tracing the history of the idea of ‘standards of 
civilisation’ in international relations from the nineteenth century to the present, 
Donnelly finds that powerful states have used their own standard of civilisation to 
determine the kind of relations they will have with weaker states. Only those 
governments that powerful (Western) governments considered legitimate have been 
recognised as equal players in the game that is international politics, and treated 
accordingly. States not meeting this standard have been the subject of ‘extra-
territoriality agreements’, or in extreme cases, colonialism (Donnelly 1998:3-11). 
Today, we can see parallels of this sort of differentiation at the international level in 
the existence of so-called ‘pariah states’, or ‘rogue states’, such as North Korea, or, 
formerly, South Africa. Another manifestation of this sort of discrimination is found 
in the European Union’s criteria for membership. 
This constructivist understanding of human rights recognises that state actors, 
in an arena where peer recognition brings considerable benefits, have powerful 
incentives to meet the standard of civilisation demanded by those who support human 
rights if such actors occupy positions of power. One of the ways in which powerful 
state actors can and do practically incentivise support for human rights is by attaching 
human rights conditions to trade and aid packages (Neumeyer 2003). The use of such 
strategies leads Hussein to complain that ‘the entire issue [of compliance with human 
rights norms] is reduced to a question of political might and realpolitik’ (Hussein 
2001:77). A similar claim is made by Langlois (2003:512). If these doubts are valid, 
then the Rawlsian overlapping consensus that Donnelly finds with respect to human 
rights is in fact closer to what Rawls called a modus vivendi, a less stable agreement 
81where such consensus as may be found is a product of shifting power relations and 
interests, which may develop into an overlapping consensus, but may not (Rawls 
1993:164-166). The purported consensus on human rights is met with a degree of 
cynicism by some commentators who see the universalism of human rights as a form 
of neo-imperialism on the part of Western powers (Evans and Hancock 1998). A 
similar   cynicism   has   met   some   interpretations   of   the   idea   of   ‘sustainable 
development’, particularly where industrialised Western powers seek to curb the 
industrialising options of poorer countries. One  Malaysian scholar claims that the 
environmentalist pretensions of the West are simply a public excuse for forcing 
developing countries to buy Western environmentally friendly technology whilst 
obtaining the rights to seed patents developed from Southern hemisphere resources. 
He also dismisses human rights:
[A]lthough the campaign for democracy and human rights is in the name 
of protecting the interests and rights of minorities, in essence, it works to 
secure the view held by the advanced countries on the subject and, thus 
giving the campaign a hegemonic character. (Balasubramaniam 1998:389)
One point to note here is that, should the most powerful actors withdraw their support 
for human rights, or should the international arena change such that those who do not 
support human rights become more powerful without meeting the ‘human rights’ 
standard of civilisation, then, where international politics is seen as a zero-sum game, 
the power of those supporting human rights is weakened, and so actors would have 
(cynical) reasons to abandon their support for human rights. 
The idea of human rights as a standard of civilisation also casts some light on 
the claim that Western powers are hypocritical in their approach to human rights. One 
of the key ideas embodied in the contemporary idea of human rights is the right to 
self-determination.
32  This right recognises that all individuals are morally equal, 
insofar as each person has the right to determine for himself his own preferred course 
of action (provided his choice does not infringe the rights of others). It is, therefore, 
an essentially democratic right, because it affirms that no-one can legitimately assert 
authority over another without their consent. This right can clearly be said to be in a 
liberal tradition, with a history traceable back at least as far as John Locke’s idea of a 
32 As Iris Marion Young (2001:26) notes, the right to self-determination does not appear in the UDHR, 
but it has nevertheless been hugely influential in the post-Second World War discourse on human 
rights, and was incorporated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
which was drafted in 1966 and went into force ten years later. 
82social contract. But the liberal values embodied in this right are not at issue here. 
What is problematic is that, if support for human rights is coerced, then it would seem 
that the democratic values embodied in the right to self-determination are not 
respected. 
It   might   be   countered   that,   while   support   for   human   rights   may   be 
incentivised, to say that support is coerced is too strong a claim. Countries have a 
choice about whether or not to accept the loans or aid packages that come with human 
rights (or other) conditions attached. Moreover, governments who accept such 
conditions can also exercise some discretion in how or even whether to implement 
them. Indeed, Neumeyer (2003) has found that non-compliance with conditions 
attached to multilateral aid has rarely been a factor in determining whether subsequent 
funds would be made available to the defaulting country. But, as discussed in chapter 
2, many argue that, in the context of globalisation, poorer countries have very little 
real choice about whether or not to accept the conditions imposed by Western 
institutions when negotiating trade and aid deals (Shiva 1999; Speth 2003). On the 
other hand, it can be argued that power relations are inevitable in any political 
situation, and so to conclude that a decision has been coerced because one party was 
more powerful than another is no more than to say that it is a decision that has been 
made in the context of politics, and that practically, it is hard to imagine what 
conditions would be necessary in order for there not to be the possibility of unequal 
power relations influencing a decision (not) to support international human rights 
standards. Iris Marion Young (2001) would respond that it is precisely because social 
interaction is inevitable, and because unequal power relations are likely, that political 
institutions must be designed to take account of the interests and preferences of 
participants in any decision-making practice.
33 As is argued in the next section, the 
ambivalence of human rights with respect to power raises some difficult issues in this 
regard.
4.2 The ambivalence of human rights with respect to power
Social movements have long politicised ideas of natural rights, and later 
human rights, in pursuit of their goals. Stammers (1999) holds that, insofar as human 
33 Young offers a nuanced account of the obstacles to freedom in view of the inevitability of social 
interaction. ‘Freedom, then, means regulating and negotiating relationships so that all persons are able 
to be secure in the knowledge that their interests, opinions, and desires for action are taken into 
account’ (Young 2001:35).  
83rights remain contested, they are an important instrument in campaigns for justice. 
However, when particular sets of rights become institutionalised, they may come to be 
used to defend the status quo, rather than to advance the claims of the disadvantaged 
and disenfranchised. In the latter half of the twentieth century social movements in a 
number   of   colonised   states   successfully   claimed   their   human   right   to   self-
determination. These claims were in part presented in the European idiom of rights 
going back to Locke. The success of these movements led to independence from 
European powers, however, the experience of many African and some Asian post-
colonial states has not been the widespread protection of human rights. Moreover, the 
language of rights is sometimes used by leaders to frustrate external efforts to 
promote human rights. This paradox in human rights is not new. Although human 
rights are not synonymous with the natural rights claimed by early liberals, there is a 
comparison to be drawn in the use of natural rights and human rights:
[T]he idea of natural rights ceased to be an instrument for political change 
and, rather, “came to be used to impede further change” when “the 
original and largely bourgeois proponents of natural rights gradually 
moved out of political opposition and into control”. (Stammers 1999:996, 
quoting Donnelly)
Two points are of interest here. Firstly, the argument of the anti-colonial 
movements was based in part on identifying an anomaly in dominant political 
practice, namely, the West proclaimed rights to self-determination for Europe but not 
for Africa.
34  Operating within the dominant paradigm, it has been possible for 
movements to achieve results by arguing that a set of values that are claimed to be 
universal ought to be universally applied. This has also been the basis of some 
arguments concerning rights for women, where success has been mixed (Rao 1995). 
Social movements are not guaranteed success simply by working within the terms of 
the power structures they seek to challenge. For one thing, success in claiming a 
particular right depends, as Rorty rightly observes, on getting the powerful to care 
(see previous chapter). The ‘progress’ of human rights, by which is meant increasing 
recognition of rights for previously excluded groups of people, has been a product not 
only of identifying and resolving anomalies in the application of supposedly universal 
rights, but also identifying previously unnoticed threats to human rights. This 
34 An-Na‘im (2001:100) notes that the idea of human rights was cited by both African leaders and 
European colonial powers in the struggles over decolonisation (see also Bain 2003:133-6).
84identification, in turn, engenders further reflection on what specific human rights 
there are, as well as asserting that previously excluded groups ought to be included. A 
relevant example here is the emerging idea of environmental human rights. A number 
of human rights scholars, including Freeman (2004), Donnelly (2003), Stammers 
(1999), and Langlois (2001), have mooted the possibility of there being legal 
recognition of some form of environmental human right in the future. But none have 
considered the implications of the hostility of much green political thought to the 
liberalism and individualism of human rights (see chapter 7). If environmental 
concerns are to be assimilated into the human rights framework, then some degree of 
renegotiation of both the form and content of human rights will be (probably) 
required. 
4.2.1 State-centrism and human rights
One point to consider when exploring the ambivalence of human rights with 
respect to power, then, concerns the structure of the human rights framework. If 
human rights are about protecting human dignity, and threats to human dignity come 
in the form of abuses of power, then human rights, as they are conceptualised in 
international and national law and politics, need to be oriented to the location of 
power. The centralised state was and is a site of extraordinary power that has the 
potential to present considerable threats to individuals and/or groups. As Donnelly 
repeatedly notes, modern markets, as well as states, also pose considerable threats to 
human dignity. Moreover, as noted in chapter 2 and discussed further in chapter 5, the 
globalised economy is having a damaging impact on the environment, which in turn 
poses further threats to human security. But the contemporary international human 
rights framework established in the International Bill of Rights is notably state-
centric.
An-Na’im (2001) holds that all societies and communities can relate to the 
notion of struggles for justice, thus he agrees with Donnelly that the Western practice 
of human rights can achieve a Rawlsian overlapping consensus. For these scholars, 
the globalisation of Western political and economic forms, achieved in part, or at least 
begun, through coercive means, need not entail the wholesale adoption of Western 
forms of resistance to the negative fall-out from these phenomena. Instead, local 
populations can approve the institution of universal human rights, but give local 
flavour to their normative content (An-Na‘im 2001:93-9; Donnelly 2003:96-98). But 
85An-Na‘im has doubts about the plausibility of a consensus on human rights as they 
are currently institutionalised. Human rights, as set out in the UDHR, are rights to be 
protected from the state. Pogge (2002:58-64) illustrates this point by highlighting the 
differences between a common assault and an assault by a police officer. The latter, 
perpetrated by an agent of the state, is taken to be a human rights violation, whereas 
the former, perpetrated by a private citizen, is not.
35  At the same time, it is the 
government of the state, through its agents, that is simultaneously responsible for 
protecting human rights. As An-Na‘im (2001:96) puts it: ‘Although the purpose of the 
modern conception of human rights is to restrict the exclusive power of the state, it is 
the same state that controls the means by which that purpose is to be achieved.’ Onora 
O’Neill has compared this to ‘putting foxes in charge of hen houses’. She is certainly 
correct in observing that while having the capacity, in terms of legitimate power and 
authority, to ensure respect for human rights, may be a necessary qualification of 
whichever agent is to be responsible for human rights, it does not follow that those 
who have such a capacity ‘can be trusted to do so’ (O’Neill 2005:435). On the other 
hand, the only plausible alternative to state-centrism, that agents outwith the state 
might be made in some way responsible for ensuring that governments honour their 
human rights commitments, is impeded by the norm of state sovereignty, enshrined in 
the UN Charter.
Sovereignty is both a norm, the principle of which is that the autonomy of 
states should be respected, and an institution, an established model of political 
organisation. It is also an expression and exercise of our human right to self-
determination (An-Na‘im 2001:96-7; Bain 2003:134), and the most proven means yet 
devised for managing plurality and achieving tolerance in a diverse and globalising 
world (Jackson 2000:156-183). The international human rights regime initiated in the 
aftermath of the horrors of the Second World War was created with the aim of 
preventing governments from abusing their citizens on the massive scale seen in the 
Nazi   inflicted   Holocaust.   The   human   rights   framework   thus   pre-supposes   the 
existence of functioning sovereign states. While Freeman (2002:154-156) is rightly 
sceptical about the supposed autonomy of many (perhaps the majority of) sovereign 
35 This oversimplifies somewhat; Pogge devotes some time to explicating the ‘official’ nature of human 
rights abuses or ‘underfulfilment’. For instance, if the police officer refused to stop or apprehend the 
private citizen who assaulted another individual that would also constitute a human rights violation, 
again, on the part of the police officer. Pogge concludes that the defining feature of a human rights 
violation is that they involve some form of ‘official disrespect’ (Pogge 2002:64). See also Richard 
Wilson (1987b:140-141) on the distinction between human rights violations and ‘common crime’. 
86states in reality, and particularly in the context of globalisation, the doctrine of 
sovereign   autonomy   is   nonetheless   at   the   heart   of   the   human   rights   regime. 
Individuals have rights against the state for which the state is responsible. Other states 
can take action to hold a government accountable if it should fail to honour these 
obligations (Freeman 2002:155). Indeed, Raz (2006) sees human rights as marking 
the limits of legitimate sovereignty. But action in support of human rights and in 
conflict   with   sovereign   autonomy  has   rarely  been   anything   more  than  public 
statements of disapproval, and, particularly during the Cold War, there was very little 
appetite on the part of governments to actively promote human rights internationally 
(Donnelly 1999a).
36  This to some extent changed under the presidency of Jimmy 
Carter in the US (see Shue (1980) and Beitz (1979)), but it remains the case that states 
have appealed to the right to have their sovereign authority respected when criticised 
by external agents over human rights.
37 
As Robert Jackson somewhat glibly notes with reference to failed states, 
‘Sovereignty can be dangerous’ (Jackson 2000:294). Where there is no state, there is 
no agent responsible for the security of human rights: 
“Failed states” such as Somalia suggest that one of the few things as 
frightening in the contemporary world as an efficiently repressive state is 
no state at all. (Donnelly 2003:36)
Following through the logic of Donnelly’s argument, if (as Donnelly claims; see 
above) human rights have emerged globally as a necessary response to the sovereign 
state (and market economies), and human rights depend upon the sovereign state for 
recognition and implementation, yet states may fail, then there would seem to be a 
flaw in the system. Of course, to exclude the possibility of failure implies embracing 
paternalism, and it would hardly make sense to sacrifice the liberal value of freedom 
in order to guarantee human rights. However, where the failure is systemic rather than 
individual, there is reason to doubt the suitability of recognising states as the 
36  In the aftermath of the Cold War, there was some optimism regarding the alleged ‘triumph of 
liberalism’ and an expectation of greater willingness to put concern for human rights at the centre of 
foreign policy (see Fukuyama 1992; Brown 2005). The only humanitarian intervention to date that has 
been undertaken without the consent of the sovereign government was the NATO led action in Kosovo 
in 1999, which can at best be viewed as a partial success (see Wheeler and Bellamy 2002:481-483). 
Since the international terrorist attacks of September 11
th  2001, the prominence of human rights 
concerns in foreign policy has diminished somewhat.
37 Similarly, states have been able to use the norm of sovereignty in order to frustrate international 
efforts to take binding action on environmental problems such as climate change (see Conca 1994). 
87appropriate agents to protect human rights.
38 To illustrate, R.J. Vincent compares the 
international sovereignty based regime to an egg carton, and individual states to eggs 
(Vincent 1986:123-5). If an individual egg goes rotten there may be identifiable 
internal reasons for that. But, given the diversity of beliefs and ideologies, as well as 
physical circumstances and capacities (of states), it is not necessarily the case that 
they will all slot unproblematically into identical spaces in the carton. This is the 
essence of Christopher Clapham’s complaint:
[T]he idea of statehood presupposes that human beings can be organized 
into   territorially-based   hierarchies   which   they   can   be   compelled   or 
induced to accept, and that the economic resources will be forthcoming to 
maintain the rather expensive institutions which statehood entails. That 
such a form of organization can be made to work throughout the world is 
improbable; that it can be made to coincide with the territories often 
haphazardly bequeathed to newly independent governments by departing 
colonial powers is staggering in its presumption. (Clapham 1999: 531)
The ability of the sovereign state to respond to the pressures of economic 
globalisation varies significantly, with post-colonial states being among those least 
able to protect their citizens from the negative fallout of the global market that 
Donnelly recognises as a serious threat to human rights (see chapter 2, above). In 
view of the significant resources required to ensure the protection of human rights, 
O’Neill complains ‘[i]t is an empty gesture to assign obligations needed for human 
rights to weak states’ (O’Neill 2005:435). Similarly, on the basis of the resources 
required, An-Na‘im doubts the universal suitability of what he identifies as the 
Western model of human rights protection, specifically, the legal protection of human 
rights by pursuing prosecution of perpetrators as both a punishment of individual 
offenders and an example to others. According to An-Na‘im, the legalistic paradigm 
developed and currently pursued in the West is ill-suited to post-colonial Africa, and 
indeed compounds many of the problems such states presently face. The Western 
model ‘presupposes that the violation of rights is the exception rather than the rule’ 
(An-Na‘im 2001:105). Where it is not the case that the violation of human rights is 
the exception, a number of problems render the standard human rights paradigm 
ineffective: (1) The systematic nature of human rights abuses in post-colonial Africa, 
38 In chapter 6 I also discuss doubts about the exclusive sovereignty-based international order from an 
environmental perspective. 
88especially in terms of social and economic rights but also in terms of political and 
civil rights, is such that the courts could not cope with the numbers of potential 
claimants without significant additional investment in resources both human and 
material. Such investment is not presently forthcoming, nor is it likely to be so given 
the economic constraints faced by most states in these circumstances. (2) Potential 
claimants also often lack the financial resources to press their claims, for example, in 
terms of access to legal advice and time off work. More fundamentally, many victims 
of human rights violations lack the education to make them aware of the opportunities 
that they could pursue with respect to the legal protection of their human rights. (3) 
The courts in a number of post-colonial states are weak and/or corrupt.
39 For these 
reasons, An-Na‘im claims:
Although the problem is lack of conditions and requirements, it can be 
argued that the modern conception of human rights itself is an instrument 
of social injustice and repression. […] what should be rejected is the 
universalization of specific assumptions and institutional arrangements for 
the legal protection of human rights. (An-Na‘im 2001:102)
In light of these difficulties, he proposes that alternative strategies of implementation 
(rather than protection) of human rights should be pursued. Such an approach 
implicitly recognises the limits of the state-centric model of human rights, but, rather 
than rejecting the concept of human rights altogether, attempts to find locally 
appropriate solutions to the problem of implementing human rights within a universal 
framework that does not serve many post-colonial states well. It is at this point that 
An-Na’im becomes regrettably vague: the details of what alternative strategies of 
implementation might be are wanting. He proposes that the legal approach should 
continue but be broadened to include ‘mediation, arbitration, and other customary 
mechanisms to resolve disputes that are more appropriate to the social and economic 
conditions in Africa’ (An-Na‘im 2001:110), but also that root causes of systemic 
human   rights   abuses   must   be   addressed.   However,   An-Na‘im   recognises   that 
‘addressing the root causes of human rights violations is an extremely complex and 
protracted task’ (An-Na‘im 2001:110). Among his specific recommendations are 
‘drastic structural changes in international economic and political relations’, the 
details of which he does not provide. In addition, he speaks of a need to address 
39 An-Na‘im’s findings are based on a study of fourteen post-colonial African states, but he believes his 
research is more generally applicable.
89‘delicate   issues   of   sovereignty  and  the   paradox   of   self-regulation’   (An-Na‘im 
2001:113), and speculates on an increased role for the UN or similar international 
agencies. Insofar as An-Na’im makes a case for these changes, he is persuasive, but 
the details are not trivial. 
One potentially fruitful innovation in human rights that moves away from the 
state-centric paradigm is the nascent idea of corporate responsibility for human rights 
(and environmental protection). Recent developments in this area include the OECD’s 
‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, first drafted in 1976, then largely ignored 
for almost twenty-five years before being significantly revived and revised in 2000; 
and the United Nations’ Global Compact, initiated in 2000, enumerating nine 
principles of corporate responsibility for human rights, and social and environmental 
issues (King 2001; MacLeod and Lewis 2004:79-80, 83-85). Both sets of standards 
are voluntary, and while the OECD’s guidelines rely on governments to encourage 
compliance   and   implement   monitoring   systems,   the   UN’s   Global   Compact   is 
facilitated directly by the UN. The jury is still out on whether these initiatives will 
deliver on human rights protections,
40 however, given that both remain committed to a 
global capitalist agenda, these strategies are unlikely to provide the basis for the 
radical action needed to ensure environmental sustainability. Moreover, as co-
operation with these initiatives remains voluntary there is no scope for those suffering 
from the violation or underfulfilment of human rights to insist that corporate 
organisations   be   held   accountable.   This   (limited)   movement   away   from   the 
established norm of the state as the sole agent with responsibility for human rights 
suggests growing recognition of the need for alternative ways of responding to human 
rights issues. But this is very much an emerging practice and the developments are to 
some extent ad hoc. In the next section, I consider a much more systematic attempt to 
theorise an alternative to the contemporary international human rights regime, 
Pogge’s institutional model.
40 The initial signs were not as encouraging as might have been wished. Of the thirty corporations 
reporting on their human rights activities in the first year of the UN Global Compact, none were 
deemed ‘worthy of publication’ (MacLeod and Lewis 2004:84), which is to say that none of the efforts 
made by corporate participants were thought significant enough to merit the Global Compact’s public 
approval. On the other hand, this also indicates that the UN Global Compact’s Advisory Council is 
prepared to act more rigorously than some sceptics feared – it is not prepared to ‘rubber stamp’ just any 
initiative that is claimed to be an example of corporate social responsibility. 
904.3 Thomas Pogge’s ‘institutional’ model of human rights
Thomas Pogge has proposed a new way of understanding human rights that 
differs quite radically from conventional understandings, and which, if accepted, 
would have far-reaching implications for political and economic institutions at a 
national and global level. One of Pogge’s key innovations is the proposal that 
underfulfilment, rather than violation, should be the standard by which the security of 
human rights is assessed, and by which the human rights credentials of governments 
and other institutions are judged. What Pogge refers to as the ‘institutional’ model of 
human rights, as distinct from an interactional model, focuses on the way that human 
rights are understood to operate, rather than what the content of human rights is. A 
further distinction of Pogge’s model is that he explicitly defends a moral conception 
of human rights, rather than being committed to legal rights as the paradigmatic aim 
of human rights claims. Finally, the institutional model Pogge proposes is claimed to 
be immune from the attacks of libertarians who have traditionally been opposed to the 
obligations implicit in honouring social and economic rights, where these rights are 
seen to be positive rights.
41 If these claims can be verified, then Pogge’s theory would 
not only answer the challenge of addressing a situation of endemic human rights 
violations (or underfulfilment, in Pogge’s vocabulary), and have gone some way to 
outlining a plausible way of responding to the problem of state-centrism, but it would 
have done so whilst maintaining broad acceptability within mainstream politics. This 
would be quite an achievement. Before testing these claims, I briefly outline Pogge’s 
institutional model. 
One important feature of the institutional model is that it is explicitly a ‘moral 
approach’ (Pogge 2002:54), in that it enjoins people to take responsibility for the 
human rights of others by not supporting human rights-violating institutions. Pogge 
thus defines human rights as ‘moral claims on the organization of one’s society’ 
(Pogge 2002:64), or, put differently, ‘postulating a human right to X is tantamount to 
declaring that every society ought to be so organized that all its members enjoy secure 
41 The libertarian critique (see, for example, Nozick 1978) relates to the infringement of liberty that is 
supposedly entailed in recognising positive rights. Whereas respecting negative rights requires only 
that the agent refrain from a particular action, respecting positive rights, it is argued, requires the agent 
to take some specific action, such as provide food or economic support. Typically, civil and political 
rights are said to be negative rights, and social and economic rights are said to be positive rights. But 
this distinction is contentious. As both Henry Shue (1980) and Vandana Shiva (1999) have argued, a 
hungry man is not a free man, thus the two sets of rights are interdependent. It is also not the case that 
civil and political rights are only negative, and social and economic rights positive. One of the 
obstacles An-Na‘im identified above to the fulfilment of civil and political rights in post-colonial 
Africa is a lack of education.  
91access to X’ (Pogge 2000:52). Pogge is looking beyond the legal route to human 
rights protection. The fulfilment of human rights relies on morally motivated action of 
citizens rather than just legal recognition and codification of human rights. 
Tim Hayward (2005a:40-42) doubts the wisdom of this aspect of Pogge’s 
approach. Pogge explicitly rejects what he calls the ‘familiar’ institutional model, 
‘that conceives a human right to X as a kind of meta-right: a moral right to an 
effective legal right to X’ (Pogge 2002:45). Instead, Pogge is open to different ways 
of implementing human rights in different societies and cultures, and therefore rejects 
the idea of a necessary link between legal and moral rights. This is consistent with 
An-Na‘im’s approach, but Samantha Besson points out that Pogge undermines his 
own argument by elsewhere insisting on some degree of constitutional guarantees for 
democracy (Besson 2003:520). However, Pogge’s inconsistency does not answer the 
question of whether human rights should necessarily aspire to be legal rights. This is 
the way that Donnelly (2003:40) understands them, claiming that human rights aim to 
be ‘self-liquidating’; the moral right is claimed by a social movement campaigning for 
a legal right that will then make appeal to moral rights unnecessary because the right 
will have been secured. But An-Na‘im’s point is that legal protection does not equate 
to fulfilment of rights in many post-colonial states. It is this problem of the gap 
between protection and fulfilment that leads Pogge to embrace the idea of alternatives 
to legal protection. Thus while Hayward is justified in observing that, ‘if a human 
right is to ‘constrain legal and economic institutions’, as Pogge envisages, it is hard to 
see how it will unless it has some constitutional force that can be applied, as 
necessary, through law’ (Hayward 2005a:41), it is also appropriate to draw a 
distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions. The legal protection of 
human rights may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. 
  A   related   point   to   be   elucidated   is   Pogge’s   distinction   between   the 
‘observance’ and the ‘fulfilment’ of human rights (Pogge 2000:50). While human 
rights may be observed by a government insofar as they are legally codified and 
publicly endorsed, those rights may yet remain underfulfilled, even if they are not 
violated in the conventional sense. If a person does not speak out against her 
government for fear of persecution from others in her society, from which she 
reasonably expects that her government will not protect her, then it cannot necessarily 
be said that her right to freedom of speech has been violated, since the government 
has done nothing actively to prevent her from speaking out, but Pogge argues that her 
92right to freedom of speech is underfulfilled, because she does not securely enjoy the 
right to freedom of speech (Pogge 2000; 2002).
42  Conversely, if a person were 
assaulted by a police officer in a society where human rights are generally respected 
and where inappropriate behaviour by agents of the government is independently 
investigated and punished, then, on the institutional model, human rights are not 
underfulfilled. It is the general (in)security of human rights that matters here. Pogge 
acknowledges that not every society could plausibly guarantee the human rights of 
every person under their jurisdiction all the time, but he proposes,
an idea of reasonable security thresholds [whereby]: Your human rights 
are fully realized (fulfilled) when their objects are sufficiently secure – 
with the required degrees of security suitably adapted to the means and 
circumstances of the relevant social system. (Pogge 2000:52)
A third important feature of Pogge’s institutional model of human rights is his 
claim that negative, rather than positive, duties arise with respect to human rights, in 
that one has first the negative duty not to uphold coercive institutions that undermine 
the fulfilment  of the human rights of others, though, if this is not possible, 
compensatory action may be appropriate. So, according to Pogge, a person who owns 
no   slaves   in   a   society   of   slave   owners   is   nevertheless   responsible   for   the 
underfulfilment of human rights if she ‘contributes taxes to the government’ or her 
‘labor to the economy’ (Pogge 2002:66). As such, she is failing to fulfil the negative 
duty not to support human rights-disrespecting institutions and contributing to the 
underfulfilment of human rights in her society. Pogge thinks it important that negative 
rather than positive duties be involved for two reasons. Firstly, as noted above, he 
claims thereby to be insulated from the libertarian critique of positive duties, and 
secondly, negative duties are, according to Pogge (2000), more onerous or morally 
compelling than positive ones:
The most remarkable feature of this institutional understanding is that it 
can go well beyond minimalist libertarianism without denying its central 
tenet: that human rights entail only negative duties. The normative force 
of others’ human rights for me is that I must not help uphold and impose 
upon them coercive social institutions under which they do not have 
secure access to the objects of their human rights. (Pogge 2002:66) 
42 There is, however, a subjective element to this that may be problematic – how can ‘reasonable’ fears 
of being left unprotected be distinguished from unreasonable fears by any objectively verifiable means? 
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human rights claims work, the duty not to support coercively imposed social 
institutions that cause or contribute to human rights insecurity extends  globally 
insofar as we are implicated in a global social system.
43 In support of this he makes 
reference to Article 28 of the UDHR, which states that, ‘Everyone is entitled to a 
social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration can be fully realized’. Article 28 does not itself specify a right, but rather, 
makes reference to the institutional setting within which the other rights listed may be 
realised, or, in Pogge’s language, fulfilled. Thus he claims:
Our   responsibilities   entailed   by   human   rights   are   engaged   by   our 
participation in any coercively imposed institutional order in which 
persons avoidably lack secure access to the objects of their human rights, 
and these (negative) responsibilities are extended, then, through the 
emergence of a global institutional order in whose coercive imposition we 
collaborate. (Pogge 2000:55)
Note that Pogge states that human rights responsibilities kick in when people 
‘avoidably’ lack secure access to the objects of their human rights. There are three 
issues to be clarified here. The first is what counts as secure access, a question dealt 
with,   albeit   perhaps   unsatisfactorily,   by   introducing   the   ‘reasonable   security 
threshold’ mentioned above. The second is how it can be established that persons 
avoidably lack secure access to the objects of their human rights. The third is Pogge’s 
implicit claim that the global institutional order, rather than local or national 
problems, is either the explanatory factor, or a significant contributory factor, to the 
lack of secure access some persons have to the objects of their human rights. 
In contrast to Rawls,
44 Pogge argues that human rights problems often found in 
developing countries are a consequence not (exclusively) of local corruption and 
oppression, but rather of a global system that, as well as being characterised by 
43 It follows from this that, where persons do not share to some extent in ‘our’ social institutions, then 
we have no legitimate interest in the security of their human rights. But Pogge thinks it extremely 
unlikely for any individual living under conditions of a globalised economy to be so isolated. 
44  Rawls has argued that his ‘difference principle’ should not apply globally because one of the 
conditions for the difference principle to hold is that the persons it covers should be engaged in social 
cooperation. Rawls finds that this cooperation is not evident at a global level, but rather, applies within 
states only. Pogge (2002:104-116) takes issue with Rawls on this point and argues that one effect of 
economic globalisation is that people who live in different states are engaged in social cooperation, 
which, Pogge argues, need not be advantageous to all parties in order for relations of justice to arise. 
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45 
Alan Patten has complained that ‘Pogge never really shows how the international 
factors he emphasizes account for global poverty’ (Patten 2005:21). This is a valid 
complaint up to a point – Pogge does not provide a detailed explanation of specific 
policies and their causal impacts. But there is a considerable literature analysing the 
variable impacts of globalisation. Pogge’s position is broadly consistent with the 
conclusions of Clapham (1999) and An-Na‘im (2001), as well my argument in 
chapter 2, which claim that both the institutions of sovereignty and the global market 
economy undermine the capacity of governments in weak states to address human 
rights issues, including the chronic underfulfilment of social and economic rights. 
To demonstrate that this situation could be otherwise, Pogge (2002:196-215) 
proposes what he calls a ‘Global Resources Dividend’ (GRD), effectively a tax on the 
extraction or use of natural resources to be levied on the governments of the territories 
where the resources are found, and used to alleviate severe poverty, either in the form 
of direct payments to governments to fund poverty eradication, or, where government 
corruption is a concern, to NGOs, such as Oxfam, who can be trusted to devote the 
resources to alleviating suffering and addressing the underfulfilment of human rights. 
The proposal is ‘moderate’ in the sense of being realisable without substantial change 
to existing institutional arrangements, and Pogge argues that it would have an 
additional benefit of improving environmental conditions, because in taxing the use of 
natural resources it would provide an incentive for the development of alternative 
resources.
46 The GRD has been criticised by some as missing its target – taxing the 
use of natural resources in the countries where they are extracted, rather than where 
they are processed and/or consumed makes it likely that the burden of taxes will fall 
disproportionately on those countries whose primary industries are the export of raw 
materials, predominantly poor countries. Pogge counters that the tax would be passed 
on to consumers in developed countries, but some remain unconvinced (Hayward 
2005b). Despite these criticisms, the GRD does serve to validate Pogge’s claim that 
45 In this regard he makes reference to the international borrowing rights and exclusive property rights 
to natural resources that governments enjoy, regardless of the way they came to power. Pogge (2000) 
thus proposes a number of measures to disincentivise coups d’etat; measures he claims that would 
render democracy in transition countries more stable.
46 Hayward (2005b) doubts the veracity of this last claim, because, he argues, there is a contradiction 
between relying on taxing the use of natural resources to fund a dividend that will generate sufficient 
funds to eradicate severe poverty at the same time as hoping to discourage the use of the very resources 
that need to be used in order to generate the tax. He also highlights the arbitrariness, from an 
environmental point of view, of taxing resources that are easily accountable, such as oil, as Pogge 
proposes, rather than taxing the use of resources that are particularly environmentally harmful. 
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alleviate the problem. The underfulfilment of human rights is not, therefore, a matter 
of a lack of resources, it is a political problem. The solution Pogge proposes is the 
replacement of the contemporary human rights regime with his new institutional 
model of human rights. 
4.3.1 Negative human rights duties
One of Pogge’s primary concerns in specifying a negative duty not to support 
institutions that disrespect human rights is to insulate himself from the libertarian 
critique of positive duties as an infringement of the duty-bearers’ rights. Pogge’s 
intention is not to attack the libertarian position, but rather, to find a way around the 
force of the criticism of positive duties, normally associated in particular with social 
and economic rights. According to one critic (Besson 2003:513-9), the success of this 
approach depends in part on being able to maintain the distinction between what 
Pogge calls institutional and interactional understandings of human rights. On an 
interactional model, a person may discharge his human rights duties by not actively 
violating anyone’s human rights. But, on the interactional model, economic and social 
rights may be violated (or underfulfilled) unless one takes positive action. For 
example, if someone has the right to be free from hunger, on an interactional account, 
the only way to avoid violating that right when confronted with a starving person is to 
take the positive action of giving him food. It is this obligation to take positive action 
that is objectionable to the libertarian. 
The   institutional   understanding   that   Pogge   proposes   assumes   the   prior 
existence of institutions, which the interactional model does not, and makes those 
institutions   responsible   for   human   rights,   but   individuals   have   human   rights 
responsibilities vis-à-vis institutions insofar as they must not support institutions that 
contribute   to   the   underfulfilment   of   human   rights.   Thus,   the   government   is 
responsible for ensuring freedom of speech, and to discharge its duties sufficiently, it 
must   not   only   directly   protect   freedom   of   speech   through   refraining   from 
unreasonable censorship, but also by protecting individuals from any private threat to 
freedom of speech, such as intimidation. The individual is then able to discharge her 
human rights duties negatively simply by not supporting institutions that disrespect 
human rights. Put in terms of social and economic rights, it is the responsibility of the 
government (or other relevant institution) to foster for its people secure access to the 
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appropriate education and training. But it is the responsibility of the individual not to 
support institutions that disrespect human rights, so where a government or other 
institution undermines the right to work for some or all of its citizens, perhaps through 
active discriminatory measures against certain minorities or through failing to take 
action on discriminatory practices in the private sector, then the human rights-
respecting individual has a negative duty not to support the institution concerned, in 
this case, the government. 
How is this to be achieved? To return an example cited above, Pogge says that 
in a society that allows slavery, owning no slaves yourself is not enough to fulfil your 
(negative) human rights duties, as it would be under the interactional model, because 
through contributing your taxes to the government or your labour to society, you 
contribute to the maintenance of a coercively imposed institution that violates human 
rights. Pogge proposes the following possible solutions:
I might honor my negative duty, perhaps, through becoming a hermit or 
an emigrant, but I could honor it more plausibly by working with others 
toward shielding the victims of injustice from the harms I help produce or, 
if this is possible, toward establishing secure access [to human rights] 
through institutional reform. (Pogge 2002:66)
This answer raises a number of further questions. Firstly, it is clear that where the 
negative duty not to support institutions that disrespect human rights is difficult or 
impossible to fulfil, then compensatory action of some kind is appropriate. But what 
Pogge does not make clear is how individuals are to decide that the negative duty 
cannot be fulfilled, nor how much or exactly what kind of compensatory action is 
required. Again, there is clearly a subjective element that limits the scope for clarity 
here. 
A more telling problem than this is the range of options for avoiding action 
that would count as upholding an institution that disrespects human rights; becoming 
a hermit or an emigrant. Neither of these options is in fact readily available to the 
overwhelming majority of people – Pogge indirectly affirms this himself in claiming 
that social cooperation is global. If Pogge is right that global social and economic 
interconnectedness is so strong, then it follows that becoming an emigrant would not 
enable anyone to escape culpability for supporting human rights disrespecting 
institutions, since such institutions are not limited to nation-states. On the other hand, 
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David Thoreau, who is much heralded by some greens as a providing a model of 
modest, sustainable living, and who clearly sought to withdraw from nineteenth-
century New England society, contributed his commerce to that society (Thoreau 
1986:ch1; see also de Geus 1999:73-85). Cruft (2005b) has argued that Pogge’s 
proposed insititutional model in fact entails a number of duties, including ‘other-
directed precautionary duties’, that are likely to be resisted by libertarians.
47  In a 
reply, Pogge (2005) claims that the negative duty not to support human rights 
disrespecting institutions generates derivative obligations, which are not duties in the 
strong sense that the initial negative duties are, but rather are derived from the moral 
force of the negative duty, and include only such obligations as are necessary to meet 
the requirements of the negative duty or make suitable compensation. However, given 
the impossibility of observing the negative duty in the contemporary world as Pogge 
sees it, it is not clear that these more onerous (in the sense of requiring positive 
action) derivative obligations are in fact avoidable. Therefore it is not clear at all that 
Pogge can regard himself as having avoided the libertarian critique.  
In proposing compensatory action, Pogge has moved from a negative duty not 
to support institutions disrespectful of human rights to a positive obligation to provide 
some form of compensation.
48 Pogge has also moved from an institutional approach, 
where human rights are to be claimed against governments or other institutions, to 
something more like an interactional model, where individuals are morally obliged to 
provide compensation where they cannot fulfil their negative duty not to support 
institutions disrespectful of human rights. So, as Besson observes, ‘some of the 
alleged negative duties individuals have ‘not to support unjust institutions’ in fact hide 
47 These ‘other-directed’ duties might include, such duties as the duty to try to ensure that others respect 
human rights. To fail to recognise these duties, Cruft argues, ‘sits uneasily with Pogge’s commitment 
to the institutional view of human rights’ (Cruft 2005b:33).
48 Precisely what this compensation would be remains unspecified. Patten (2005) worries that Pogge’s 
notion of social cooperation could be interpreted to mean that whenever a rich person is involved in 
some way with a poor person, the rich person can be deemed to be in a coercive relationship with them. 
Pogge (2005) replies that the compensation due as a result of failing to discharge the negative duty 
should only respond to the fundamental rights expressed in the idea of human rights (thus limiting the 
extent of appropriate action), which he claims arise from the interests of all humans in having their 
basic needs met (Pogge 2002:225n91). But needs are a notoriously difficult concept on which to base 
any programmatic guidelines (see, for example, Berry 1999). Pogge (2005) also holds that the degree 
of compensation should be in proportion to the degree of responsibility individuals have for supporting 
a human rights disrespecting institution. This caveat perhaps rightly places greater responsibility for 
human rights on the shoulders of the powerful, but it does not empower those who suffer the 
underfulfilment of human rights. Rather, the weak continue to be dependent upon the strong taking the 
trouble to care, as Rorty pointed out. For a further discussion of this issue, see previous chapter, or, 
with reference to the idea of ‘post-cosmopolitan citizenship’, see chapter 6. 
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institutional  from interactional  understanding of human rights in practice fails 
because,
[w]hat   individuals,   who   violate   their   negative   duty   not   to   support 
institutions which do not respect positive duties, are ultimately asked to 
answer for, are violations of positive duties by institutions which represent 
them [in some sense] and therefore cannot be entirely separated morally 
from them. (Besson 2003:518-9)
Pogge himself acknowledges that ‘A commitment to human rights goes along with 
interactional moral commitments; but’, he goes on, ‘this is no reason to identify the 
former with the latter’ (2002:65). As noted above, he is also explicit in regarding the 
appeal of his institutional model as being consistent with (what he calls) the ‘central 
tenet of minimalist libertarianism: that human rights entail only negative duties’ 
(Pogge 2002:66). The institutional approach seeks to uphold this claim, whilst 
achieving far more than libertarian approaches to human rights can, particularly with 
regard to social and economic rights. But I would follow Besson in arguing that 
Pogge has not entirely succeeded here.
4.3.2 The institutional model and universalism
There is another ambiguity in Pogge’s argument to which I wish to draw 
attention. Human rights have an additional purpose in Pogge’s model, in that they 
serve as a standard by which to judge the justice, and thence the legitimacy, of our 
global institutions. The idea of using human rights in this way is not new in itself; as 
noted above, Donnelly moots the proposal that human rights be seen as ‘a standard of 
civilisation’, whereby the cost of a place at the table of international politics is 
compliance with international human rights regimes. The difficulty here is that, as one 
Malaysian Minister complained, human rights become a matter of ‘realpolitik’, as the 
richer, more powerful countries set human rights standards and effectively bribe 
poorer countries with trade and aid packages that contain human rights conditions. 
Pogge’s proposal differs from Donnelly’s in that Pogge invites those in the wealthier 
countries not to judge particular countries’ human rights records, but to use the 
institutional understanding of human rights to judge the contemporary global order, 
and assess its appropriateness in terms of its likelihood of fostering respect for human 
rights. 
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italics in original). In the context of a multicultural world, this may give some pause 
for thought, though perhaps not typical cosmopolitans. Pogge’s response to this is 
quite uncompromising:
If the Algerians want their society to be organized as a religious state and 
we want ours to be a liberal democracy, we can both have our way. But if 
the Algerians want global institutions to be designed on the basis of the 
Koran and we want them to render secure the objects of human rights for 
all, then we cannot both have our way. With respect to our global 
institutional order,  one  conception will necessarily prevail – through 
reason or force. There is no room for accommodation here, and, if we 
really care about human rights, then we must be willing to support the 
global order they favor, even against those who, perhaps by appeal to 
other values, support an alternative world order in which the objects of 
human rights would be less secure. (Pogge 2000:68)
Two questions spring to mind here. The first concerns how, exactly, one institutional 
order will prevail. Pogge talks here of reason or force, but his discussion of the GRD 
suggests a third option – economic encouragement. As noted above, the GRD is 
ideally to be distributed through governments, but where this is not possible (for 
example, where there is no effective government, or where there are grounds to 
suspect government corruption) through aid agencies and NGOs, which would then 
require more scrutiny than that to which they are currently subjected (Pogge 2000). 
The GRD would thus create an incentive for governments to tackle poverty and 
corruption and foster greater respect for human rights. Where progress is made it may 
be rewarded with a greater share of the GRD. 
Yet this sounds suspiciously like a form of coercion. Certainly, it is vulnerable 
to the charge that respect for human rights will remain a matter of realpolitik. Pogge 
makes repeated reference to the coerced imposition of the contemporary global order 
on the poorer countries. He is, perhaps, correct in this, but it is not clear from his 
argument what an uncoerced global order would be like; nowhere does Pogge provide 
an explanation. If the coerced imposition of any order is unjust, then a clearer 
understanding of what constitutes coercion is needed in order to assess the legitimacy 
of his GRD proposal. If some coercion is acceptable (indeed, inevitable?) if it is to 
impose the right institutions, then there is a different argument to be made, and one 
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argument,   since   what   he   finds   most   objectionable   about   the   present   global 
institutional order is not that it is coercively imposed, but that it leads to the chronic 
underfulfilment of human rights for so many people. 
In the context of a pluralistic world, where people have many different 
conceptions of what constitutes a good life, this latter type of argument risks being as 
divisive as it is persuasive. Indeed, Pogge’s strong universalism disclosed in his 
unmistakable conviction that human rights are a better guide to the good life than the 
Qur‘ān, which he nonetheless recognises others are deeply committed to as a guide to 
a good life, is illustrative of the problem of pluralism. Insofar as human rights provide 
a non-perfectionist account of the good life, they can be defended as allowing for 
cultural diversity. But Pogge insists that they are the only appropriate standard by 
which to assess global institutions, and that alternative standards, such as the Qur‘ān, 
should therefore be rejected. Given that there is no objective way of judging these 
morals, many will be sceptical. Furthermore, the historical record on this issue is not 
encouraging. Enforcing a global standard of human rights is, on the face of it, very 
different from enforcing the ‘standards of civilisation’ that legitimised slavery and 
colonialism, for example, but there are parallels nevertheless that give cause for 
disquiet:
The new standard of civilization is defended normatively as the means to 
promote the advancement of the backward. It is not clear, however, why 
human   flourishing   is   better   promoted   by   the   construction   of   an 
identifiable ‘other’, an ‘us’ and ‘them’ from amongst the myriad ways of 
understanding and classifying the world. (Kingsbury 1999:91) 
Both   Booth  and  Rorty,  though  different  in  their   approaches,   see  the   aim  of 
encouraging the spread of human rights as helping to make ‘the other’  an  other, 
thereby redescribing, in Rorty’s language, the sense of difference between peoples, 
and rendering it less threatening (see Booth 1999 and Rorty 1993). The idea of human 
rights as a standard of civilisation, explicit in Donnelly’s work and at the very least 
implicit in Pogge’s, would seem to undermine this endeavour.
The second question I would raise follows on from this last point. Quite 
simply, how do we know that human rights provide a better basis than the Qur‘ān, or 
say, the Bible, does? It is unfortunate that Pogge has chosen here to juxtapose the 
Qur‘ān and human rights, not least because a number of Muslim scholars have tried to 
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support for human rights may be derived from the teachings in the Qur‘ān. But that 
should not detract attention from the substance of Pogge’s point. In making reference 
to ‘other values’ which would render ‘the objects of human rights less secure’, Pogge 
clearly has a substantive account of human rights in mind, one presumably, that 
rejects the idea that apostasy is a crime and perhaps favours freedom of religion. But 
if this is the case, then Pogge undermines his claims for a broader appeal for his 
institutional understanding of human rights based on its focus on conception rather 
than content. He comes close to saying, as Rorty does, that anyone would prefer 
human rights to the other values, if they understood the benefits that human rights 
would bring. Thus he has a tentative theory of what it is to be human, or at least, of 
what every humans’ best interests are. And while I would concur with him in 
preferring human rights to any alternative way of regulating social relations, I cannot 
prove that I am right to do so, and that the devout follower of a religious doctrine that 
conflicts with human rights, and prefers this way of life, is wrong to do so. 
At this point it might be argued that the majority of people do seem to think 
some notion of human rights to be a good thing, and that, if it could be proved that 
human rights were affirmed by the majority, there would then be a democratic 
mandate that would render illegitimate any dissent from the view Pogge puts forward. 
However, this proposal raises another telling problem with Pogge’s theory. In placing 
responsibility for the implementation of human rights in the hands of individuals, 
Pogge invites individual judgement about what human rights there should be. On the 
evidence presented in Langlois’ study,  it is perfectly plausible to imagine an 
individual, Bob, affirming respect for human rights in general, but finding one or 
more specific rights objectionable. Acting on his negative duty not to support the 
underfulfilment of human rights, Bob decides that he shall withdraw his support from 
various institutions, or, where he cannot do so, work to offer compensation. But he 
does not support the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of gender. 
Indeed, he thinks a woman’s place is in the home. So, conscientious though he is in 
honouring his other human rights duties, he continues his support of any institution 
that fosters gender discrimination. It might be that there are a lot of people who agree 
with Bob and follow his example, thereby contributing to the underfulfilment of 
human rights for women, but respecting other human rights. What this example 
illustrates is that there are good reasons for not making the protection of rights of 
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on courts to be independent. As noted above, Pogge is not entirely clear cut on the 
question of whether the institutional model can be completely dislocated from the 
legal protection route that An-Na‘im finds insufficient, but I suggest that in fact 
neither is sufficient on its own. 
That is not to say that Pogge’s institutional model is without merit. Pogge can 
be commended for recognising that the contemporary international human rights 
regime is ill-equipped to deal with the chronic underfulfilment of human rights that is 
endemic in very poor countries. The institutional model he proposes represents a way 
of conceptualising human rights such that they address this problem. Clearly, this 
innovation is of significant interest in view of the current and potential future threats 
environmental   problems  pose  to  human  rights.  If   the  worst  predictions  about 
increasing environmental degradation are proven to have been founded, then the kind 
of human rights issues likely to arise will be similar in character to the kind of 
problems Pogge particularly wishes to address – the problems of severe poverty such 
as lack of access of sufficient food, clean water, basic shelter and medical care. A 
model of human rights that can offer a means of conceptualising the dynamic between 
individuals, governments, corporations and global institutions that would better 
facilitate the fulfilment of human rights has much to recommend it. Furthermore, the 
idea of making individuals instead of, or better, as well as, governments responsible 
for the fulfilment of human rights is appealing, despite the difficulties noted above. It 
also comports with more active notions of citizenship proposed (in particular) in 
environmental political theory which are discussed below in chapter 6. 
Pogge is guilty of optimistically assuming an ideal human rights-respecting 
individual, who, on learning that he has in fact been violating his negative duty not to 
contribute to the underfulfilment of human rights, will be moved to act in support of 
human rights. The foregoing discussion also demonstrates that Pogge’s model is not 
immune to some of the important criticisms that can be levelled at the contemporary 
international human rights regime. On the other hand, Pogge’s institutional approach, 
in obliging individuals to resist supporting human rights-disrespecting institutions, is 
a potential corrective to Donnelly’s tendency to reify markets and states, and suggests 
the possibility of change. The existence of institutions that threaten human rights is 
neither natural nor inevitable, and is as susceptible to change as the prevalence of 
environmentally unsustainable patterns of living. 
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A   number   of   criticisms   have   been   advanced   against   the   contemporary 
international human rights regime, including the charges that the consensus on human 
rights is in part coerced, that some of the rights contained in the International Bill of 
Rights are not universally endorsed, and that human rights are ambivalent with 
respect to power. One consequence of this is that, just as human rights can be used as 
tools to protect the interests of the weak, they can also be used to impede change. This 
point was illustrated in the state-centrism of human rights, which is problematic 
because of the need to recognise other threats to human dignity, such as corporate 
power. However, the emerging norm of corporate social responsibility indicates that 
conceptions of human rights need not be fixed, rather, the way that human rights are 
institutionalised can evolve to respond to changes in the threats to human security.
This conclusion suggests that when assessing whether human rights provide an 
adequate framework for responding to the challenges of globalisation, particularly 
increasing environmental problems, scholars must consider both the human rights 
regime as it is and possible innovations. The problem of state-centrism and a pre-
disposition to the legal protection of human rights, rather than an orientation towards 
the chronic underfulfilment of human rights associated with extremely poor countries, 
was also criticised. Pogge’s institutional model of human rights presents a potential 
solution to these issues, and is therefore of considerable interest to those theorising 
ways of addressing the kind of problems identified in chapter 2 in terms of 
environmental threats to human security. The idea of making individuals rather than 
states responsible for human rights by recognising a negative duty not to support 
institutions that contribute to the underfulfilment of human rights could have a 
significant impact, particularly if the content of human rights could extended to take 
account of environmental threats, an issue I address in chapter 7. 
On the other hand, Pogge, like Donnelly, affirms something like a ‘standard of 
civilisation’, which divides peoples and asserts the superiority of some over others. 
Though perhaps not Pogge’s intention, this aspect of Pogge’s institutional model may 
limit its appeal in the context of a plural world. Historically, such devices have been 
met with resistance, and there is a suspicion amongst some environmentalists in poor 
countries of the concept of sustainable development being used in the same way. The 
next topic to deal with here, then, is how the concept of environmental sustainability 
104can or should be understood, hence the next chapter looks at ways of defining 
environmental sustainability.
105Chapter 5: Defining environmental sustainability
The aim of this chapter is to explore what is meant when ‘environmental 
sustainability’ is discussed, and to cut a path through some of the confusion 
surrounding attempts to define environmentally sustainable patterns of living. One 
route into this debate is to consider different ideas as to what causes environmental 
problems, or, more specifically, what factors legitimate and sustain the prevalence of 
environmentally unsustainable patterns of living. Green theorists have studied a 
variety of possible causes, ranging from human spiritual and cultural attitudes towards 
nature, to patterns of social and political organisation, through to models of economic 
organisation. I think it likely that these all play a causal role and therefore I do not 
propose to isolate any single explanatory variable. Nor do I exclude there being other 
possible or actual causes. 
However, I do want to suggest that some approaches to environmental 
sustainability are more helpful than others. To that end, my first task in this chapter is 
to challenge the view that genuine theories of environmental sustainability are 
necessarily ecocentric. Justifications for policies aimed at realising environmental 
sustainability can be phrased in a number of ways, including in terms of the rights of 
future generations of humans, the rights of non-human nature, or, rejecting rights 
language, because environmental sustainability is virtuous in the Aristotelian sense 
and thus something that should be pursued, or because of moral duties owed to non-
human nature or to future generations. Definitional problems are further complicated 
by the distinction drawn by some between  environmental  sustainability (broadly 
speaking, the continuation of an environment habitable for humans), and ecological 
sustainability (the continuation of the biosphere as healthy living planet).
49  Often 
these distinctions are thought to correspond to a spectrum of ‘shallow’, ‘weak’, or 
‘reformist’   environmentalism   through   to   ‘deep’,   ‘strong’,   or   ‘radical’ 
environmentalism, and are linked to ecocentric versus anthropocentric approaches. I 
argue, on the contrary, that a plausible argument for a robust model of sustainability 
can be advanced in anthropocentric terms. 
Thereafter I look at the distinction that is often drawn between needs and 
wants in environmental discourse, typically implying a critique of the indulgence of 
present generation wants at the expense of future generations’ needs. I argue that this 
49 I tend to use the term ‘environmental sustainability’, but this is not intended to imply a shallow or 
weak or merely reformist attitude. 
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Finally, in section 5.3 I return in more detail to some of the issues raised in chapter 2 
in relation to the environmental impact of economic globalisation, and propose a 
framework for evaluating three alternative models of economic organisation to 
contemporary market economies. The discussion of the conditions for environmental 
sustainability continues in chapter 6, with analysis of the political institutions that 
might underpin an alternative economic model.  
5.1 Ecocentrism, anthropocentrism, and environmental sustainability
It was argued in chapter 2 that environmental sustainability is inevitably 
threatened in the context of a global market economy. Given the focus of this thesis 
on whether human rights, as a globalising discourse, is an adequate and appropriate 
framework   in   which   to   address   the   environmental   problems   associated   with 
globalisation, the concentration on economic globalisation as a significant cause of 
environmental unsustainability is warranted. But broader debates about the causes of 
environmental problems are also relevant to the present inquiry for a number of 
reasons. As argued in chapter 2, the prevalence of a particular model of economic 
organisation is not an arbitrary or immutable fact, it is the product of human policy 
choices, and policy choices are themselves a reflection of values and of ideas about 
how people should live. The ecocentric argument is that a wholesale change in 
Western spiritual and cultural attitudes to non-human nature is required in order to 
reverse currently damaging trends.
50 Ecocentrists have argued that an anthropocentric 
approach is not able to achieve this wholesale change. Since the object is to overcome 
what Tim Hayward (1998) calls ‘human chauvinism’, an ethical approach based on 
concern first for human well-being seems an unlikely candidate for generating the 
hoped for paradigm shift. One question to be addressed in this chapter, then, is 
whether ecocentrists are correct in arguing that anthropocentrism is an obstacle to 
environmental sustainability. If so, this would have significant implications for the 
idea that human rights, by their nature anthropocentric, could be an appropriate tool in 
addressing the environmental problems associated with globalisation.
50 Ecocentrism here is taken also to encompass biocentrism, which accords value to all living creatures, 
whereas ecocentrism is sometimes interpreted as according value to ecosystems rather than individual 
organisms. For a range of ecocentric perspectives, see Eckersley (1992), Attfield (2003), Naess (1973), 
Leopold (2002), Salleh (1992), Mathews (1987).
1075.1.1 Ecocentrism, anthropocentrism, and intrinsic value
There are a variety of proponents of what is broadly termed ecocentrism, 
defending a number of different positions with regard to both ethics and politics. To 
reduce this plurality to a few key tenets inevitably sacrifices nuance and detail, but it 
is nonetheless useful, for the purposes of defining environmental sustainability, to 
highlight some salient points that are recognisably ecocentric. Ecocentrists regard the 
environmental crisis as an ethical crisis as well as a political and economic one, which 
is to say that the prevalence of environmentally unsustainable patterns of living is a 
failure of ethics rather than exclusively of politics or economics.
51 It follows from this 
that the remedy to environmental problems lies not (only or primarily) in articulating 
and advocating different policies, but rather, in defining and promoting different 
values. Central to this argument is the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic 
value. Anthropocentrists, it is claimed, value non-human nature only instrumentally, 
as a resource to be used or consumed to achieve particular ends, whereas ecocentrists 
argue that nature has intrinsic value – value independent of the uses it can or does 
have for  humans  (Attfield 1999).  The  anthropocentric attitude  of instrumental 
valuation is explained variously as the product of the dominance of economic 
rationality (Hancock 2003); the modernist disenchantment of the natural world, 
proceeding from the insights of Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton, and culminating in 
the industrial revolution (Marshall 1995); or the continuation of patriarchy beyond the 
social sphere and into human – non-human relations (Salleh 1997). Whatever the 
causal root of this attitude, the resultant human chauvinism facilitates a lack of care 
for the environment that has paved the way for the policy choices that have brought 
on the environmental problems now faced (outlined in chapter 2).
The solutions proposed by ecocentrists to these problems vary in detail, but 
some broad themes are discernible. Most importantly, nature is to be recognised as 
having intrinsic value. The consequence of this would be that there would be a 
presumption in favour of preserving a given feature of nature, rather than a 
presumption in favour of human use of the environment being acceptable (Naess 
2003). Secondly, humans are to be recognised as necessarily a part of, rather than 
apart from, non-human nature. The community of moral concern is therefore radically 
altered and expanded to include animals, plants, ecosystems, rocks and sands. In this 
respect ecocentrists present a challenge to what might be thought of as the typical 
51 Though ecocentrists are not unique in doing so; some anthropocentrists also take this view. 
108position of liberal democratic politics, and certainly to the proponent of human rights; 
the individual human is not to be construed as an autonomous, rational agent, and the 
centre of moral value. Instead, because humans can only exist if embedded in an 
ecological context, the self is to be understood as ‘relational’, rather than independent 
of the rest of nature. An example of this type of thinking can be found in Robyn 
Eckersley’s development of ‘transpersonal ecology’ (based on Warwick Fox’s work), 
whereby the individual is constituted by both social and environmental relations:
According   to   this   model,   we   are   neither   completely   passive   and 
determined beings (as crude behaviourists would have it) nor completely 
autonomous and self-determining beings (as some existentialists would 
have it). Rather, we are  relatively  autonomous beings who, by our 
purposive thought and action, help to constitute the very relations that 
determine who we are. (Eckersley 1992:53)
Another influential proposal is Aldo Leopold’s ‘land ethic’, which, ‘enlarges the 
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or 
collectively: the land’ (Leopold 2002:39). 
The proposal that nature has intrinsic value is, I argue, a distinctly ecocentric 
claim. Anthropocentrism is, by definition, grounded in the claim that humans have 
value,
52 and the value that is ascribed to non-human nature is typically justified in 
terms of the more or less abstract use that it has for humans.
53  Some prominent 
anthropocentrists have explicitly attempted to disprove the coherence of the intrinsic 
value position.
54 However, I doubt that the debate over whether nature has intrinsic or 
52 Though why is usually not specified (see the debate in chapter 3 re Perry et al). 
53 Abstract because the uses identified can include the ‘aesthetic’ or ‘contemplative’ value of knowing 
that environmental ‘resources’, such as wildernesses or ladybirds or pond algae, exist without the 
valuing human ever directly ‘using’ the resource. See O’Neill (1993) and Wissenburg (1998) on the 
range of reasons for which individuals might value non-human nature.
54 Often a counter to this position is framed in terms of the ‘last man’ (or, in Keekok Lee’s (1993) 
politically correct version, ‘last person’) argument, whereby a hypothetical thought experiment is said 
to reveal that most people do intuitively believe that nature has intrinsic value. While this is to an 
extent persuasive, I suggest that such arguments lead to something of a theoretical cul-de-sac, rather 
than serving to guide debate on policies that might or might not help societies shift towards 
environmentally sustainable patterns of living. The last man argument runs thus: if the last man on 
earth cut down the last tree, would he have done something morally wrong? If yes, then there has to be 
intrinsic value in non-human nature, since there is neither valuer left nor human subject to derive 
instrumental value from the erstwhile healthy tree. But this position can be opposed by including in the 
definition of instrumental value aesthetic value, or spiritual value. The debate therefore spills into a 
discussion of what, precisely, counts as intrinsic value, and what is only instrumental value. As O’Neill 
(1993:9) points out, this eventually leads to a reductio ad absurdum type argument, since instrumental 
valuations cannot go on indefinitely. Hayward (1998:25) also points out that moral argument derived 
from the purported intrinsic value of X is tautologous, since the argument runs; ‘X has intrinsic value, 
therefore X should be protected, because X has intrinsic value’.
109only   instrumental   value   is   especially   important   in   defining   environmental 
sustainability, and identifying relevant policy-guiding norms, in the context of 
globalisation. Insisting on the intrinsic value of the natural world is unlikely to be 
persuasive to the broad spectrum of political opinion in what ecocentrists rightly 
characterise as a largely disenchanted world. Certainly, opinions can be changed, and 
ecocentrists such as Eckersley (1992) have highlighted the role that government might 
play in promoting the idea of nature having intrinsic value in environmental 
citizenship education in schools. But, as Alan Carter (2000) argues, there is no 
necessary link between the ethical motivation behind a particular policy and the 
outcome of the policy:
[S]ome poor people need to burn far more wood than they would need to 
if they possessed wood-burning stoves. Hence, if one wants to stop them 
denuding   the   ground   of   tree   cover   and   hastening   the   process   of 
desertification, then one needs to aid their society in attaining a certain 
level of development. One might feel one needs to go even further and 
provide not wood-burning stoves but biogas generators, say. And one 
might want to do so simply because one wishes to stop those living in that 
un-developed or underdeveloped society from destroying their natural 
environment. And the motivation for that could be purely biocentric. 
(Carter 2000:451)
Conversely, anthropocentrically motivated policies can (and do) have outcomes that 
ecocentrists would welcome. The reason for this is clear when the ecocentric way of 
understanding humans as necessarily ecologically embedded beings is taken into 
account – any attempt to preserve or maintain the integrity of the environment for 
humans inevitably does so for non-human nature also. This position is also affirmed 
by anthropocentrists, from liberals, such as Wissenburg (1998), to communitarians, 
such as de-Shalit (2000). So, it is possible to accept the ecocentric claim that 
environmental problems require a broader engagement than a focus on economic 
policy would provide, whilst bypassing the debate over the intrinsic value of non-
human nature. It is enough, for the present purpose, to note that humans are 
ecologically embedded, and therefore argue that, whether on account of the intrinsic 
value of nature, or because of the profound importance the natural world has for 
humans, finding environmentally sustainable ways of living is vital.
110Carter’s target in the above passage is Andrew Dobson’s (1998) typology of 
theories of sustainability that run along an axis of deep green to shallow green, 
corresponding more or less to ecocentric through to anthropocentric positions. Carter 
rejects the view, formally stated by Naess in his 1973 article ‘The Shallow and the 
Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement’, and since repeated by many ecocentrists 
(including Dobson), that an anthropocentric position equates to a shallow and 
reformist approach, whereas the ecocentric position is deep and radical. Ecocentrists 
might respond that an anthropocentric ethic that puts human welfare first is unlikely 
to secure the degree of environmental protection that respect for the intrinsic value of 
nature would ensure. But there is no prior reason why this must be the case. Bryan 
Norton proposes the ecological value of ‘integrity’ as a standard by which to assess 
models of sustainability, whereby the most desirable policies are those that protect the 
integrity of ecosystems (see Norton 1999 and 2002).
55 The justification for this policy 
preference is presented in anthropocentric terms, specifically, preserving the integrity 
of global and local ecosystems is held to be good because doing so preserves the 
greatest possible number of options and opportunities for future generations. This is a 
desirable strategy, and a just strategy, because the actions of present generation 
humans will affect the options available to future generations, but it is not possible to 
predict accurately precisely what the needs and wants of future generations will be.
56 
Therefore, since humans are ecologically embedded beings, the best approach to take 
is to bequeath to future generations the healthiest possible ecosystem, and let future 
generations make their inevitable selective judgments about which particular aspects 
of the environment to value for which purposes. This approach, I argue, has the 
benefit of being politically intelligible to a broad audience, and is capable of 
grounding a robust model of environmental sustainability that would deliver the aims 
of ecocentrists and anthropocentrists alike, without relying on ethical commitments 
that are not widely shared.
 
55 For a more detailed discussion of ‘integrity’ as a benchmark for sustainability see chapter 6.
56 This is in part because environmental resources that have been useless to one generation may, with 
technological development or other changes, come to be important for a future generation. An oft-cited 
example here is uranium (see Holland 1999:61), but other examples include changing attitudes to areas 
of natural wilderness, such as the Scottish highlands, once seen as dangerous and forbidding places, 
now valued as places for recreation and as having aesthetic value (see O’Neill 2007). Hence de-Shalit 
(2000) is correct in arguing that nature, or more precisely what is identified as ‘nature’ by each 
generation, is socially constructed. Nevertheless, the biophysical fact of humanity being ecologically 
embedded means that constructing nature as something separate from human activity is misleading.
1115.1.2 Social and ecological embeddedness
Turning to the second important theme of ecocentric theory identified above, I 
argue that the ecocentric proposal that the self should be understood to be ‘relational’, 
that is, ‘always already’ embedded within an ecological as well as a social context, is 
only distinctive by a matter of degree. Eckersley describes green politics as ‘post-
liberal’ in part because of what she sees as the paucity of the liberal account of 
individual autonomy: 
From the perspective of the ecological model of internal relations, the 
liberal idea of autonomy as independence from (or “freedom from”) 
others   is   seen   as   philosophically   misguided.   (To   the   extent   that 
interconnectedness with others is acknowledged under this particular 
liberal interpretation, it is likely to be experienced as threatening, as 
causing a loss of self.) (Eckersley 1992:54)
The claim here is that humans are neither completely independent from nature nor 
from other humans. Social and ecological embeddedness should not be seen as 
threatening, or causing a loss of self, since it is the ecological context that gives 
humans life, and the social context that teaches humans how to live. Recognition of 
this fact is held to be emancipatory in that it facilitates a changed relationship between 
humans and non-human nature that delegitimises the modernist discourse of human 
dominance and mastery over nature, in favour of a new set of relations based on 
justice and the recognition of the right of non-human nature to flourish. 
The implicit claim that liberalism does not recognise the social embeddedness 
of humans seems to me to be misguided. Liberal theorists of rights typically note that 
rights are not absolute, but rather entitle the right-holder to whatever good is specified 
only insofar as that entitlement does not interfere with the equal rights of others 
(Jones 1994:138-142). Thus the right to free speech does not extend to the right to 
incite violence against minorities. Moreover, liberal theory is no more a unified 
perspective than is green theory. Whilst liberals such as Robert Nozick and John 
Locke can be said to be anti-ecological (de Geus 2001), the liberal theory of John 
Stuart Mill is quite different. Millian ideas that can readily appeal to greens include 
his later support for a steady-state economy, his foreboding over the indiscriminate 
exploitation of natural resources during the industrial revolution, and his humility 
112about the fallibility of human knowledge (de Geus 2001; Stephens 2001).
57 Nor is it 
clear that all liberals would recognise themselves as advocating a view of social 
relations that constrain autonomy as necessarily involving a ‘loss of self’. Mill’s 
defence of freedom of speech, specifically his argument that confronting views 
contrary to one’s own helps to avoid subscribing to a position only as lifeless dogma, 
suggests a positive dimension to social embeddedness. Mill’s influence is admittedly 
weaker than it once was, but the point to be made is that while Eckersley’s criticisms 
might be accurate with respect to Locke and Nozick, they are not true of all liberals. 
The relevance of this for the present discussion is that ecocentric resistance to the 
individualism of the human rights discourse can be said to be attacking a straw man – 
the human rights framework does not necessarily posit a disconnected autonomous 
individual. As discussed in the previous chapter, human rights are invoked to protect 
individuals from oppression, they need not, however, imply a view of humans as 
completely atomistic, autonomous beings.    
On the other hand, neither the contemporary human rights regime, nor the 
liberal   tradition   from   which   it   emerged,  sufficiently   recognises   the   ecological 
embeddedness of human life; in this respect Eckersley’s criticism is valid. But, as 
already indicated, this perspective need not be grounded in ecocentrism. Norton’s 
anthropocentric model of sustainability understood in terms of the value of ecological 
integrity clearly affirms not only that humans are ecologically embedded, but that this 
has significant implications for policy choices. Similarly, Hayward’s (1998) theory of 
‘enlightened   anthropocentrism’   recognises   the   inevitability   of   an   ecological 
dimension to human life. The clearest difference between the two perspectives is the 
claim  about  value;  ecocentrists  claim  that  nature   has  intrinsic  value,  whereas 
anthropocentrists   see   instrumental   value   in   nature.   But,   as   already   indicated, 
instrumental value can be broadly interpreted. The more telling point, however, is the 
ontological claim that humans are ecologically embedded beings, but this can be 
sustained from either perspective. There is arguably only a semantic difference in the 
57 That said, Mill was clearly interested in the idea of progress, which some greens have been critical of 
because of the implicit teleological approach that is said to underpin ideas of the unquestioned value of 
technological development and economic growth, and which is said to be contrary to the cyclical 
nature of the natural world (Dobson 2000:62-105). On the other hand, Barry (1999:249-251) argues 
that the task of green theory is not to reject the idea of progress but rather to reinterpret progress such 
that it is concerned with human rather than economic development. A complementary line is taken by 
Nigel Dower, who argues that, ‘economic growth […] is justified, when it is justified, by the fact that it 
enables people to achieve a better quality of life, better that is in terms of criteria of well-being other 
than more wealth’ (Dower 2000:40-41).
113consequent   motivation   for   acting   prescribed   by   weak   anthropocentrism   and 
ecocentrism – one acts either out of ‘enlightened self-interest’ (Hayward 1998), 
enlightened in the sense of understanding and affirming the ontological claim that 
humans are ecologically embedded and realising that it is therefore in one’s own 
interest to protect the environment; or out of an identification with the natural world 
where the self is ‘relational’ (Mathews 1991), in the sense of encompassing a broader 
identity that recognises the self as ecologically embedded, realising that to harm the 
environment is ultimately to harm oneself.
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The reason that all this matters for the present discussion was highlighted 
above. Taking their cue from Naess (1973), a number of green thinkers have 
perpetuated a distinction between ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ green theories that equates to 
ecocentric and anthropocentric accounts of environmental ethics, and informs a 
radical versus reformist politics. On this basis, it is argued that ecocentrism is a 
precondition of environmental sustainability. On the contrary, what is demonstrated 
here is that an anthropocentric approach is equally capable of grounding a persuasive 
model of environmental sustainability. It also has the appeal of being more intelligible 
to the majority of people who do not, at present, share ecocentric values. This is not to 
deny that what might be called strong anthropocentrism, or, more specifically, the 
assumption   that   humans   can   continue   to   consume   environmental   resources 
indiscriminately,   is   deeply   flawed   and   misguided.   But   what   I   have   tried   to 
demonstrate is that the most problematic aspect of such an approach is not the value it 
places on the environment, but rather the empirical error of assuming that humans are 
not dependent on their environment. The remainder of this chapter is therefore 
devoted to defining environmental sustainability from a ‘weak’ or ‘enlightened’ 
anthropocentric perspective.
5.2 Needs and wants and future generations
Perhaps the most widely cited definition of sustainability is the ‘Brundtland 
definition’, put forward in the Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) in 1987, which declares that ‘[h]umanity has the ability to make 
development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’  (WCED 
58 Both approaches share a tendency to postulate a ‘transformative’ experience that will inspire in 
environmental citizens the understanding of themselves as ecologically embedded beings. For further 
discussion of this point see chapter 6.
1141987:24). While a number of greens have been critical of the (qualified) endorsement 
Brundtland gives to continued economic growth, the themes of prioritising needs 
rather than wants, and showing concern for future generations, appear repeatedly in 
green theories of sustainability. One oft-discussed response to the problem of 
providing for the needs of future generations has been the idea of ‘maintaining natural 
capital’, or sometimes only ‘critical natural capital’, that is, the ecological resources 
necessary for human survival (see, for example, Turner 1992; Goodland and Daly 
1996). 
However, Alan Holland (1999) has criticised the idea of natural capital as 
being an appropriate device for measuring sustainability. Following the economist 
Herman Daly, Holland points out that ‘the economic notion of ‘natural capital’ is an 
essentially relational concept: it makes no sense to ask how much natural capital is 
represented by a grain of sand or lump of coal ‘in itself’’ (Holland 1999:59, italics in 
original). For that reason Daly is persuasive in his argument that one can only feasibly 
speak of the complementarity of natural and human-made capital – that is, the coal as 
well as the knowledge of how to mine it and how to convert it into heat or electricity – 
rather than substitutability between natural and human-made capital. But Holland 
goes further than this in his critique of the substitutability debate, because, as noted 
above, it is not easy to know what will be useful to future generations:
Thus it turns out that, amongst other complications, the concept of natural 
capital contains an epistemological variable: changes in the level of 
natural capital are contingent, not only upon changes in the natural world, 
nor simply on its actual utility, but upon changes in assumptions about its 
utility. […] Referring back to the example of uranium, this century would 
seem to reckon it a considerable addition to the store of natural capital. If 
the   next   century   judges   the   nuclear   experiment   to   have   been   an 
unmitigated disaster, judgements as to the state of our current natural 
assets would need to be seriously revised. (Holland 1999:61)
The only way of making sense of the idea of natural capital in a way that assists us in 
deliberating strategies for environmental sustainability, is what Holland calls the 
‘physical stock’ approach (Holland 1999:63-65) or what Norton refers to as the 
‘Listing Stuff’ approach (Norton 1999:119). This is the idea of furnishing future 
generations with the opportunity to make of the natural capital available what they 
will with the human capital they inherit and develop themselves. Since what future 
115generations will need/want cannot be predicted with certainty, the fairest thing to do is 
to leave them everything possible.
59 Of course, bequeathing everything, complete with 
an accurate inventory, is a rather Sisyphean task, so the most viable way of 
operationalising this strategy, according to Holland, is to use ‘indicator species’, a 
well-known approach in ecology of testing the health of an ecosystem by looking for 
particular species that will only thrive in unpolluted environments (Holland 1999:65). 
This fits well with Norton’s (2002) idea that what should be preserved is the 
‘integrity’ of the environment. 
This   is   a   rather   different   approach   than   that   immediately   apparent   in 
Brundtland’s recommendations and in many other strategies for sustaining the 
environment   for   future   generations.   The   most   prominent   complaint   with   the 
Brundtland interpretation is that it endorses as legitimate continued economic growth: 
The concept of sustainable development does imply limits – not absolute 
limits but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and 
social organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the 
biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities. But technology and 
social organization can be both managed and improved to make way for a 
new era of economic growth. (WCED 1987:24)
However, the report also clearly states that economic growth is a legitimate aim of 
developing nations insofar as it alleviates the material deprivation of the very poor, 
whereas wealthier populations are enjoined to ensure equity of access to ‘the 
resources required to sustain that growth’ (WCED 1987:24) (which presumably 
includes human as well as natural capital), and are further required to alter their ways 
of living such that they do not exceed the capacity of ecological resources. 
John S. Dryzek (1997) is rightly sceptical of what he calls the ‘Promethean 
response’, whereby it is believed that technological innovation will, in the future, 
solve current environmental problems, disputing the need to change environmentally 
damaging   practices.   But   there   is   some   middle   ground   between   relying   on 
technological   innovation   to   facilitate   endless   economic   growth,   and   rejecting 
59 Robin Attfield (1998:211) argues that we can predict ‘some of the basic needs of future people’, 
which seems intuitively true – surely all future generations will need breathable air, clean water, 
sustainable soils for growing crops. But, as I argue below, ‘needs’ is a term that confuses more than it 
clarifies. Moreover, restricting concern to what are seen to be ‘basic needs’ is likely to yield a weaker 
account of sustainability than might be desired, certainly than would be possible if the integrity of the 
ecosystem were taken to be the appropriate measure, since, as Wissenburg (1998:211-212) argues, it is 
conceivable that basic needs could be met whilst living in a ‘global Manhattan’. 
116technology, or growth, as having any part to play in overcoming environmental 
problems. Both Carter (1999:ch1) and Goodland (1995) point to the increased 
environmental destruction that is attendant upon the extreme poverty of many people 
in developing countries, where resources are overused by people in order to survive. 
The pressures of rapid population growth are also a relevant issue here, but not less so 
than the vast inequality in consumption of environmental resources that exists 
between the global rich and poor. What all this points to is the error of rejecting 
outright the legitimacy of continued economic growth on the part of the poor – 
inequality within the present generation is as much a part of environmental ethics as is 
inequality between generations. Economic growth pursued on conventional models 
across the world is likely to be ecologically disastrous (NEF 2006), but it may 
nonetheless be a limited part of the solution to environmental problems. Green 
scepticism about both technological innovation and economic growth is entirely 
justified if they are taken to be unquestioned goods, but equally, greens are naïve if 
they take either to be unquestioned harms. 
5.2.1 The problem of needs and wants
However, there is a notable ambiguity in all of this, and curiously enough one 
that afflicts both the Brundtland definition and many alternative ways of approaching 
the question of intergenerational justice, which is the normative implications of 
differentiating needs from wants. It is easy enough to agree that the needs of all 
should be satisfied before the wants of any, but it is not immediately clear how wants, 
rather than needs, can be objectively determined. Andrew Dobson indicates some 
awareness of this problem but retreats from it:
If the needs/wants problem seems presently intractable, it is enough for 
our purposes – that of identifying the principal features of the radical 
green sustainable society – that the emphasis on reduced consumption 
brings up the question sooner or later, and that therefore the distinction 
between needs and wants is one of the intellectual features of the various 
pictures of such a society. (Dobson 2000:80)
Even those who have attempted to sketch in more detail the features of ‘a radical 
green sustainable society’ have studiously avoided the question. Arne Naess, in 
outlining eight principles of deep ecology, lists as the third principle: ‘Humans have 
no right to reduce this richness and diversity [of life forms] except to satisfy vital 
117needs’ (Naess 2003:264). In an explanatory note, he goes on to say, ‘[t]he term “vital 
need” is deliberately left vague to allow for considerable latitude in judgement. 
Differences in climate and related factors, together with differences in the structures 
of societies as they now exist, need to be taken into consideration.’ (Naess 2003:265). 
Also looking at the question of needs and wants, Ted Benton suggests that the 
idea of needs may be most intelligible in the context of emergencies, where it is 
obvious that people need food, shelter, water, sanitation and health care. But such a 
minimalist   conception   of   needs   is   not   adequate   for   a   long   term   theory   of 
sustainability: 
To meet needs in a way which is proper, or appropriate to humanity is to 
meet them in ways which satisfy normative, cultural requirements. So, for 
humans to meet their need for food is not solely a matter of consuming a 
certain necessary bundle of nutrients, but it is a matter of collecting, 
preparing, and socially consuming what are culturally recognized as foods 
according to the customs and standards of the people involved. (Benton 
1999:205)
It should be added that these customs and standards are neither fixed nor given, but 
rather are learned and adapted over time and across communities. It follows that there 
is no objective standard of needs that can be determined for the purposes of 
environmental sustainability, presumably a conclusion with which Naess would 
concur. An additional variable is the level of technological development. Greens are 
often  fans   of  Rousseau,   finding  in  his  critique  of   the  increasing  reliance  on 
technology, and the attendant increasing distance from the ideal (idealised) state of 
nature, a parable for modern dependence on technology that is damaging to the 
environment,  and  ultimately  to  human  well-being  (Dobson  2000:111-112).  An 
example here is nuclear technology and the problem that nuclear waste remains toxic 
for many thousands of years. The decision to use nuclear technology places on this 
generation, as well as many future generations who had no part in the decision-
making process, the obligation to accommodate nuclear waste as safely as possible. 
But nuclear technology is used in medicinal contexts as well as for creating energy 
and weapons. It would be a particularly misanthropic environmentalist who would 
suggest that medicinal benefits of environmentally damaging technology are a luxury, 
118not a necessity, and so should be forsaken, without at least a debate about whether the 
benefits are worth the risk.
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Hayward (1998:ch5) suggests that, in view of the difficulty of judging whether 
something is a necessity or a luxury, standards of needs must be intersubjectively 
determined. Hayward uses the language of preferences and interests, but rejects the 
idea, accepted in neoclassical economics, that preferences are fixed, and argues that, 
through intersubjective engagement, preferences can be ‘interrogated’ and potentially 
educated, to arrive at ‘genuine’ interests. There are a number of problems with this. 
Firstly, it is patronising and potentially oppressive to deny that what a person believes 
their interest to be is in fact their interest. Secondly, if the principle of intersubjective 
agreement on standards of needs or genuine interests is accepted, this weakens the 
normative force of the concept of needs. Needs, on this model, are whatever the 
democratic body agrees them to be. A self-interested demos therefore presents 
problems to the rest of the world and to future generations. 
This is a problem of democratic politics, which will be discussed further in the 
next chapter. The point to note here, however, is that Norton’s idea of environmental 
sustainability   understood   in   terms   of   preserving   the   integrity   of   ecosystems 
circumvents the needs/wants problem. It does, however, depend on humans caring 
about the fate of future generations. Concern for future generations is a virtue that 
green theorists of citizenship have suggested ways of inculcating, but it is not 
necessarily a spontaneous attribute of all humans (see chapter 6). What these last 
points demonstrate is that neither economic nor political solutions to the problem of 
environmental sustainability will be sufficient independently, they must be developed 
in tandem. The remainder of this chapter assesses three proposed economic solutions; 
the following chapter considers what political strategies might support and foster such 
change. 
5.3 Two problems and three solutions
The need for sustainability comes from the fact that ‘[t]he global ecosystem 
does three things that the human economy cannot do without, or do for itself’ (Prugh 
et al 1999:15). These are, firstly, provide resources, secondly, assimilate waste 
products; and finally, perform ‘environmental services’, for example, biodiversity, the 
60 The idea of weighing up the benefits versus the risk of a particular path of development, or policy 
option, is a theme identified by Ulrich Beck (1997) in his idea of a ‘risk society’ which he argues 
characterises contemporary life. For further discussion, see chapter 6. 
119regulation of climate, or ‘amenities for consumption’ (Jacobs 1991:3-5). The structure 
of the global economy causes (at least) two significant problems which threaten these 
essential functions: firstly, what is called the ‘tragedy of the commons’, and secondly, 
the practice of ‘discounting’, or, the result of discounting, ‘externalities’. 
As stated in chapter 2, by ‘global economy’ I mean an economy organised 
around neoliberal economic principles, promoting growth-led development, and 
fostering globalised networks of production and consumption. To be clear, the neo-
liberal emphasis on export-led growth is not necessarily characteristic of market 
economies. Indeed, the market is valued not only for its potential to promote growth 
but also because of its capacity to foster innovation and as a mechanism for 
coordination. I argue below that neo-liberal policies emphasising export-led growth at 
fairly robust rates are environmentally problematic, but this might not hold true for 
market   economies   in   general.   However,   in   the   section   on   free   market 
environmentalism, I further argue that coordination by market prices to the exclusion 
of government oversight, is also problematic from and environmental point of view.
Neoliberal   economics   encourages   increasing   economic   globalisation   and 
endorses economically rational behaviour. The tragedy of the commons
61 occurs when 
economically rational agents use a commonly owned (or non-owned) resource in 
economically rational ways. To take a simple example, suppose that fishing boats A, 
B, and C fish a public lake for their livelihood. The skipper of boat A decides to buy a 
bigger net with which to catch more fish, and thereby increase his share of the market. 
This is economically rational because he exclusively benefits from the investment in 
the bigger net (more fish to sell, so more profit), while the cost in ecological terms 
(fewer fish to catch tomorrow) is spread equally amongst him and his competitors. So 
the next week the skipper of boat B decides that he should also buy a bigger net, so as 
to maintain his share of the market relative to boats A and C, and in this he also 
behaves rationally, and the process continues as each economic agent seeks a 
comparative advantage in the market. 
This ‘ratcheting’ effect that markets tend to have undermines the sustainability 
of   the   resource;   unchecked   increasing   demand   will   eventually   exhaust   the 
regenerative capacity of the lake. That said, it should be noted that growth per se is 
not necessarily the problem (Jacobs 1991:26). Growth in the rate of extraction of a 
61 The tragedy of the commons was famously highlighted in an article of that title by Garrett Hardin, 
published in 1968, the ‘commons’ originally having referred to common grazing land in pre-industrial 
Europe, which Hardin used as an analogy for commonly used environmental resources today.
120resource might mean 100 fish being caught in year 1, 103 in year 2, 107 in year 3, and 
so on. A steady rate of 100 fish being caught per year would represent zero growth. 
But this too would be unsustainable if the fish stocks were only replenished at a rate 
of 80 fish a year. This problem illustrates why simply switching to a zero-growth 
economy, as some greens have suggested, is not enough. Indeed, the real question is 
not simply the rate of growth in the economy, but the extent to which an economic 
model takes account of rates of ecological regeneration.
62 Thus the problem of climate 
change, a typical tragedy of the commons issue, would not be solved simply by 
halting   carbon   emissions   at   today’s   levels,   as   those   levels   are   themselves 
unsustainable. The climate change issue also draws our attention to the problem of 
renewable and non-renewable resources. Carbon emissions for the most part come 
from burning fossil fuels, the depletion of which is a source of considerable concern, 
as they are non-renewable in human time-frames and industrialised economies are 
heavily dependent on them. Yet the pollution from burning fossil fuels is threatening 
the sustainability of renewable resources, such as breathable air and fertile soil, and 
the depletion of renewable resources, though it has received less attention in the 
popular media, is of even greater concern than the depletion of non-renewables. Many 
of the world’s renewable resources are not privately owned and so are subject to the 
logic of the tragedy of the commons.  
Discounting also represents economically rational behaviour. It is the practice 
of placing less value on costs or benefits that occur at a distance from us. To take, 
again, a simple example, if I am offered £100 today or in ten years time, I would 
rather have it today. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, I may be dead ten years 
from now. If I am alive, £100 buys more today than it would in the future. Even if the 
£100 were adjusted for inflation, I may reasonably expect to be wealthier in ten years 
than I am now, and £100 means more to me, makes more of a difference to my life, 
when I am poorer. For all these reasons I quite rationally ‘discount’ the future. 
62 Dobson (2000:62) describes the ‘limits to growth’ thesis, based on the research of the Club of Rome 
in the 1970s, as ‘an article of faith’ amongst greens. The conclusion of the report by Meadows et al was 
that there are ecological limits to possible levels of economic growth, and that, eventually, indeed, 
within 100 years, ecological systems would collapse if the pursuit of economic growth continued. In 
response to this, a number of greens endorsed the idea of a zero-growth economy. However, as Carter 
(1999:ch1) notes, a zero-growth economy can also be environmentally destructive. What matters, then, 
is not the level of economic growth, but the rate of consumption of ecological resources relative to the 
natural absorption/rejuvenation rate. It should also be noted that endless recycling does not solve the 
problem of the increasing consumption of resources that is attendant upon economic growth, since the 
recycling of goods itself requires energy because of the typically high entropic value of post-consumer 
waste (Jacobs 1991:13-15; Dobson 2000:67-68). 
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by Jacobs (1991:27-28), if a chemical company is able to release effluent into a river 
that then poisons fish, and people use the river for drinking water downstream, then 
the chemical company does not bear the full (social and ecological) cost of producing 
the chemicals. Further, unless the company is fined for such discharges or is by law 
made to clean up the river, the market price of the chemicals will not include the full 
cost of producing the chemicals, and so the transaction between the customer buying 
chemicals and the chemicals company produces ‘externalities’, that is, negative costs 
which fall on agents external to the transaction (Jacobs 1991:28-29). According to 
Joan Martinez-Alier, ‘one can see externalities not as market failures but as cost-
shifting successes’ (Martinez-Alier 2002:257). In this case, externalities fall on people 
poisoned by the drinking water in terms of loss of health, on fishermen in terms of 
depleted fish stocks, and unless and until the river is cleaned up, on future 
generations, as well as plants and animals, now and in the future. Externalities can 
take the form of pollutants and/or loss of environmental resources, either renewable or 
non-renewable. Insofar as lower prices are preferred in the marketplace, there is no 
economic incentive for companies to internalise externalities. 
These two problems, the tragedy of the commons and discounting, are widely 
agreed on facets of market economies. What to do about them is much debated of 
course, as will be discussed below. But first it is useful to rehearse briefly the 
discussion in chapter 2 of why all this matters. The globalisation of the economy is 
clearly linked to environmental degradation, which in turn threatens human security, 
thereby contributing to the underfulfilment of human rights of the present generation, 
particularly the poor. The poorest of this generation are feeling the impact now. It is 
mostly poor people who live on lands subject to flooding, and it is in particular in sub-
Saharan Africa that soils are drying out at alarming rates, made worse by drought. The 
IPCC holds human caused global warming to be responsible for both increased 
flooding and increased desertification, as well as stronger and more frequent extreme 
weather events such as hurricane Katrina (Page 2006:38-40). But, as noted above, it is 
also future generation humans that will bear these costs, in terms of reduced options 
and a greater burden of risk compared to those facing previous generations. These two 
constituencies,   present   generation   poor   and   future   generations,   are   inevitably 
excluded from market transactions, thus do not have the opportunity to influence 
economic   activity,   and   the   environmental   impacts   they   experience   are   (quite 
122rationally) discounted by those who do. What this means is that there is an 
information gap in the market. Externalities are the consequence of this information 
gap. 
It is now possible to outline the problem facing those trying to define 
environmental sustainability specifically in the context of globalisation: The market-
driven nature of the global economy has two features which foster ecological 
degradation – the tragedy of the commons and the problem of discounting. To make 
the economy sustainable, it is necessary to find ways of making economic agents 
appreciate the full ecological costs of production and consumption. Firstly, a model of 
sustainability has to have a solution to the tragedy of the commons; economic actors 
must not be able to pollute or extract materials from common resources such as air, 
water, grazing lands, etc., without somehow being made to recognise and internalise 
the ecological costs of doing so. Secondly, with respect to the problem of discounting, 
both in terms of pollution and the depletion of resources, insofar as economic agents 
care about the fate of their children or grandchildren, mechanisms must be developed 
to close the information gap that exists with regard to externalities. Thus one question 
for a model of sustainability to address is how can the demands of intergenerational 
justice be integrated into an economic model? 
But economic agents also discount across space as well as time. As an 
economically rational agent, if cheaper goods are available from countries with lower 
regulatory standards than my own, then I will prefer the imported goods to those 
produced domestically, thereby contributing to environmental damage abroad and 
global damage from the ecological impact of transport costs. A full account of what 
future generations are owed might deal with this problem; if all externalities could be 
fully internalised for the sake of future generations, the present generation would also 
presumably   benefit.   But   the   fact   of   massive   economic   inequality   makes   the 
displacement of environmental costs easier, because the poor who lack the economic 
resources to register their preferences in the market also typically lack the political 
power to call attention to the injustice of disproportionately suffering the problems of 
externalities (Shiva 2003). The displacement of environmental costs onto poorer 
communities is therefore more likely in the short term, which serves to deepen 
environmental problems in the long term. 
123The poor often live on cheaper land that is cheap precisely because it is 
environmentally insecure, either because subject to ‘natural’ problems such as 
flooding (though exacerbated, in recent years, by human-induced climate change), or 
because polluted by toxic waste (Rosen 1994; Shiva 2003). Poor people therefore 
often experience environmental problems from which richer communities are at 
present relatively insulated. There is a scientific consensus, though, that these 
problems will become more widespread (Page 2006). Green theorists can be said to be 
misguided if they focus on intergenerational justice as the measure of sustainability, 
since   looking  at   intragenerational   justice   offers   a  better  chance  for   the   early 
identification of problematic patterns of economic behaviour. As Goodland observes, 
‘[i]f the world cannot move toward intragenerational sustainability during this 
generation,   it   will   be   that   much   more   difficult   to   achieve   intergenerational 
sustainability somewhere in the future’ (Goodland 1995:6). Moreover, insofar as 
environmental threats to human security are recognised as undermining human rights, 
it is appropriate, in a global order that affirms the value of human rights, that the 
economic problems producing these environmental harms be resolved. There is 
therefore a third important question for environmental sustainability to address; the 
issue of intragenerational justice. A model for sustainability should look to decrease 
inequality between and within nations, and at the very least should not entrench or 
perpetuate existing inequalities. This is not a sufficient condition for environmental 
sustainability, since, for example, increases in population over time could be to the 
detriment of future generations, but it is, I argue, a necessary condition. 
In summary, I have identified a three-question framework for analysing 
models of sustainability: 1. How is the tragedy of the commons addressed? 2. How 
are the demands of intergenerational justice recognised? 3. How are the demands of 
intragenerational justice recognised? In the remainder of this chapter, I use these three 
questions to consider the relative merits of three competing models of environmental 
sustainability;   free   market   environmentalism,   ecological   modernisation,   and 
ecological economics. This study does not exhaust the possible range of models of 
sustainability, rather, it evaluates three positions on a scale of increasing interference 
in the global market economy. Whereas previous comparative studies have assessed 
sustainability models in terms of their adherence to green principles (Dobson 1998), 
or in terms of their compatibility with liberal democracy (Labaras 2001), the aim of 
124this study is to identify which of these approaches is most promising in addressing the 
environmental problems specifically associated with globalisation.
5.3.1 Free market environmentalism
Free market environmentalists, such as Terry Anderson and Donald Leal 
(1991; 2005), contend that the environmental problems the market engenders are a 
consequence of political interference in the market, and the fact that markets are 
incomplete. If the market was allowed to operate fully and freely, Anderson and Leal 
claim, then the ecological costs of production would be fully internalised in the 
market price of goods, and environmental quality would improve. Indeed, in this 
analysis, the complex spontaneous order created by the market is said to be a mirror 
of the complex spontaneous order of ecosystems. Thus, the solution to the tragedy of 
the commons is to eliminate the commons; that is, privatise public or common 
goods.
63 
This argument boils down to the idea that better care is taken of any given 
resource if it is owned by someone who has a direct interest in that resource’s 
continued cultivation, than if it is owned by the public, or not owned at all. So, if 
rivers were privatised, chemical companies would be charged a price for releasing 
effluent into the river, as would swimmers for recreational use, fishermen for fishing 
rights (presumably with quotas), and so on. The owner of the river would set the price 
to be paid for each activity, the price being determined by the prices being offered by 
competitors, and the relative costs of each type of activity to the resource. As the 
owner of the river would presumably want to maximise his income from the resource, 
he has an interest in pricing polluting activity highly, thereby maintaining the quality 
of the river. 
Privatising environmental common or public goods is particularly attractive, 
free market environmentalists claim, because it eliminates the danger of special 
interest groups influencing the political process that would otherwise determine the 
fate of these goods. In short, the free market is held to be less corruptible than politics. 
Anderson and Leal also argue (2005) that the market is a better, faster and more 
63 Public goods are technically things like the security provided by police forces. Common goods are 
things like fresh air – they exist anyway, with or without a government. I take them to be the same 
class of goods here in that they share certain features – they benefit everyone, even those who choose 
not to pay for them, and indeed it is practically impossible to exclude people from the services 
provided by public or common goods.
125efficient   communicator   of   values   than   the   political   process   is.   Market-based 
transactions are more responsive to consumer demand than politicians are to voters’ 
demands, particularly as voters typically express their opinion effectively only once 
every few years at election time. Moreover, voters decide for whom to cast their 
ballots on a range of issues. On the other hand, the market allows consumers to 
disaggregate their values, and use their economic power to indicate precisely their 
preferences, to which producers must respond in order to maximise profits and 
maintain or increase their share of the market relative to their competitors.
The only practical difficulty here, then, is how to restrict access to the river, or 
clean air, or any other common resource, so as to prevent its use by people who have 
not paid for the service. Indeed, Michael Jacobs rejects free market environmentalism 
on the grounds that it is practically impossible as a solution to the tragedy of the 
commons, because the type of goods that suffer from the tragedy of the commons do 
so precisely because they cannot be ‘captured, commodified, and bought and sold’ 
(Jacobs 1995:16). While this is not strictly true of lakes, it is clearly true of a stable 
climate and breathable air. But free market environmentalists argue that where there is 
a demand for technology that limits access to a public good or a common good, then 
the technology will be developed. After all, this is how markets work, they provide 
incentives for innovation. It might seem far-fetched to imagine that there might one 
day be a way of restricting access to clean air only to those who had paid for it, but it 
is worth noting that the WTO has speculative plans for trade rules should water be 
fully privatised globally (Manger 2003). Moreover, biodiversity, one would think, 
could not be privately owned, but the TRIPS agreement, one of the outcomes of the 
Doha round of WTO trade talks, allows, among other things, the patenting of plants 
(see chapter 2). So we can see that there are reasons to take seriously the arguments of 
free market environmentalists. Indeed, if the technology to make private air workable 
should become available, then it is conceivable that the privatisation of air would 
solve the tragedy of the commons. 
But privatising public or common goods raises important ethical questions. 
Discussing public goods, Andrew Light argues that ‘publicly provided goods have the 
normative status of publicly recognised needs’ (Light 2000:214). Certainly, it cannot 
be denied that we all need clean water and breathable air. It may be argued, then, that 
we should not have to pay for them, that it would be unethical to privatise them, 
particularly on a global scale. Yet we already have to pay for food, which we also 
126need.
64 The onus, then, is on opponents of free market environmentalism, to show 
why other goods that we need, such as water and air, should not also be commodified. 
To this it might be replied that the commodification of food has not been a stunning 
success, that the pressure a global economy puts on farmers in developing countries to 
switch from subsistence to cash crops makes neither social nor ecological sense, and 
that the evidence on increased inequalities resulting from intensified global trade 
suggests that the benefits from privatising the commons would not be evenly 
distributed (see Shiva 1999; Woods 2000). 
Increasing inequalities, both within and between countries, raise again the 
problem of discounting – poor communities are much more vulnerable to both 
environmental exploitation, as they have limited resources with which to pursue a 
comparative advantage in the global economy, and environmental degradation, as 
they have fewer resources with which to protect their populations from the effects of 
climate change and toxic pollution. Free market environmentalists rely on economic 
growth to raise the economic wealth of all, but by accepting inequalities, also accept 
limits on the poor communities’ abilities to be active in and influence the market. 
Note that it is relative, rather than absolute, poverty that makes a difference to this – 
certainly the absolutely poor cannot participate in the market, but relative poverty 
means that market outcomes are skewed in favour of those with greater economic 
power. Thus the demands of intragenerational justice receive very little recognition in 
free market environmentalism. 
It should also be noted that free market environmentalism rests on certain 
assumptions   with   which   many   greens   are   uncomfortable.   Free   market 
environmentalism takes preferences as indicated in the market as given.
65 That is, it 
assumes that people’s preferences are sovereign, and so, if someone wants to spend 
their money on a 4x4, then there is nothing more to be said about it. The market will 
price such commodities highly if the ecological costs are fully included, but the 
individual is free to pay that price if he so desires. As argued above, it is certainly 
problematic to suggest that people do not know what is in their own long term best 
interests, and that their liberty should therefore be restricted, but it is also problematic 
64  There is also the problem, discussed above, that needs and wants are difficult to determine 
objectively.
65 Another important assumption free market environmentalists make is that the environment only has 
value insofar as it contributes to human welfare. This view is anathema to many greens, in particular 
ecocentrists, but one need not take an ecocentric perspective to be unpersuaded by the argument of free 
market environmentalists.
127to accept environmentally damaging behaviour without criticism or comment. By 
taking consumer preferences as sovereign, free market environmentalists do not 
necessarily indicate any concern for, or interest in, future generations. Indeed, the 
problem of discounting continues in the context of free market environmentalism. If I 
would rationally prefer £100 now rather than in ten years time, then I might well 
rationally prefer to strip my woodland of timber for a profit and not worry about the 
next generation. The next generation, meanwhile, does not have an opportunity to 
express their preferences in the market place, they simply inherit the sum total of 
preferences our generation has expressed, the balance of which will also reflect the 
balance of the present generation’s spending power. In short, the most wealthy will 
get to decide what environmental resources we bequeath to the future. Thus free 
market environmentalism offers at best an ambiguous, and an undemocratic, response 
to the demands of intergenerational justice. 
In summary, free market environmentalism does not provide convincing 
answers to the three questions that form my evaluative framework. The free market 
response to the tragedy of the commons would perhaps be effective if the technology 
became   available,   but   it   raises   serious   ethical   questions.   Free   market 
environmentalism has nothing to offer in terms of intragenerational justice, it accepts 
Adam Smith’s promise that a rising tide lifts all boats, despite the fact that Smith did 
not envisage the degree of capital mobility witnessed today (Mander 2003:113), and 
despite the fact that inequality has been increasing both within and between nations 
for the past decade (Woods 2000; Shiva 2003). And given that future generations are 
necessarily excluded from market transactions, and the market is to be the sole agent 
for   resolving   environmental   problems,   intergenerational   justice   is   also   poorly 
accommodated in free market environmentalism. 
5.3.2 Ecological modernisation
Ecological   modernisation   shares   some   features   with   free   market 
environmentalism, in that it seeks to harness market forces to make progress on 
environmental issues, but it also sees a role for government action. In this respect it 
may be thought of as a middle way, or perhaps ‘third way’, between free market 
environmentalism and the much more interventionist ecological economics approach. 
Ecological modernisation is particularly attractive to politicians as it essentially denies 
the purported zero-sum relationship between environmental protection and economic 
128growth, and instead emphasises the economic opportunities created by the demand for 
new   environmentally   friendly   technology.   Thus   the   ecological   modernisation 
approach to sustainability promises to benefit everyone – the environment, the 
economy, and, again because of the trickle-down effects of continued economic 
growth, people too. 
A central claim of ecological modernisation theorists, such as Mol (2002), 
Barry (2003; 2006b), is that environmental sustainability is a precondition for 
economic   growth   in   the   twenty-first   century.   The   key   strategies   to   achieve 
sustainability are a supply-side focus to environmental regulation, because post-
production solutions are held to be both inadequate and unwieldy, and to integrate 
environmental aims into all sectors of public policy (Labaras 2001:93-4). The 
relationship between government and the market is constructed as one between 
problem-setter   and   problem-solver.   The   government   defines   the   goals   of 
environmental policy and the encourages the market to find ways of achieving these 
goals. So, for example, the ‘polluter pays’ principle, applied by governments, creates 
in the market an incentive for companies to find clean production methods. Acting on 
this incentive will allow companies to pursue a comparative advantage in the 
marketplace, both domestically and on a global scale, as consumers increasingly 
demand environmentally friendly goods.
With respect to the tragedy of the commons, the benefits of an ecological 
modernisation  approach   are  uncertain.  There   is  nothing  intrinsic  to  ecological 
modernisation that encourages a global focus, indeed, even advocates of ecological 
modernisation have acknowledged as much:
Neither  does   ecological  modernisation   take  into   account  the  global 
dimensions of the environmental crisis, nor the need for global political 
co-operation to deal with global environmental problems. On this issue, 
ecological modernisation is limited to being a domestic approach to 
environmental problems. (Barry 2005:316)
The domestic preoccupation fits, of course, with the political desire to secure a 
comparative advantage in the global economy – politicians are answerable to the 
present generation of constituents in their own country only, and voters have a 
justifiable concern with economic stability. But the domestic preoccupation fails to 
recognise the extent to which the global economy itself contributes to environmental 
problems. 
129Ecological   modernisation   does  not,  then,  offer  specific  answers   on  the 
question of how to avoid the tragedy of the commons. But it is clear that, where the 
political will to achieve an international consensus is there, then the principles of 
ecological modernisation could be applied globally, to address commons type issues, 
such as climate change. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol can be studied as an example of the 
ecological modernisation approach in action – governments have agreed targets on 
carbon emissions, and have created a mechanism (tradable emissions permits) for the 
market to do what the market does best – find the most cost-effective way of meeting 
the targets. This should provide incentives for the development of new, cleaner 
technology. Setting aside the problems associated with the exclusion of major 
polluters like the US, India and China from the agreement,
66 and also setting aside 
concerns raised by many environmental scientists that the targets are not nearly 
ambitious enough, there are further concerns that the trading scheme does not work as 
it was hoped. 
Trade in emissions permits within a country does not disrupt overall the 
amount of emissions that the country produces. But trade in emissions rights between 
countries may well result in country A producing more emissions than country B. 
While   this   may   be   advantageous   to   country   B,   it   is   not   straightforwardly 
advantageous to the planet, for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it does not necessarily 
promote the technological innovation hoped for. The most cost-effective way of 
reducing emissions need not involve investment in new, cleaner technologies if 
increased polluting rights can be purchased with the profits from polluting activity. 
Secondly, it does not even guarantee environmental protection. If country A has oil 
reserves in an ecologically sensitive natural wilderness, and country B has natural 
features that make hydropower a cheap and viable energy source, then allowing 
country A to purchase emissions credits from country B may give country A an 
incentive to exploit its oil reserves, thereby disrupting a sensitive ecosystem. Clearly, 
in this example, the environment has not gained. Note that the deficiency is not in the 
market. The market is efficient precisely because it does not require an ‘overseer’ of 
some kind to coordinate action. The free market environmentalist is quite correct in 
arguing that political or technical overseers are less efficient at communicating 
information   with   different   actors   than   uncoordinated   market   prices   are.   Yet 
66 It looks likely that these countries may well be participants in the yet to be negotiated successor to 
the Kyoto Protocol (Bhat et al 2007).
130coordinated  action   is   precisely   what   is   needed   to   achieve   environmental 
sustainability. 
There is also a question of ethics lurking in the background here. Suppose the 
initial allocation of trading permits across a scheme involving four countries gives an 
equal number and value of permits to each country as shown in table 1.
67 At T1 each 
country has an equal right to pollute up to a certain level, which overall represents a 
reduction in the level of emissions, as shown below in table 1.
68 A year on, at T2, 
trade between permit holders has altered the rights to pollute held by each country, 
such that some now emit more than what might be thought their ‘fair share’ of 
pollutants.
Table 1 
Country T1 Allocation T2 Allocation
A 25 35
B 25 15
C 25 10
D 25 40
Total 100 100
Now  suppose that the distribution of initial allocations is in fact determined, not 
equally, nor by population size, but by a measure of the capacity that the territory of 
the country has to absorb pollutants, that is, the ecological capacity, which, in the case 
of carbon emissions, we might crudely measure in terms of the amount of land in that 
country that is covered by trees. The figures at T1 and T2 would then be as shown in 
table 2. What this means is that countries B and D use more ecological resources than 
are available within their own territories. They run at an ecological deficit, while 
countries A and C have a surplus (shown in table 2). As long as the surpluses balance 
or outweigh the deficits, then there is a sustainable equilibrium. The ecological 
modernisation   approach   accepts   this.   Precisely   because   it   takes   a   supply-side 
approach, it has nothing to say about the distribution of the consumption of ecological 
resources   (Barry   2005:311).   Hence,   David   Pepper   argues   that   ecological 
modernisation   ‘is   likely   to   foster   continued   attempts   at   displacement   and 
externalisation of both environmental and social costs’ (Pepper 1998:1).
Table 2
Country Eco-capacity T1 Allocation T2 Allocation Surplus/Deficit
67 In the case of Kyoto this was not the case, but this is supposed for the sake of a simple illustration.
68 Creating a ‘right’ to pollute is itself problematic, but again, let us set this issue to one side.
131A 25 25 15 +10
B 5 5 10 -5
C 30 30 20 +10
D 40 40 55 -15
Total 100 100 100 0
Turning to the question of intragenerational justice, though, this is a matter of 
concern. Ecological modernisation relies on the idea of being able to pursue a 
comparative advantage in the global economy to make progress on environmental 
issues. That presupposes inequality. Inequality per se may not be a bad thing, indeed, 
natural inequality is inescapable – nature has distributed some ecological resources 
unevenly. But it was claimed above that substantial economic inequality is a factor in 
the unequal distribution of environmental harms. Insofar as this claim is justified, 
ecological   modernisation   may   further   contribute   to,   rather   than   eliminate,   the 
displacement of environmental harms to poorer countries, especially where ecological 
modernisation policy maintains a domestic focus. Moreover, by accepting inequality 
in terms of the amount of ecological resources that can be consumed, tied to relative 
economic power, the ecological modernisation approach accepts, indeed, endorses, 
considerable injustice within the present generation. In effect, the poor still have very 
limited opportunities to express their preferences in the market. 
On the question of intergenerational justice, the results are more positive. 
Advocates of ecological modernisation typically give enthusiastic endorsement to the 
precautionary principle, which requires proof that a given product is safe before that 
product can be made available on the market. Where the evidence is disputed, the 
product cannot legitimately be made available. Thus, even though future generations 
cannot express a preference in the market, the acceptance of this element of political 
interference in the market allows the interests of future generations to be safeguarded, 
provided the political will is there. This acceptance of limited political interference in 
the market indicates a key difference between ecological modernisation and free 
market environmentalism. That said, where the solution to the tragedy of the 
commons proposed by free market environmentalists was clear, the ecological 
modernisation approach to this problem was less certain. Thus there is cause for 
132concern as to whether an ecological modernisation approach could guarantee future 
generations the ecological inheritance they might wish for. 
In summary, the ecological modernisation approach also cannot adequately 
answer the three questions that form my evaluative framework. The benefits of the 
hybrid  strategy of government-set market-achieved goals to protect the global 
commons looked uncertain. While there was a clear commitment to intergenerational 
justice, the question of intragenerational justice was largely ignored in the ecological 
modernisation  model.   Moreover,  like  free  market  environmentalism,  ecological 
modernisation implicitly accepts the ‘right’ (if it may be called that) of some countries 
to run an ecological deficit, which clearly must be at the expense of other countries. 
Finally, ecological modernisation does not challenge, but rather embraces, the export-
led growth model of development that neoliberal economics encourages, and which 
has to date has led consistently to the increased consumption of ecological resources. 
This, it seems to me, is not a robust understanding of environmental sustainability.
5.3.3 Ecological economics
Ecological economics is by far the most radical (in terms of most strikingly 
different from currently prevalent ideas about economic organisation) of the three 
approaches considered here. While both free market environmentalists and ecological 
modernisation advocates accept some of the key principles of neoliberal economics, 
for example, that growth is good for the economy, that growth should be measured in 
terms of total economic activity, and that growth is potentially limitless (given the 
right technology), ecological economists, such as Martinez-Alier and Schlupmann 
(1991), Gowdy (2000; 2003), take a very different approach. They question growth as 
the central goal of economic policy, reject undifferentiated growth as a measure of 
well-being, and recognise limits to growth insofar as countries are enjoined to live 
within their ecological capacity. If there is to be growth in the economy it must be 
separated from physical growth (Goodland 1995). This is also an aim of ecological 
modernisation, but whereas ecological modernisation expects the market to find ways 
of growing the economy without increasing the material throughput,
69  ecological 
economics proposes the setting of a ‘sustainability boundary’, to be determined by the 
ecological capacity of the country. The economy must not then be allowed to surpass 
69 The amount of material resources extracted from the environment, converted into products, and then 
into post-consumer waste.
133that boundary. Thus one of the key prisms of analysis is the ecological ‘carrying 
capacity’ of either the earth as a whole, or a particular state.
Practically, Goodland and Daly (1996:1004-1005) propose that economic 
management focus on maintaining natural capital for future generations, but, as 
discussed above, a more robust account of sustainability would focus on the integrity 
of the ecosystem. This can be achieved by ‘using key environmental indicators to 
define the level of environmental capacity’ (Jacobs 1991:95),
70 and then, through a 
mixture of regulation and tax incentives ‘constraining the economic behaviour of 
firms and households’ such that the boundary is not breached (Labaras 2001:90). 
Jacobs, refers to this two-stage process as ‘sustainability planning’. The political level 
at which sustainability planning takes place depends on the impact that a particular 
issue has (Jacobs 1991:97). To return to a couple of earlier examples, carbon 
emissions have a global rather than a local impact, so global planning is necessary. 
The problem of over-fishing in a particular river, on the other hand, can be resolved 
by local planning. This flexibility as to the political level at which decisions are made 
is described by E.F. Schumacher as ‘appropriateness’ (Dobson 2000:106), and has 
significant implications for political institutional arrangements, as will be discussed in 
chapter 6. A reflexive approach to policy is also mandated, since the integrity of the 
ecosystem must be continually monitored, and the sustainability boundary revised, 
where necessary, to sustain the environment as technological innovation, population 
levels, and other variables, fluctuate. Like ecological modernisation advocates, 
proponents of ecological economics endorse the precautionary principle, but unlike 
those in favour of ecological modernisation, ecological economists also engage 
directly with questions of consumer demand, and in particular the scale of economic 
activity relative to ecological capacity (Daly 2006). Thus while it is recognised that a 
great  deal  can  be  achieved  by improving  the  efficiency  of energy-consuming 
products, such as cars, and finding new and more efficient ways to recycle post-
consumer waste, not using a car and avoiding waste altogether is considered 
preferable to efficiency improvements or recycling. 
Looking at our three question framework, the solution to the tragedy of the 
commons is clear – sustainability planning can feasibly be expected to protect the 
70  The scientific capability is for the most part there for this. Ecologists use the presence of key 
‘indicator species’ to determine the health of a river. At the global level, the IPCC, a global consortium 
of scientists producing peer-reviewed studies, could provide the kind of information that would be 
needed to set a sustainability boundary.
134commons. This also serves intergenerational justice well, which is further enhanced 
by ensuring that the present generation does not live beyond its ecological means. 
With respect to intragenerational justice, ecological economics also has much to 
recommend it in that it pays detailed attention to the distribution of both consumption 
of environmental resources and environmental wastes. Thus we would not expect to 
find poorer communities disproportionately suffering from environmental degradation 
as we do now. 
That said, there are also a number of questions unanswered. In particular, it is 
unclear what level of welfare poorer countries could expect within an ecological 
economics framework. Although ecological economics does not exclude growth, 
markets are to be severely restricted; growth is only permissible when achieved in 
ways that do not increase material throughput, and annual growth rates are expected 
to be much less than the 3% that is conventionally thought to be quite healthy. This 
closes one door to economic development for much of the Third World. The 
alternative, perhaps, is redistribution of wealth, or at the very least welfare, in terms of 
technology transfer, education, and almost certainly a relaxation of patents of 
medicines and agricultural products. That may be more realistic as a means to ending 
poverty – a recent New Economic Foundation (NEF) study (2006) suggested that 
poverty-reduction pursued through conventional economic growth is likely to be 
ecologically disastrous over the long term – but there is limited political will for such 
action in Europe and even less in the USA, and in developing countries there may be 
justifiable suspicion at having welfare defined by others on their behalf. A further 
problem is that sustainability planning, a central strategy of ecological economics, 
may lack political appeal in view of the Soviet experience of planned economies. The 
planning implied here is closer to management of human-environment relations than 
the setting of production (and consumption) targets practised in the former Soviet 
bloc. Ecological economics does not eschew markets per se, but the market is to be 
heavily regulated, and the ecological limits of permissible material growth are clearly 
defined. This would be likely to have the effect of eliminating a considerable amount 
of global trade, for example, in products that can be made domestically, and in 
agriculture, the transport costs of importing food stuffs out of season would be 
substantial. 
These latter points highlight a further problem. Sustainability planning would 
depend on public and political support for its effectiveness to a far greater extent than 
135either free market environmentalism or ecological modernisation. The transition from 
growth-led economies to sustainability planning as the organising principle of both 
domestic and international economies would be extraordinarily difficult, and would 
mean overturning the fundamental principles that underpin both national economic 
policies in Europe, and the policies of international financial institutions such as the 
IMF and the WTO. At present there is neither the political will nor public appetite for 
such radical and far-reaching change. It is also difficult to see how one country or 
even a small coalition of countries could move towards sustainability planning on 
their own, without facing economic collapse. In short, ecological economics demands 
a strong, and global or near global consensus on the necessity of working towards a 
strong model of sustainability that, at present, is conspicuously absent. For this 
reason, Labaras (2001:92) describes ecological economics as ‘incomplete’, providing, 
as it does, a near utopian vision, without any clues as to how it might be achieved.
In summary, then, ecological economics provides a convincing model of a 
sustainable economy that can protect the global commons and meet the demands of 
intergenerational justice as well as at least some of the demands of intragenerational 
justice. On the other hand, it seems less politically viable, at present, than the 
alternatives studied here. Contrary to Labaras’ conclusion, this seems to me to be 
reason for further research, rather than abandoning the idea. Detailed economic 
analysis of a transition to an economy organised around the principles of ecological 
economics is beyond the scope of this thesis. But green theorists have suggested 
innovations in political institutions that could orchestrate a growth in public support 
for such a transition. These potential political strategies are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
5.4 Conclusion
The features of a definition of environmental sustainability as identified here 
can be summarised as follows: Firstly, environmental sustainability requires an 
ontological perspective in which humans are understood to be ecologically embedded 
beings. On the other hand, it does not necessarily require a commitment to the belief 
that nature has intrinsic value. Thus, environmental sustainability can be adequately 
theorised from an anthropocentric perspective. Secondly, neither a clear, nor a robust 
definition  of   sustainability  emerges  from  differentiating  needs  and  wants,  and 
prioritising the needs of future generations over the wants of the present. A more 
136useful approach, in the sense of being clearly intelligible and translatable into policy 
goals, is Norton’s idea of the integrity of the ecosystem as a standard by which to 
assess models of environmental sustainability. 
Of course, the integrity of the ecosystem will in part be a function of the 
stresses to which it is exposed, hence the third area studied here was the specific 
problems associated with a global market economy. These were analysed to yield a 
three-question framework for analysing three models of sustainability; free market 
environmentalism, ecological modernisation, and ecological economics. Given its 
focus on the scale of the economy and the ecological capacity of the environment, 
ecological economics was found to offer the most persuasive answers to the issues of 
addressing the tragedy of the commons and the problem of discounting, the demands 
of intergenerational justice, and intragenerational justice. 
The political implications of adopting ecological economics as a model of 
sustainability included affirming the principle of ‘appropriateness’ in deciding at 
which political level decisions are to be made, and reflexiveness as standard attitude 
to policy decisions. It is clear that the ecological economics approach mandates 
substantial changes to living patterns and economic organisation, as well as political 
institutions, and the transitional path from a global market economy organised around 
neoliberal principles to an economy organised on the principles of ecological 
economics remains unspecified. This, I argued, suggests the need for further research, 
rather than to abandon the idea. But I also suggested there is little evidence at present 
for public or political appetite for such fundamental change, therefore one of the tasks 
of theorists of environmental sustainability is to explore the ways in which political 
institutions might be reformed in order to foster support for such a robust model of 
sustainability. The focus of the next chapter, therefore, is green interpretations of 
citizenship, democracy, and justice. 
137Chapter 6: The politics of environmental sustainability: 
Citizenship, democracy, and justice
In the previous chapter I argued that an ecological economics approach to 
sustainability was in principle the most persuasive one. Ecological economists argue 
that there are physical limits to the material throughput that the planet can sustain, and 
that patterns of production and consumption need to be modified so as to be brought 
within these limits. It is important to note that such limits are not fixed, however. 
They are variable in relation to the size of the human population, the level of welfare 
that the population expects or requires, and the level of technological development. 
Nevertheless, ecological economists stress that a vision of human development 
predicated on ever-continuing economic growth is fundamentally misguided. Thus, 
changes in our economic relations are both necessary and inevitable – if we do not 
make such changes voluntarily, it is feared that increasing environmental degradation 
will precipitate ecological conditions that will significantly disrupt current patterns of 
living (see chapter 2). 
Two questions, then, seem to be in need of an answer: Firstly, what political 
arrangements would adequately ground a sustainable society? Secondly, how do we 
get there from here? Pursuing answers to these two questions has caused green 
theorists some difficulties. Many utopian visions of a sustainable future characterised 
by harmonious relations between nature and humans, and humans and humans, have 
been published and debated within green theory (de Geus 1999; Bookchin 1987). 
They have also been attacked for their very utopianism (see Pepper 2005). On the 
other   hand,   those   taking   an   incremental   approach   to   realising   environmental 
sustainability (by proposing policies that would reform our current institutions) have 
been   rejected   because   they  risk  co-optation   and  arguably  advocate   a  shallow 
reformism that is inadequate to the challenge posed (Hancock 2003). 
Given this quagmire of debate, what I present here is a discussion of the 
principles of  citizenship, democracy, and justice, as they have been (re-)interpreted in 
green theory. The aim is to critically engage currently dominant political models, 
principally liberal democracy, as well as appraise green conceptions of the political 
conditions for environmental sustainability. That is not to say that there is a unified 
green vision of what are the appropriate models of citizenship, democracy, and justice 
for sustainability. The present chapter explores a selection of recent proposals for new 
138ways of understanding the enduring concepts of citizenship, democracy, and justice, 
that have long been seen as corner stones of political institutions. The deliberative 
democrat is held to be more likely to advocate environmentally sustainable decisions, 
while the debates in the literature over how citizenship is best understood point 
towards a desire on the part of green theorists to link environmental duties with the 
ecological footprint. Rights, however, are not emphasised, which, I argue, undermines 
claims   that   environmental   politics   can   foster   social   justice.   Thus   theories   of 
citizenship also have implications for green theories of justice, which are the subject 
of the final section of this chapter. 
6.1 Greening Citizenship
Green interpretations of citizenship are many and varied. In addition to 
competing accounts of the duties and virtues of green citizenship, distinctions are also 
drawn between weaker and stronger versions, characterised as ‘environmental’ versus 
‘ecological’   citizenship   by   Andrew   Dobson   (2003),   or   ‘environmental’   versus 
‘sustainability’ citizenship by John Barry (2006a), ‘passive’ versus ‘active’ by 
Graham Smith (2004). Although there are differences between the three contrasts, 
broadly speaking, the former category in each case is seen as a model of citizenship 
that does not engage critically with prevailing norms or institutions, but modifies 
behaviour in response to either economic incentives or legal restrictions. The latter 
category entails a more wholesale change, not only in behaviour but also in values. It 
is this latter model of citizenship that is generally seen to be connected with 
deliberative democracy. While behaviour might be changed by fiscal policies such as 
a tax on plastic bags, it is impossible to tell whether the change in behaviour has been 
accompanied   by   a   change   in   values,   or,   if   the   tax   were   withdrawn,   the 
environmentally sustainable behaviour (not using a new plastic bag for each visit to 
the shops) would also discontinue (Dobson and Bell 2006:3). On the other hand, 
advocates of deliberative democracy (and citizenship education
71) regard part of its 
appeal   as   being   the   capacity   to   change   values,   with   changes   in   behaviour 
spontaneously following. Whereas the passive citizen responds to ‘altered incentive 
structures’ to consume less and recycle more; the active citizen participates in 
71 Citizenship education, mostly directed at school children, has been the subject of considerable debate 
among green scholars in recent years. I touch on this debate only tangentially in what follows, leaving 
it to others to consider the desirable scope and content of citizenship education, and its relationship to 
the (green) state. For a discussion of these issues, see Bell (2004).
139political decision-making, either through deliberative forums, or through collective 
action to effect institutional change (Smith 2004:144). Barry (2006a:33) adds that it is 
not just a right, but a duty, of sustainability citizens, to engage in the latter type of 
activities. 
Some feminists have at this point raised doubts about the literature on 
environmental   citizenship.   As   well   as   speaking   in   rather   hackneyed   terms   of 
‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ virtues, where the masculine virtue is ‘wildness’ and the 
feminine virtue is ‘caring’,
72 greens have also been guilty of failing to take note of 
earlier feminist criticism of republican, and particularly Aristotelian, notions of 
citizenship, from which John O’Neill (1993) and James Connelly (2006) draw 
inspiration. Sherilyn MacGregor complains of green citizenship theorists in general:
They assume a gender-neutral citizen and a gender-neutral model of 
citizenship practice that mask the realities and specificities of gender 
inequality while depending on a division of labour that frees autonomous 
citizens to participate in the public domain. (MacGregor 2006:106)
An example of this tendency is evident in the duty to respond ‘passively’ to altered 
incentive structures in the economy (that would tend towards a re-intensification of 
labour processes, especially in the domestic sphere), whilst simultaneously ‘actively’ 
participating   in   time-consuming   deliberative   forums   for   decision-making.   This 
conundrum leads some to wonder ‘who will be minding the kids?’, in Mary O’Brien’s 
phrase (quoted in MacGregor 2006:110). There is also an invidious tendency among 
some environmentalists to regard the problem of overpopulation as a problem 
concerning only women (Wissenburg 1998:84). But what is of most concern to 
feminist commentators is not the chauvinism of a male-dominated discipline (irksome 
though that is), but rather, that green theorists of citizenship have been blind to the 
structural inequalities that the emphasis on citizenship responsibilities may come to 
mask and re-entrench. Moreover, the focus on duties rather than rights devalues the 
rights-based mechanisms that have been developed (and fought for) to underwrite 
equality in society. As will be discussed below, it cannot be assumed that deliberative 
democracy will be blind to inequalities in society. Therefore, strong rights to equal 
72  I grant that some ecofeminists have also emphasised so-called feminine virtues of caring and 
compassion, and have argued on this basis that women are better at being environmentally friendly 
than men. I agree with Eckersley (1992) that this argument is misguided. MacGregor (2006) stresses 
the oft-made point that the idea of women as caring mistakes a socialised disposition for a natural 
predisposition.
140treatment would seem to be an important mechanism for ensuring an equitable 
distribution of duties. 
Duty does indeed loom large in green theories of citizenship. Connelly claims 
that ‘[e]cological citizenship is not characterised by rights but by the self-imposed 
duties of the citizen’ (Connelly 2006:63). This contrast between rights and duties is 
frequently held to be one of the defining features of green citizenship as opposed to 
liberal democratic citizenship. The liberal democratic citizen is characterised as one 
whose relationship to the community is determined by the possession of certain rights, 
and who enters the community in order to further his own privately determined ends, 
with regard to which the state (or government of the community) is neutral (de-Shalit 
2000:104). In the republican tradition in citizenship, on the other hand, there is a 
‘focus on deeper reciprocity between rights and duties’ (Connelly 2006:63). In other 
words, the entitlement to the rights afforded by the community is to some extent 
dependent upon the performance of certain duties. This relationship is constitutive of 
the republican community insofar as it is conceived as a communal enterprise, 
whereas the liberal democratic ‘community’ affords opportunities for individual 
enterprise and is indifferent to the goals of each of its members, unless those goals 
threaten the ability of others to pursue their ends. Thus in liberal democracies there is 
a reciprocal tolerance, and the emphasis is on rights rather than duties. Some sceptics 
of the idea of environmental human rights base their criticism on the egotism of a 
rights-based culture, which, so the argument goes, leads to a disregard of our impacts 
on  others  (people  and  non-human  beings), and absolves  us of  our reciprocal 
responsibilities (see chapter 7).
6.1.1 Stewardship
Terence Ball (2001) proposes the green virtue of what he calls ‘punctuated 
reciprocity’, whereby duties to others do not depend upon standing in reciprocal 
relations with them. Instead, we have a duty as members of an intergenerational 
community to provide for future generations, just as we would wish that future 
generations had provided for us. Such a norm, if widely fostered, would serve as a 
corrective to the practice of discounting the future, discussed in chapter 5. Punctuated 
reciprocity also invokes a particular model of community that again stands in 
opposition or contradiction to the liberal democratic one. Ball sees the community in 
something approaching Burkean terms (although the communitarianism of Burke is 
141not necessarily implied), as an ongoing enterprise across generations that stand in 
‘asymmetrical’ relations to each other with regard to the duties and rights each can 
exercise. The idea of the community as ‘stewards’ rather than ‘sovereigns’ has also 
been proposed by Robin Attfield (1998), which again has implications for the practice 
of discounting. Whereas a sovereign authority may choose not to discount the 
interests, or ‘rights’ if there be any, of future generations, the steward is not so 
entitled. The relationship between the steward and its heirs is not, and could not be, 
reciprocal, but there is nevertheless a duty on the part of the steward not to discount 
the heirs’ interests or rights.
73  A further endorsement of stewardship comes from 
Barry (2002) who proposes ‘ecological stewardship’ as a virtue-based approach to 
green citizenship, which, he argues, should be understood as a reflexive practice for 
coping with the ongoing task of managing human-environment relations in a way that 
necessarily links present activities to future generations.
There is, as Edward Page (2006:115-117) notes, a ‘motivational assumption’ 
present in all of these accounts of environmental stewardship, which is that people 
have a sentimental concern for and interest in future generations, often, but not 
exclusively, of their own families. What this means for citizens is that they are not 
free to pursue their own interests without regard to the interests of others, rather, they 
have a duty, for the sake of their grandchildren, not to be the self-interested rational 
egotist of neoliberal economic theory, but instead to act to preserve the integrity of the 
environment. I argue below, in section 6.3, that this is an important alternative to self-
interest, which is insufficient as a motivational force for maintaining environmental 
integrity when generations do not overlap, but the stewardship argument is vulnerable 
to the charge that people do not, in fact, care about future generations.
A further problem with the stewardship model is whether citizens can be said 
to have duties in virtue of benefits they receive non-voluntarily (Page 2006:123). For 
example, if I inherit a cat from a friend, though I did not ask to receive this cat, and in 
fact dislike cats, then it is not self-evident that I ought to keep the cat and look after it, 
simply because I was given this ‘benefit’. However, it may be possible to overcome 
the non-voluntary benefit problem if, adapting Thomas Pogge’s approach to human 
rights (see chapter 4), the duty to act as an environmental steward is cast in terms of 
negative rather than positive duties. A full elaboration of this proposal is not the 
73 I leave open here the question of whether future generations can have rights. For a discussion of this 
question, see Attfield (1998). I also discuss the issue briefly in chapter 7.
142subject of this thesis, however, a brief sketch can be given of the type of citizenship 
duties involved. A negative duty not to diminish the integrity of the environment 
would   be   less   onerous   than   positive   duties   to   preserve   the   integrity   of   the 
environment, since it would require only that environmental citizens refrain from 
engaging in environmentally destructive behaviour.
74  A positive duty to act as 
stewards, on the other hand, would require citizens to act in particular ways, such as 
participate in deliberative forums or engage in community sustainability work, and so 
on. 
The positive/negative distinction does not follow the same lines as the 
distinctions noted above between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ models of citizenship, since 
the citizen as steward is not passively responding to altered incentive structures, but 
rather, is actively pursuing a particular way of living that avoids contributing to 
environmental degradation. Should individual citizens find that they cannot avoid 
failing to honour their negative duty not to diminish the integrity of the environment, 
then   derivative   compensatory   obligations  might  follow,  such   that,  in  practice, 
environmental citizens might find that they are after all obliged to engage in 
deliberative forums or sustainability work. But unlike Pogge’s negative duty not to 
contribute to the underfulfilment of human rights, it is not impossible to honour one’s 
negative duty as environmental steward. This might be achieved by living sustainably, 
for example, buying locally grown organic produce, living in carbon neutral homes, 
using public transport, etc., or perhaps by living in an eco-anarchist community, 
though, as I argue below, it is not, in my view, desirable, that this latter option be the 
only way of discharging one’s citizenship duties. 
In any case, the stewardship model of citizenship is capable of being endorsed 
from a variety of perspectives and being adapted to different models of political 
organisation.   On   the   other   hand,   both   communitarian   citizenship   and   post-
cosmopolitan   citizenship   imply   particular   models   of   community   that   depart 
substantially from contemporary norms.
74 However, positive action to improve a relatively poor environmental inheritance would fall beyond 
this obligation, hence it might not yield a strong model of sustainability if the starting position were 
poor. 
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Avner de-Shalit endorses Michael Jacobs’ observation that ‘[l]iberalism […] 
fails to explain to people the relationship between social goods and their own well-
being’ (de-Shalit 2000:93); de-Shalit therefore rejects liberal democracy in favour of 
communitarian socialism, inspired in part by the Rousseauian model of small rural 
communities mentioned above, and in part by the experience of work collectives such 
as the Israeli kibbutz. ‘Socialism’, he explains, ‘is a theory of community as collective 
action, with citizenship being attuned to this collective action’ (de-Shalit 2000:199). 
Thus part of being a citizen is working for the common good of the community.
75 
Community is defined here as ‘a process of collective reflection on ideas and identity’ 
(de-Shalit 2000:110). So citizenship also involves engagement with, and renegotiation 
of, notions of the identity of the community, as well as reflection on and collective 
deliberation about how the community should live. 
It is this process of reflection and deliberation, that, according to de-Shalit, 
saves his model of communitarian socialism from some of the standard criticisms of 
communitarianism. Communitarian societies have often been thought insular and 
potentially oppressive to anyone who does not embrace the majority vision of the 
common good. Marcel Wissenburg warns that:
Green communitarianism would be the nightmare of Utopia come true. It 
would be a world of fear – fear for new techniques, developments and 
ideas, fear for environmental risks and dangers, fear for one’s neighbours. 
To ensure that a communitarian society would conform to a particular 
ideal   of   the   environmentally   friendly   sustainable   society,   important 
liberties would have to be curtailed. […]At any rate, the freedom to 
transform society away from the ideal would be gone. (Wissenburg 
1998:224-225) 
De-Shalit disagrees. By putting collective reflection at the centre of his model of 
community, he argues that the community is constituted by an openness to debate and 
ideas and therefore will not become oppressive. Ideas or beliefs are subjected to the 
critical evaluation of citizens, and citizens only ‘rationally endorse’ the ideas of the 
community if they are seen to be rational. Reasoned commitment to shared ideals is 
75 Page (2006:120) suggests that the environmental credentials of communitarianism are weaker than 
de-Shalit believes since it is the survival of the community that matters, which may impede cooperation 
across communities that affirm different values, which of course is crucial to resolving global issues 
such as climate change.
144the test of membership of the community, thus de-Shalit’s communitarianism escapes 
also the ‘harsh partiality’ of communities where belonging is based on ethnicity, race, 
or some other historical connection.
Therefore, it can be said that this is not a model of community vulnerable 
to the liberal critique of communitarianism, i.e. that it treats the ‘other’  or 
some minorities as not equal. Not only are the institutions open to 
procedures that allow minorities to express themselves, but minorities are 
encouraged to do so, since the majority needs its beliefs to be questioned 
in order to maintain their vitality. (de-Shalit 2000:111)
This last claim – that the majority needs its beliefs to be questioned in order to 
maintain their vitality – is surely a proposition John Stuart Mill could readily endorse, 
being, as it is, entirely consistent with his defence of free speech. Thus it would seem 
that liberalism is not so morally bankrupt after all. But it is difficult to believe that the 
majority would benevolently insist on having their beliefs questioned so as to 
maintain vitality without recourse to a rights-based mechanism to defend the minority 
if they questioned beliefs more vigorously than the majority cared for. Or perhaps 
Wissenburg (above) is being too sceptical; it may be that, were a committed group of 
communitarian socialists to form a community, it would turn out to be a positive 
Utopia that not only tolerated but encouraged difference. The empirical evidence is 
limited; some small eco-anarchist communities do exist, but it is not clear from this 
how plural societies could easily organise themselves in this way. Alan Carter 
(1999:255-272) points to anthropological studies of tribal societies to argue that a 
society of eco-anarchist communities would readily accommodate difference by 
periodically changing composition; those who found they were not accepted by the 
majority in one community could simply move to another. This is not a solution 
likely to persuade liberals such as Wissenburg. 
6.1.3 Post-cosmopolitan citizenship
Dobson’s work on citizenship has another take on the debate about the nature 
of the political community, which takes another view of the motivation to discharge 
one’s environmental duties. He argues that a special feature of globalisation is that 
many of the decisions we make impact on the lives of other people who we may not 
think of as members of our community, and of whom we may not even be aware 
(Dobson 2003:ch.1). As discussed in chapter 2, globalisation is an unequal process of 
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however unwittingly, the lives of others in poorer countries, is generally not 
reciprocated. The most common medium through which such power is expressed is 
market transactions. In view of the impact that market externalities have on the 
environment, and that environmental degradation has on the global poor, Dobson 
argues that ‘we’ are ‘always already’ in relationships of justice with the poor, in virtue 
of the harm inflicted on them by markets and the global institutions that support them. 
Put  simply,  ‘the ecological  footprint produces  political relations by  producing 
circumstances of justice’ (Dobson 2006a:448). 
Dobson (2006b) is clearly sympathetic to Pogge’s account of the demands of 
justice to the global poor, but rather than constructing a more onerous model of 
human  rights, as Pogge does (see chapter 4), Dobson grounds his proposals for 
achieving justice in the duties of a new type of citizenship – post-cosmopolitan. The 
post-cosmopolitan community is created by the patterns of harm that globalisation 
weaves:
post-cosmopolitan citizenship’s ‘community’ is created by the ‘historical’ 
or (better) ‘always already’ obligations of globalization. This differs 
markedly from the ideal and discursive boundaries of cosmopolitanism in 
its (post-cosmopolitanism’s) rooting of the space of citizenship in ‘global 
actualities rather than transcendent principles’. (Dobson 2003:81)
For   Dobson,   this   account   of   citizenship   represents   an   improvement   over 
cosmopolitanism because it rests on a stronger motivation for action. Cosmopolitan 
obligations are generated by our shared humanity. The duty to take action to assist 
those in distress is therefore the duty of the good Samaritan – in short, cosmopolitans 
say one should help others because individuals have equal moral standing and because 
one is able to help. In post-cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, obligations are 
generated by a prior action that has caused harm. So, whereas cosmopolitanism 
implies obligations to all mankind,
[p]ost-cosmopolitanism’s rootedness in identifiable relations of actual 
harm, in contrast, limits obligations to those implicit in these relations. 
These may still be extensive and demanding, as in the case of global 
warming. But this very example makes clear that obligations are not those 
of ‘all humankind’ since not all humankind contributes unsustainably to 
global warming. (Dobson 2003:81) 
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heavily on those who have contributed to it. The model post-cosmopolitan citizen is 
not, then, the good Samaritan, but rather, the perpetrator of an injustice who readily 
seeks to redress the harm done. Dobson (2006b) characterises this motivation as 
‘political’ rather than ‘moral’ because it is a relationship of justice, rather than 
benevolence. While benevolence requires us to be humanitarians and respond to need, 
justice requires us to take account of the extent to which the need we encounter is our 
fault. More importantly, the individual has a choice about whether or not to be 
benevolent, but cannot legitimately choose to be unjust. However, recognising 
someone as a ‘recipient of justice’ (in Dobson’s phrase) is itself a moral issue, resting 
on moral claims about what it is to be a human. To claim that humans are ‘always 
already’ in relationships of justice is also implicitly to claim that all humans are equal 
and that one owes justice to those who are one’s equals. The argument of those who 
reject cosmopolitanism is that non-citizens are not the moral equals of citizens of a 
particular community. Indeed, some claim that, while all humans are entitled to 
certain basic goods, our duties to fellow citizens are stronger than our duties to non-
citizens, thus, discounting the interests of outsiders is legitimate, because the interests 
of those within the community take precedence. For Dobson, on the contrary, the 
relevant political relationship is not shared membership of a political community 
defined in terms of nations or states, but rather, the relationship between perpetrator 
and victim of harm.
I   want   to   suggest   the   possibility   of  unreciprocated  and  unilateral 
citizenship obligations, and to claim that this type of obligation is both 
definitive   of   ‘post-cosmopolitan   citizenship’,  as   well   as   that  which 
distinguishes it most obviously from liberal citizenship and from the 
reciprocity of civic republican citizenship. (Dobson 2003:47)
The possibility of unreciprocated and unilateral obligations has some attractions, not 
least those indicated above when discussing Ball’s idea of ‘punctuated reciprocity’. 
But   linking   these   obligations   to   past   harms,   rather   than   encouraging   them 
independently, raises some problems. 
Firstly, Hayward suggests that if citizenship is restricted to those who have 
caused  harms,  then  the victims of  ecological  harms  are non-citizens.  Dobson 
(2006a:449) responds that this apparent inequality is only a problem if you regard 
citizenship as ‘status’ rather than as ‘practice’. Citizenship as practice is Dobson’s 
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have caused harm, it is not, therefore, a ‘status’ people would ordinarily covet. Not 
everyone will have citizenship duties, or not all the time, nor equally, because some 
are more responsible for environmental problems than others. The burdens of 
environmental citizenship fall most heavily on those most (historically) responsible. 
Hayward rightly points out that ‘we do need to know how ecological citizens are to be 
identified’ (Hayward 2006:439), and on this matter Dobson is unclear. Dobson claims 
that anyone who has been complicit in causing ecological harm has an obligation to 
engage in citizenship practices. But what if people refuse? Their peers might try to 
shame them into action, but this will not succeed if the prevalent opinion in society 
permits one to shun one’s ecological duties, a situation not beyond the realms of 
possibility. Dobson (2006a) explicitly regards citizenship as a horizontal, not a 
vertical, relationship which implies an absence of an authority common to all citizens 
that could compel recalcitrant citizens to undertake their duties. A further question is 
what duties might fall on the descendants of people who do not fulfil their citizenship 
obligations. Dobson speaks of a ‘historical community of obligation’ (Dobson 
2003:81). Applied beyond the realm of environmental issues, this might be taken to 
imply, for example, that the present descendants of former slave owners should pay 
reparations to the descendants of slaves. Whether or not that should be the case is not 
a question I wish to pursue here. Rather, my point is that Dobson’s argument leaves 
unclear who precisely will be environmental citizens. 
Secondly, if citizenship practices are unilaterally undertaken, then the role of 
the victim continues to be passive, indeed, cannot be otherwise. Put differently, if 
someone crashed into my car, I would want him to pay for the repairs. But I would be 
thought naïve if I trusted the reckless driver to diligently attend to the repairs himself. 
I would want to be able to press my legitimate claim against him. In short, I would 
want to be able to exercise rights. Dobson speculates briefly on the possibility of 
extending existing notions of human rights to include environmental rights (2003:90-
93), but he characterises citizenship practices as duties rather than rights, and does not 
seem to recognise a specific need for victims of ecological injustice to be able to press 
rights claims on those responsible for ecological harm. This deficiency leads to a third 
problem. Dobson (2003:34-35) claims that his citizenship proposals are informed by a 
feminist ideology. I take this to indicate that he is conscious of the way that power 
structures in society can serve to disenfranchise people who are theoretical equals. It 
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proposals may be disenfranchising. Though he would certainly not support the 
‘winners’ of globalisation having any more power over the fate of the ‘losers’, by 
placing responsibility for addressing ecological injustice in the hands of those who 
caused it, he re-entrenches their power over the lives of those who have been harmed. 
Furthermore, by emphasising the unilateral duties of the powerful whilst apparently 
undervaluing the rights of the weak, he denies the weak the tools they need to reclaim 
power over their own lives and define for themselves what justice demands. If the 
extent to which redress is justly required is determined by those responsible for 
injustice, it would be naïve to think that justice would really be done. But this is the 
trap into which Dobson seems to have fallen. He builds a model of citizenship on 
‘global actualities’ whilst ignoring the actualities of human fallibility. 
That is not to say that the model of citizenship Dobson proposes is redundant. 
On the contrary, it demonstrates that citizenship is intimately connected with justice, 
and provides one of the clearest formulations of a widespread desire among greens to 
link political obligation to the ecological footprint. Yet it appears that separating 
justice from rights raises difficulties. One of the unresolved issues of environmental 
citizenship, whether construed as a stewardship role, or post-cosmopolitan citizenship, 
is the motivation to act in green ways, to discharge one’s environmental citizenship 
duties. The stewardship approach assumes that people are motivated by concern for 
their immediate heirs, but some environmental problems will concern people who will 
live many generations from now. In Ball’s notion of punctuated reciprocity as a 
stewardship model, the obligation to future generations is more generalised, but there 
is nonetheless a motivational gap to be addressed, a problem I return to in relation to 
justice and future generations in section 6.3. Dobson’s post-cosmopolitan citizenship 
has a clear position on motivation but one that looks backwards rather than forwards, 
which I argue makes it less appealing than he suggests. Given the kibbutz model, de-
Shalit’s communitarian citizenship could provide an explanation for motivation in 
terms of community solidarity and an environmental work ethic as constitutive of 
individual identity. But, as noted above, his defence of plurality and difference is 
unpersuasive in the absence of explicit recognition for minority rights. Although I 
concede that the empirical evidence is not there to authoritatively disprove de-Shalit’s 
claims, I am inclined to side with Wissenburg in fearing the potential for oppression 
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citizenship shorn of rights seems unpromising, and though greens have bemoaned the 
selfishness and individualism attendant upon the emphasis on rights in liberal 
democracy, the value of rights should not be neglected if the poor and minorities are 
not to be made more vulnerable. In the next chapter I therefore return to the theme of 
environmental human rights. In the meantime, it is appropriate to return to the 
question of what should be sustained and why. In chapter 5 I suggested that the 
integrity of the environment was the most appropriate benchmark of sustainability, 
and stated that ‘reflexiveness’ and ‘appropriateness’ were key to environmental 
decision-making. Greens have frequently endorsed deliberative democracy, both as a 
way of building these values into political institutions, and as an improvement on 
liberal democracy, which is attacked by greens as being inhospitable to environmental 
values. Deliberative democracy is also often said to be linked to environmental 
citizenship in that deliberation is held to foster an environmental ethic that will 
underwrite   citizenship  practices.  In   the   next   section,   I   assess   the  promise   of 
deliberative democracy for environmental sustainability. 
6.2 Liberal democracy, deliberative democracy, green democracy
There is no necessary connection between environmental sustainability and 
democracy (Achterberg 2001b). It is possible to argue that sustainability is a 
necessary precondition of democracy, in that life itself, democratic or otherwise, is 
threatened if we pursue unsustainable ways of living, but the reverse does not hold. 
Democracy is only good (or necessary) for sustainability if it achieves ecologically 
good outcomes, and these cannot be guaranteed by democratic procedures in a free 
society. Given the freedom to choose, people may not choose to adopt sustainable 
practices.   On   the   other   hand,   there   is  also  no  necessary  connection   between 
environmental sustainability and authoritarian regimes. While Humphrey (2004) 
justifiably argues that the true empirical test of a green authoritarianism would require 
the existence of a green autocracy dedicated to environmental sustainability, there are 
non-empirical reasons to be sceptical of the merits of a ‘green Leviathan’. For non-
environmental   reasons,   in   the   absence   of   an   Aristotelian   ‘best   man’   to   rule, 
democracy does seem to many if not most people to be the ‘least bad’ form of 
government available. It may, therefore, be advocated as a route to environmental 
sustainability if it is better able to facilitate a peaceful transition to an economy 
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social   justice,   which   ecologists   might   value   for   both   instrumental   and   non-
instrumental reasons. In particular, Joan Martinez-Alier’s (2002) work on what he 
calls the ‘environmentalism of the poor’ indicates an urgent need to instigate 
democratic procedures to negotiate the distribution of environmental harms and 
benefits. In light of these considerations, and given both the general popular appeal of 
democracy and the recent preference for democratic government evident in green 
theory,
76 my interest here is in democratic forms of government.
Greens have been deeply critical of the quality of existing democratic norms 
and procedures. Two primary concerns are raised – firstly, that liberal democratic 
states have become principally ‘administrative’ states (Dryzek 1992; Conca 2000), 
and secondly, that the norm of political equality is undermined by the prevalence of 
what is called ‘interest group liberalism’ (Anderson and Leal 2005;   Baber and 
Bartlett 2005). The administrative state is held to be symptomatic of globalisation, the 
pressures of which oblige the government of any given state to function as a facilitator 
for capitalist enterprise. Government policy is therefore focused on maintaining a 
competitive advantage in the global market-place. In such circumstances, it is 
claimed, business interests inevitably trump environmental interests (Conca 2000; 
Mander 2003). This antagonistic relationship arises because of the government’s 
reliance on tax revenues to fund public programmes, which are in turn crucial to the 
government’s legitimacy. As discussed in chapter 5, ecological modernisation seeks 
to render benign this antagonistic relationship between the environment and business 
by diminishing the extent to which economic growth necessarily entails ecological 
destruction. 
Ecological economists, though, are sceptical of the viability of this strategy in 
view of the need for ever-increasing economic growth in a global, market-driven 
economy (again, see chapter 5). Taking into account the problems of entropy and of 
fairly static natural rates of ecological regeneration, combined with an exponential 
increase   in   population,  ecological   economists   argue   that   even   an  ecologically 
modernised economy cannot sustain growth at currently desired levels (Jacobs 1991; 
Goodland 1995; NEF 2006). Although most greens would acknowledge that ‘nature’ 
is to some degree constructed and that humans’ capacities to use the Earth’s resources 
76  Several   volumes   taking   a   positive   perspective   on   the   relationship   between   environmental 
sustainability and democracy have been published in recent years – see, for example, Barry and 
Wissenburg (eds) (2001), Doherty and de Geus (eds) (1996), and Minteer and Taylor (eds) (2002).
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is nevertheless the case that increasing technological development cannot be relied 
upon to square the circle. Indeed, many argue that it is the relentless pursuit of 
technological development that has fuelled profligate consumption of ecological 
resources, consequently narrowing options whilst perpetuating the environmental 
problems that are the central concern of the green movement.
The problematic relationship between politics and business is said to be 
compounded by the incidence of ‘interest-group liberalism’, whereby well-organised 
and well-funded interest groups dominate the political agenda at the expense of 
democratic equality (Baber and Bartlett 2005). Although citizens have equal rights to 
vote, they do not have equal capacities to influence the media and the political 
agenda. Particularly disadvantaged in this scenario are poorer constituencies, or 
constituencies that are not represented at all in the political process, such as future 
generations of humans and non-human nature. The interests of such constituencies are 
said to be marginalised by political parties that depend on donations from private 
enterprises to fund campaigns, and that are more likely to be influenced by corporatist 
interest groups than by the concerns and claims of weaker groups in society. Thus the 
position of those already marginalised by poverty tends to be further compounded by 
the political process. 
Another problem of exclusion is highlighted in Robyn Eckersley’s (2005) 
critique of ‘exclusive sovereignty’. Though undermined somewhat by globalisation in 
the experience of some countries (see chapter 2), the norm of sovereign autonomy 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations nevertheless continues to be asserted 
when states seek to resist pressure from neighbours over environmentally damaging 
practices. It has become almost a cliché to note that pollution does not respect state 
boundaries, and that environmental impacts therefore affect people who have no role 
in authorising them. Finally, contemporary liberal democracy is also accused of 
fostering   ‘short-termism’,   whereby   regular   elections,   purported   to   ensure   the 
accountability of politicians, discourage bold initiatives and long-term planning (and 
thinking), and again make politicians captive to powerful interest groups that may 
particularly focus their energies at election-time. None of this is conducive to the 
project of ‘sustainability planning’ discussed in chapter 5, which may reasonably be 
expected to require a collaborative effort between countries and generations. On the 
other   hand,   deliberative   democracy   builds   into   political   decision-making   the 
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organised around the principles of ecological economics.
6.2.1 Democracy and the politics of risk
The limits of liberal democracy are particularly apparent, it is argued, in the 
new situation in which citizens presently find themselves, characterised by Ulrich 
Beck as a ‘risk society’ (Beck 1997). The politics of risk, Beck argues, are a 
consequence of the production of increasingly hazardous materials in industrial 
processes. As technological development continues, these risks ‘are no longer limited 
in scale, neither geographically nor in time nor socially; by the same token they 
cannot be covered by any insurance’ (Achterberg 2001a:103). Examples include 
nuclear waste, which remains toxic for thousands of years,  affects all people 
irrespective of age, wealth, gender, etc., and may cause toxic rains to fall many 
thousands of miles from the site of initial contamination. The ecological risks 
associated with global warming and the potential risks of the use of genetically 
modified organisms are further examples. The presence of such risks in society forces 
citizens to reflect on the values and choices that have given rise to these risks. Thus, 
in Beck’s view, the late-industrial age has gone from being a period of ‘autonomous’ 
modernisation, in the context of which the development of technology was widely 
seen to be unqualified good, to ‘reflexive modernisation’, wherein citizens critically 
evaluate the costs incurred and the benefits gained from industrial activity. Wouter 
Achterberg (2001a:109) argues that bequeathing such risks to future generations (who 
had no input in creating these risks) constitutes a violation of their human rights, and 
that the defence of such initiatives as nuclear power on the basis that they increase the 
total stock of capital available to future generations is thus invalidated. However, the 
short-term   focus   of   liberal   democracy   inhibits   development   of   the   long-term 
perspective that is crucial to a comprehensive understanding and evaluation of the 
risks of late-industrial society. 
The conclusion of Achterberg and others who have drawn on Beck’s analysis 
is that the appropriate democratic model for risk society is a deliberative one. The 
‘problem-solving’ approach of the liberal democratic state is inhospitable to the more 
critical and evaluative questions that citizens confront with regard to public policy in 
the context of a risk society. Jan Hancock and Tony Evans (1998) argue that this 
‘problem solving’ approach is also characteristic of the apparatus of the international 
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towards evaluating conflicting goals, rather than seeking compromise. Eckersley, 
whose theory of ‘critical political ecology’, inspired by critical theory, might be a 
suitable candidate, argues that the ties of community in the context of risk society are 
‘no longer nationality, ethnicity, religion, or language but rather a common exposure 
to actual or potential ecological harm’ (Eckersley 2005:176). As a consequence, the 
appropriate model of sovereignty for the risk society is ‘inclusive sovereignty’. She 
argues that ‘citizenship type rights should be conferred on people outside a political 
community   but   likely   to   be   affected   by  ‘proposed   developments’’   (Eckersley 
2005:176). 
Clearly, then, the politics of risk have a significant impact on the green 
understanding of both the scope and character of democracy – deliberation is vital, 
and participation is to be the right of all those likely to be affected by any given 
decision. This approach to democratic politics complements the ecological economics 
perspective discussed in the previous chapter where the level of political decision-
making is determined by E.F. Schumacher’s principle of ‘appropriateness’ – whether 
a decision is made by local, national, or international agents is determined by how 
localised   are   the   implications   of   the   proposed   development.   The   traditional 
sovereignty of liberal democratic states is therefore compromised on two fronts; green 
democracy is variable as to the level at which decisions are made and as to the 
relevant constituents.
It is also apparent that green conceptions of democracy are tied up with 
citizenship. A key feature of the distinction drawn between the representative 
democracy   typical   of   Western   liberal   democratic   states   and   the   deliberative 
democracy proposed in green theory relates to the way in which the citizen is 
conceptualised. Russell Keat (1994) has pointed out that people are able to act 
differently in different settings, so that while it may be true that in the market citizens 
typically act as consumers (that is, as rational egotists with individual  preferences, 
privately and independently formed, which they seek to satisfy), in political forums 
people can, and often do, act as citizens (that is, as members of a community with a 
notion of what is in the public interest). The argument that follows from this 
observation is that, while liberal democracy treats citizens as consumers, or,  rational 
egotists with privately formed preferences, deliberative democracy implies an active 
154model of citizenship among people with a shared or sharable conception of the public 
good. 
In   reality,   the   distinction   between   liberal   democracy   and   deliberative 
democracy is probably less clear than theoretical abstractions suggest. Firstly, as 
Attfield has observed, actually existing liberal democracies do disclose some notions 
of a public good. For instance, marriage is incentivised, and cohabitation discouraged, 
in the British tax system (Attfield 2001:152). Secondly, an oft-proposed first step in 
greening liberal democracies is to make democratic procedures more participatory, 
which would somewhat blur the lines between traditional representative liberal 
democracies and deliberative democracies (see, for example, Wissenburg 1998; 
Humphrey 2004). Finally, deliberative democratic procedures may themselves adopt 
representative mechanisms for decision-making, which raise a number of questions 
regarding legitimacy and authenticity (see below and O’Neill 2002; Smith 2003; 
2004).   But   among   these   similarities   is   a   fundamental   difference.   Deliberative 
democracy is for the most part favoured by greens because it affords an opportunity 
largely absent in liberal democracy to initiate and engage in public debate about 
environmental sustainability as a common good.
6.2.2 Deliberative democracy as a solution to the problem of needs and wants?
One point of entry into this debate was raised in the previous chapter. Green 
theorists and activists have long been preoccupied with the distinction that it is said 
can be drawn between needs and wants. I have already indicated that I do not find this 
a particularly useful way of conceptualising sustainability. But even though the 
needs/wants distinction is of little use in defining environmental sustainability, it is 
nonetheless clear that some people, particularly in the West, are going to be asked, 
indeed are already being asked, to lessen the environmental impact of their lifestyles. 
On the other hand, poor people in developing countries may argue that they have to 
damage the integrity of their local environments in order to satisfy basic needs, which 
may be said to have the status of human rights (Shue 1980). It is therefore likely that 
some degree of public debate about needs and wants is on the cards. Although few 
people would deny that the average Westerner consumes more than they strictly need 
to, it is extremely difficult to determine in the abstract exactly what a person needs. 
Dobson asks, rhetorically, ‘do we need kiwi fruits? but, then, do we need tea?’ 
(Dobson 2000:90). However, he also notes that ‘the option of doing without things’ 
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presumably because it is thought to be unlikely to appeal to a society of profligate 
consumers. Wissenburg (1998:207) argues that we have unconditional rights to 
‘goods of the needs category’ but only conditional rights to ‘goods of the wants 
category’,   but,  being  a  committed   liberal,   he  is  reluctant   to  acknowledge  an 
objectively verifiable set of goods that would meet human needs because doing so 
would   arguably   deny   individuals   the   right   to   determine   for   themselves   what 
constitutes a good life. Remarkably, given their positions at almost opposite ends of 
the green spectrum, Arne Naess takes an almost identical line (see previous chapter). 
Deliberative democracy is seen by many as a potential resource for resolving 
some of the difficulties of challenging people to want less whilst respecting people’s 
right to determine for themselves what they need. Hayward, as noted above, casts this 
debate in terms of ‘preferences’ and ‘interests’, rather than needs and wants, and 
argues that, whereas ‘preferences carry no automatic weight in decision-making 
processes […] interests have a necessary claim to be recognized but not necessarily 
satisfied’ (Hayward 1998:108-109). What this suggests is that, in the context of 
deliberative democracy, all people have a right to claim certain interests, but their 
position may legitimately be questioned by others engaged in the deliberative process. 
It is hoped that in the process of debating and seeking justification for propositions, 
unreasonable claims will be defeated. As Walter Baber and Robert Bartlett (2005:165-
184) note, the standard of what counts as ‘unreasonable’ is, of course, open to 
interpretation,
77  but one of the aims of deliberative politics is to come to what 
Hayward describes as ‘intersubjective agreement’ on such matters. 
6.2.3 Deliberative democracy and the environmental citizen
While deliberative processes cannot guarantee a green outcome, it is argued 
that a general commitment to environmental sustainability is more likely in the 
context of deliberative institutions. In short, deliberative institutions can help to 
‘green’ citizens. De-Shalit (2000:178) offers some small-scale empirical evidence in 
support of this, and claims that frequently the obstacle to ecological awareness among 
the general public is not lack of sympathy for the green agenda, but rather, lack of 
77 Baber and Bartlett consider three models of deliberation, ‘Habermasian’, ‘full liberalism’ (drawing 
on Amy Gutmann and James Bohman), and ‘Rawlsian’, that offer different ways of assessing 
reasonableness, as well as nuanced discussions of the character of deliberation. The detail of these 
debates is beyond the scope of this thesis.
156knowledge. One attraction of deliberative democracy is that it ‘rests on improved 
information flows’, and, 
it   is   argued   that   democratic   deliberation   provides   motivation   and 
encouragement to articulate preferences and justifications which are 
oriented toward the common good – the reciprocal requirement to put 
forward reasons and to respond to challenges makes it difficult to sustain 
preferences held on purely self-interested grounds. (Smith 2004:145)
There may be grounds, then, to think Wissenburg too sceptical when he says that 
‘there is no reason to believe that after a process of dialogue and deliberation, any 
random set of flesh-and-blood individuals will make the good decision’ (Wissenburg 
1998:223), but he is justified in observing that rational and environmentally sensitive 
deliberation in one community could well lead to the conclusion that the ‘good 
decision’ is to dump toxic waste in the territory of another community. Such potential 
outcomes explain why Eckersley (2005) and Dobson (2003) have argued for a 
reconceptualisation of sovereignty and citizenship, such that neither is held to be co-
terminous with state borders, but instead should follow the contours of ecological 
impact. But even with this proviso, the inevitability of green outcomes may have been 
oversold. As John O’Neill (2002) points out, proponents of deliberative democracy 
are misguided if they assume that deliberative forums can resolve all disagreements. 
Some  values may  ultimately be incommensurable.  In  that case,  the best  that 
deliberative democracy can offer is a harmony in difference. 
Although advocated by a remarkable range of green theorists, from green 
liberals such as Wissenburg (1998), through those seeking a reformed liberal 
democracy   (Barry   2001),   to   green   communitarians   (de-Shalit   2000)   and   eco-
anarchists (Bookchin 1987), there are a number of unanswered questions in the 
literature. One such question relates to the ‘inclusive sovereignty’ proposed by 
Eckersley. She holds that the right to participate in democratic deliberation regarding 
environmental decisions should be extended to all those ‘likely to be affected by 
‘proposed developments’’ (Eckersley 2005:176). It is unclear, though, what counts as 
‘likely to be affected’. The most obvious definition would be anyone whose material 
interests could be damaged, were a proposed development to go ahead. Material 
interests could include health or economic well-being, and at a stretch might cover 
local people who feel that there is some spiritual significance to a given piece of land. 
But this would exclude from participation anyone who did not have a direct 
157connection with the land, but was nonetheless interested and wished to express an 
opinion about the proposed development. Such exclusion would surely not be 
acceptable to the many green activists who have welcomed concerned individuals 
from outside a given community engaging in direct action to try to conserve a 
particular ecological resource, as happened in, for example, the protests over the 
Newbury bypass.
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However, allowing anyone who feels interested to participate in deliberation 
risks   being   non-democratic   in   the   sense   of   failing   to   respect   rights   to   self-
determination. If a particular community wants to destroy an area of forest (which, 
say, provides habitat for a rare species of flower or bird) so as to create more 
agricultural land to feed a burgeoning population, it is problematic to claim that 
people with no connection to the community have a right to involve themselves in 
deliberative forums engaged in reaching a decision about the proposal, particularly if 
a majority is required to carry the decision. This scenario is further complicated if the 
community in question live in a developing country and the outsiders seeking to 
influence the decision are from developed countries that have already destroyed much 
of their own wilderness (O’Neill 2007:ch8). Martinez-Alier has been deeply critical of 
first world environmentalists who propagate what he calls ‘the cult of wilderness’ 
(2002: vii), that is, environmentalists concerned to preserve what is left of ‘wild’ 
earth, regardless of the impact this may have on poorer communities who live in or 
around such ‘resources’. But to deny the legitimacy of intervention to prevent 
environmental destruction abroad would undermine the capacity of green activists to 
criticise environmentally destructive activities outwith their communities and their 
immediate environs. Clearly, then, there is a potential tension between ‘inclusive 
sovereignty’ and self-determination.
A final problem related to questions of power in deliberative democracy is 
raised within deliberative forums: 
It is simply assumed that face-to-face participation is more democratic. 
However, studies of face-to-face assemblies have shown that they are not 
78 Similarly, the principle of ‘appropriateness’ as a guide to the level of government at which decisions 
are made may be problematic if, for example, different levels were to claim jurisdiction over a 
particular issue. This could perhaps be rectified if an independent panel were appointed to settle 
disputes, but such a panel would only be successful is accepted by all parties, and may be seen to lack 
democratic accountability.
158necessarily democratic panaceas and are easily manipulated by powerful 
and experienced citizens. (Smith 2004:147)
Moreover, even if deliberative forums increase the likelihood of participants being 
informed about environmental problems, there remains the difficulty that they may 
not fully  understand  the complexities involved. This is not to cast doubt on the 
intelligence of citizens, but rather to acknowledge the degree of specialisation 
involved in some areas of environmental research. The role of experts who advise or 
present evidence to deliberative forums is therefore potentially an extremely powerful 
one,   which   again   may   undermine   the   democratic   credentials   of   deliberative 
democracy (Baber and Bartlett 2005:ch10).
A further issue is how decision-making forums are structured. Deliberative 
democracy can be practised in a variety of ways, such as, through focus groups, 
citizens’ juries, or in councils either comprising or representing the entire community. 
As already noted, small anarchist communities are championed by a number of greens 
(see,  inter alia, Bookchin 1987, Carter 1999). Among the attractions of such 
communities are the fact that they can be more democratic than larger associations 
that find it practically impossible to include everyone in decision-making processes 
and therefore rely on some degree of representation. But the more recent trend has 
been to reject eco-anarchism in favour of larger, pluralist states, not least because of 
worries raised above that small communities can be uncomfortably insular and 
intolerant of difference, and because ‘the local level is not always the most suitable 
for dealing with the scale and complexity of many environmental problems’ (Smith 
2004:147). But if a larger community is assumed, we encounter the problem of 
representation. O’Neill (2002) refers to Borges’ story of the perfect map in order to 
illustrate the difficulties posed in seeking to find legitimate representatives of any 
given community. The perfect map would be one that perfectly replicates the real 
world on a 1:1 scale. But it would be impractical – that is why we favour 
representation, both in maps and in democratic institutions. However, randomly 
selected participants on citizens’ juries or in focus groups may fail to express the will 
of the majority of those they are taken to represent, even if they take it to be their duty 
to do so. 
Even more difficult than ensuring the legitimate representation of actually 
existing citizens is the question of how, if at all, to represent the interests of future 
generations of humans, and of non-human nature. The use of proxies representing 
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to be undemocratic, as presumably those suitable to be proxies for future generations 
would be ecologically-minded citizens, and so the deck would be stacked in favour of 
the green agenda. Perhaps this is acceptable if the purpose of adopting deliberative 
mechanisms is to reach greener outcomes. Indeed, the express desire of many 
proponents of environmental citizenship education is to teach people to think and act 
with the interests of non-human nature and future generations in mind. However, 
Humphrey’s point, above, remains. Democratic outcomes are not, and cannot be, pre-
determined. To fail to grasp this fact is to fail to value democracy. Green outcomes 
presumably could be reached through authoritarian means given the right application 
of coercive power, but this route has been rejected by the majority of contemporary 
scholars of environmental politics. Therefore, green theorists can be presumed to 
value both democracy and environmental sustainability. That being the case, it is 
incumbent upon them to respect both values when appraising models of deliberative 
democracy.
Greens   have   endorsed   deliberative   democracy   because   it   is   thought   to 
overcome the features of liberal democracy that make the latter particularly ill-suited 
to fostering environmental sustainability, such as short-termism and exclusivity. 
Public deliberation as a political model also has the appeal of instituting the 
reflexiveness which was said in the previous chapter to be a necessary feature of 
environmental sustainability. Moreover, green theorists have proposed a model of 
deliberative democracy that transcends the borders of the ecologically-arbitrary 
nation-state, and instead includes in its constituency all those exposed to ecological 
risk by a given policy. However, there remain unanswered questions as to how to 
balance inclusive sovereignty and the right to self-determination. More generally, 
advocates of deliberative democracy have sometimes appeared to oversell its potential 
benefits. It is also argued that deliberative democracy can help to ‘green’ citizens, but 
the evidence on this point was mixed. A further unresolved question was what 
resources deliberative democracy can offer with respect to the problem of future 
generations. However, in the discussion of citizenship, I suggested that a stewardship 
approach might best protect the interests of future citizens. In the final section of this 
chapter, I return to the question of future generations to consider what goods or 
resources future generations might be said to be owed as a matter of justice.
1606.3 Justice and future generations
There are a number of possible ways of construing justice in green politics. It 
could refer to relations between present generations of humans, or to relations 
between present generations of humans and non-human nature, or to relations 
between present and future generations of humans. In the limited space available here, 
I restrict myself to the last of these three questions – intergenerational justice – having 
dealt briefly with intragenerational justice in chapter 5. Wissenburg argues that 
sustainability and justice are not intrinsically related:
the first concerns the question of how much of which resources should 
exist or be made to exist over time, the second concerns the question of 
what to do with whatever exists at one particular moment. (Wissenburg 
2007:3)
But to argue for a relationship between sustainability and justice is not arbitrary. 
Unsustainable patterns of life constrain the amount and quality of ecological resources 
available for distribution, now and in the future. Put simply, a situation is unjust if 
greater opportunities for A are bought from common resources at the expense of 
fewer opportunities for B, without B’s consent. In a finite ecosystem this applies both 
between and within generations: as discussed in the previous chapter, neither present 
generation   poor   nor   future   generations   have   the   opportunity   to   express   their 
preferences, or ‘give their consent’, in the market transactions that are currently 
determining   the   range   and   quality   of   ecological   resources   available   to   them. 
Intergenerational   justice   has   long   preoccupied   green   theorists.   Advances   in 
technology, particularly in the fields of agriculture and industry, have massively 
increased the resources available today relative to those available to previous 
generations. But scarcity has not been eliminated. On the contrary, rapid population 
growth, from one billion persons worldwide at the turn of the twentieth century to six 
billion world wide at the turn of the twenty-first, has created unprecedented stress on 
natural resources, not only to provide adequate food, water, and shelter, but also to 
provide raw materials for industrial processes and to assimilate wastes. Given that 
present generations have the capacity to influence considerably the resources that will 
be available to future generations, the question arises, what, if anything, do present 
generations owe to posterity? 
The answer that the ideal-type proponent of liberal democracy might give to 
such a question is complicated by the commitment liberals typically hold to the 
161neutrality of government with respect to the good.
79 In a plural society, government 
should not favour one conception of what constitutes a good life over another, instead, 
it should foster the widest possible availability of the means for individuals to pursue 
their own privately determined conception of the good, interfering only to prevent any 
individual from pursuing a vision of the good life that inhibits the capacity of others 
to achieve a good life. Intergenerational justice, it is argued, is incompatible with 
liberal neutrality, because to be just to future generations requires that people choose 
now on behalf of future generations what environmental goods they would want to be 
preserved. It is also probable that some sacrifice on the part of present generations 
will be required in order to maintain a particular environmental good for future 
generations. It is with these sorts of conflicts in mind that Michael Hannis (2005:578) 
argues that ‘we can have neutrality  or  ecological sustainability,  not both’.  A 
hypothetical example may help to clarify these issues. Suppose the government 
prohibits development on a particular area of land that provides habitat for an 
endangered species because it is thought to be a good thing that biodiversity be 
maintained for future generations. This prohibition thwarts the pursuit of a particular 
conception of the good, in this case the one held by the developers. In choosing 
posterity over the developers, the government has given up its neutrality. On the other 
hand, siding with the developers would not have been entirely neutral either, if there 
had been people currently alive who had reason to value the forest to the extent that 
its preservation was crucial to their idea of the good without reference to posterity.  
There are two relevant issues here. The first is that the capacity of future 
generations to pursue their particular conception(s) of the good may be constrained or 
undermined by actions taken now. To an extent this has always been the case – the 
capacity of future generations to travel to another solar system is to some extent 
constrained by the failure of generations up until now to develop the technological 
capacity to do so. Future generations may wish that their forefathers had invested 
more in space technology. But it is within the power of future generations to change 
investment priorities and do their best to get to Pluto. As discussed in chapter 2, the 
kind of environmental problems that arise from unsustainable development and 
growth strategies are not so easily reversible. Indeed, both the scale and the 
irreversibility of environmental problems have the potential to pose tremendous 
79 There is a considerable literature on liberal neutrality which I do not directly engage with in the 
limited space available here. I subscribe to the view that sustainability, as a precondition for the pursuit 
of other goals, is not an issue there can be neutrality about.
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alter the Atlantic Gulf Stream, a number of choices (for example, to grow crops 
suitable to a temperate climate) that were available to this generation will be closed to 
future generations. There are two reasons to reject the idea that technological 
innovation will solve these problems. One is that it is an awfully big risk to take to 
assume that the technological means would be forthcoming, and that, in the old adage, 
prevention is better than cure. The second is that those who had other reasons for 
valuing the forest might not find the idea of breathing through an iron lung terribly 
appealing. Put another way, people alive today have no business presuming that future 
generations would not have preferred just to inherit a temperate climate without the 
need for technological innovation to make the alternative palatable.  
The   second   point   that   can   be   explicated   with   reference   to   the   forest 
development example is that neutrality with respect to the good among the present 
generation may not, in fact, be possible. Individual conceptions of the good may 
conflict, and it may fall to a public authority to choose which one should be allowed 
to advance in a particular case. Moreover, completely neutral societies, Attfield 
argues, would be unsustainable, ‘as they would have to tolerate (and indefinitely at 
that) unsustainable practices’ (Attfield 2001:152). What liberal neutrality refers to, 
then, is neutrality with regard to a plurality of conceptions of the good, limited by 
crucial liberal values such as tolerance. Sustainability is also arguably coming to be 
among the core values held by liberal democratic states, at the very least rhetorically, 
in that the government of most states that would be considered liberal and democratic 
(and many states that would not) have in recent years made some public commitment 
to some notion of sustainability, most often sustainable development (Barry 2006a). 
But how sustainability is interpreted has considerable implications for the range of 
choices open to future generations. In the following discussion I consider two 
possibilities, Wissenburg’s restraint principle, and Norton’s idea of integrity. 
6.3.1 The restraint principle
Wissenburg, a proponent of green liberalism, has devised what he calls the 
‘restraint principle’, derived from Rawls’ just savings principle, as a norm that could 
provide rules to facilitate environmental sustainability. The savings principle, if 
adopted, will ensure that each generation will not be ‘worse off relative to  any 
previous generation’ (Wissenburg 1999:176). This is also the aim of the restraint 
163principle, but the restraint principle has been developed by Wissenburg specifically 
with the special problems of environmental resources in mind. It holds that:
no goods shall be destroyed unless unavoidable and unless they are 
replaced by perfectly identical goods; if that is physically impossible, they 
should be replaced by equivalent goods resembling the original as closely 
as possible; and if that is also impossible, a proper compensation should 
be provided. (Wissenburg 1998:123)
Clearly, a community adopting the restraint principle is likely to incur considerable 
costs that they might not otherwise do. This is a problem that also exists for Rawls’ 
savings principle. But Wissenburg (1999:180) argues that it is nonetheless rational to 
adopt the savings principle because it is in the interests of generation 1 to invest in the 
future of generation 2, given that generation 2 will one day have a role (to a greater or 
lesser extent) in ensuring that generation 1 does not suffer in old age, and the same 
argument applies to the restraint principle. In short, investing in the future creates and 
sustains bonds of trust between generations that co-exist. The motivation is therefore 
self-interest – generation 1 has an interest in creating a bond of trust between itself 
and generation 2. Justice to future generations is not achieved, on Wissenburg’s 
argument, by pondering the needs or interests of people generations hence, nor of 
introducing proxy votes for future people in democratic forums, rather, it is achieved 
by maintaining a compact built on trust and self-interest between overlapping 
generations.
There is, however, reason for concern as to how robust the restraint principle 
is. In explaining the principle Wissenburg says substituting a particular resource for 
either an identical item, or appropriate compensation, is only acceptable when it is 
impossible to do otherwise: ‘no part of nature should be destroyed unless necessary, 
in   which   case  it   should  be  renewed,   replaced  or   substituted   by  an  adequate 
compensation’ (Wissenburg 1998:207). The move from ‘only when it is impossible 
not to take X action’ to ‘only when it is necessary to take X action’ is more than 
semantic, given that Wissenburg assiduously ‘dodge[s] the debate about the difficulty 
of distinguishing basic and non-basic needs’, as Eckersley rightly complains he does 
(Eckersley 1999:262). Wissenburg specifies that ‘rights to needs goods can as a rule 
support only user rights, not ownership rights: that is, the right to destroy an object 
can only be part of a person’s set of rights if destruction is a necessary condition for 
its being used’ (Wissenburg 1998:207). But what constitutes ‘needs goods’ is not 
164explained. As already noted, though he endorses deliberative democracy, Wissenburg 
is typically liberal in being committed to the idea that preferences are sovereign.
80 
What emerges from this complicated picture is an account of sustainability that allows 
for, if necessary, the potentially irreversible destruction of ecological resources, and 
only a subjective basis on which to judge what is necessary. As noted in chapter 5, 
Wissenburg candidly acknowledges that his green liberalism might well produce a 
‘global Manhattan’ if followed as a model of sustainability. A global Manhattan 
would limit the choices of future generations substantially relative to the choices 
available to the present generation. On this reading, it would be difficult to view the 
restraint principle as offering justice to future generations. In view of Wissenburg’s 
apparent acceptance of a global Manhattan as plausible and sustainable, Eckersley 
(1999:262) bemoans the lack of ‘ecological guarantees’ in green liberalism. 
6.3.2 Justice and integrity
It was noted above that there are no guarantees in politics of any shade, and 
that to seek them is a fool’s errand. Nevertheless, one might reasonably hope for a 
more robust understanding of justice to future generations than the restraint principle 
provides. Part of the problem is derived from the way in which sustainability is 
conceived. In chapter 5 I proposed Norton’s model of interpreting sustainability in 
terms of the integrity of the ecosystem, rather than explicating the conditions under 
which goods may legitimately be substituted for equivalent goods or compensation. 
Here   justice   to   future   generations   is   assessed   in   terms   of   the   ‘options   and 
opportunities’ available to them (Norton 1999:131-137).
81  Injustice is therefore 
understood to be the unequal distribution of harms and benefits across generations – 
an opportunity today should not be pursued if it can only be exercised by harming a 
future person’s interests by narrowing his opportunities to live a life of his own 
choosing. Inheriting a sustainable environment maintains the range of options for 
future generations. 
80 Wissenburg correctly argues that liberals do not accept any preference as valid – a preference for 
attacking people, for instance, is not tolerated within liberalism. But he argues that while certain 
preferences can be labelled environmentally harmful, they cannot legitimately be ‘disqualified’ 
(Wissenburg 1998:220-221).
81 Norton draws a distinction between options and opportunities – a simple reading of which might 
characterise options as choices but opportunities as the capacity to exercise them, thus the one is 
dependent upon the other. The detail of Norton’s argument is not crucial to the point being made here. 
Henceforth I shall refer only to opportunities, but I accept Norton’s argument on this point.
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would   be   enhanced   if   present   generations   bequeathed   to   their   heirs   more 
development, rather than less. It might be argued that, on current trends of dwindling 
oil supplies, increasing energy demand, and insufficient capacity in alternative fuels 
to cater for the whole or even most of the energy market in the UK, it would be 
irresponsible of the government not to invest in new nuclear power stations, because 
nuclear power is the only reliable method currently known to be able to service the 
energy needs anticipated in the short- to mid-range future. Not to do so would, it 
could be argued, decrease the opportunities available to future generations relative to 
those available today, because future generations would not have sufficient energy 
resources to meet their needs. Clearly, if a pristine forest were destroyed to make way 
for a nuclear power station, then the opportunities available to future generations 
would have been narrowed, relative to the present generation.
82 But if a brown-field 
site were used for the nuclear plant, then the charge of narrowed opportunities is more 
difficult to sustain. However, if increased risk, as discussed by Beck (above), is 
considered to be a threat to opportunities, then there may yet be grounds for regarding 
the nuclear development to be an injustice to future generations. Given that the 
present generation has not found a safe method for storing nuclear waste indefinitely, 
the risk posed to future generations of significantly reduced opportunities consequent 
upon radiation leaks makes the choice of nuclear power an injustice to future 
generations.   Norton’s   idea   of   ecological   integrity   as   the   guiding   principle   of 
sustainability could prove an appropriate norm where the economy is organised 
according to the principles of ecological economics – that is, where ecological 
capacities are not outstripped – but if it is to protect fully the opportunities available 
to future generations then threats to opportunities posed by development must also be 
taken into account. 
It is precisely these sorts of considerations that Beck regards as the moral 
questions characteristic of ‘risk society’. In comparison to the restraint principle, the 
synthesis of Norton’s and Beck’s position described here has the benefit of not being 
undermined by reference to unspecified needs. However, like any account of the 
82  Note, however, that the relative position of future generations to the present one is not an 
uncomplicated starting point. Justice to future generations might be better served by aiming to restore 
either a local environment to its condition at some point in history. For instance, many moor lands in 
the UK that currently support various species of grasses and birds were previously dense forests. How 
integrity should be interpreted at a local level is therefore an issue to be decided in deliberative forums.
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guaranteed sustainable outcomes some greens have hoped for. Ecosystem integrity 
can only be maintained by ‘flesh and blood’ environmental citizens, who, in the 
context of democratic deliberation, are free to choose their own ends over those of 
future persons. Maintaining the integrity of the ecosystem is preferable to the restraint 
principle because it is more sensitive to long-term problems, such as climate change 
or nuclear power, that need not affect behaviour on a model of sustainability 
concerned with the relative well-being of overlapping generations, since the effects of 
climate change are gradual and incremental. But over the long-term, these effects will 
be felt several generations hence. On the integrity model, on the other hand, the 
benchmark for sustainability is set higher – protecting the integrity of the ecosystem 
for one generation also has the effect of protecting it for generations beyond those 
with whom generation 1 overlaps. However, if one generation inherits a poor quality 
ecosystem, there is no immediate motivation to improve the ecosystem to the extent 
being discussed here – to make the radical changes to global economic organisation as 
well as political institutions envisaged in pursuing the ecological economics approach 
to sustainability. As a matter of self-interest, generation 1 has a motivation to 
maintain the quality of the ecosystem for generation 2. But the integrity model may 
require some generations to take action to improve the integrity of the ecosystem, and 
it is plausible that the benefits will take some time, perhaps a generation or more, to 
filter through. At the same time, the costs may well be thought likely to fall upon 
more than one generation. The motivation, then, cannot be self-interest. Instead, the 
motivational assumption already highlighted in the stewardship model is implicit in 
the integrity approach: it is assumed that people have a sentimental concern with the 
fate of future generations. Indeed, integrity as a standard of sustainability can be 
thought of as a strong version of the stewardship account of our duties to future 
generations. 
At this point in the debate it is necessary to return to questions of citizenship. 
For what generation 1 owes to future generations as a matter of justice now seems to 
depend upon what model of citizenship is affirmed. Dobson’s proposed post-
cosmopolitan   citizenship   has   the   potential   to   produce   a   rather   unhelpfully 
parsimonious account of justice between generations: focusing on those who have 
caused problem X may inhibit co-operative action to address it, which, given the 
threats to human security that environmental problems can pose, is surely the more 
167urgent issue. Taking an intergenerational view, demanding that the direct descendants 
of polluters accept a greater degree of responsibility for the costs of realising 
environmental   sustainability   or   human  rights  may  undermine  the   mutual   trust 
Wissenburg hopes the actions of generation 1 will inspire. Yet it is also apparent that 
the unequal distribution of ecological harms and goods constitutes an injustice that 
people might legitimately seek redress for, and it is clear that developed countries 
have played a far greater role in creating these. What all this suggests is that a more 
careful explanation of the implications of a historical account of justice is required. A 
generalised acceptance of there being ‘always already’ relationships of justice among 
people whose lives interact, consciously or otherwise, might be part of being an 
environmental citizen. If narrowing a person’s opportunities can be construed as 
harming them – and I would argue that it can
83 – then both tackling ecological debt 
and caring for future generations may be motivated by a desire to prevent future 
injustice, rather than to rectify past injustice. In short, if we are ‘always already’ in 
relationships of justice then our attention should be directed forwards, not backwards. 
But this presumes that generation 1 will look on future generations as their 
moral equals, rather than discounting their interests, and it also entails the claim that 
preventing future injustice is a moral priority. Wissenburg’s restraint principle can 
affirm that this is the case with regard to overlapping generations, but over the longer 
term,   the   picture   becomes   less   clear.   Turning   to   Dobson’s   account   of   post-
cosmopolitanism, the motivation for honouring ‘duties’ to future generations is, I 
argue, assumed, rather than explicated. Thus ultimately the stewardship model of 
citizenship is at least as persuasive as Dobson’s model, given the motivational 
assumption implicit in both. But the stewardship model also encounters difficulties 
specifying duties of justice. Attractive though Ball’s notion of punctuated reciprocity 
is, he is clear that it is a virtue to be taught and cultivated, not an abstract account of 
duties of justice, a point also made by Barry in his account of ecological stewardship. 
Furthermore, in view of the non-voluntary benefit problem raised above in relation to 
the fact that ecosystem integrity bequeathed over several generations cannot be said to 
have been voluntarily received, the most persuasive argument for a stewardship 
83 Of course, it could be the case that narrowing someone’s opportunities would in fact benefit them. 
For example, an alcoholic who is deprived of the opportunity to get drunk may reasonably be said to 
have been benefited by this restriction. What is at issue here is the restriction of opportunities to 
flourish, or to pursue a reasonable conception of the good, which, I argue, is a plausible consequence of 
continuing environmental degradation. 
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descendants. This seems to me to be a plausible assumption to make, and it need not 
rest upon a communitarian account of citizenship and identity – stewards could be 
Kantians like the good Samaritan, rather than Burkean in the communitarian sense – 
but it is an assumption. Absent from this assumption, there is a motivational gap in 
the integrity model of sustainability, which cannot be resolved by rationalist appeals 
to self-interest. Indeed, the only appeals that could conceivably be made to the 
unconvinced would be of the sentimentalist sort proposed by Richard Rorty with 
regard to human rights. Democratic deliberation about environmental decision-
making must therefore include discussion of whether and how much environmental 
citizens care about future generations. It may be that they do not.
6.4 Conclusion
Deliberative   democracy,   environmental   citizenship,   and   intergenerational 
justice are interconnected in accounts of environmental sustainability. The extent to 
which   one  model   of   environmental   sustainability   is  preferred  over   another  is 
ultimately determined by democratic deliberation; few green theorists now advocate 
authoritarian routes to a sustainable future. Although deliberative democracy clearly 
represents an advance on liberal democracy from a green perspective, the merits of 
deliberative democracy have at times been oversold. As Wissenburg argues, ‘flesh 
and blood’ environmental citizens may ultimately decide to continue to bequeath 
serious environmental problems to future generations. 
Theorists of environmental citizenship, however, have argued that fostering a 
reconceptualisation of what it means to be a citizen would minimise this risk. For the 
most part, the greening of citizenship entails a more active and engaged approach to 
citizenship and to the community than that found in liberal democratic models. 
Citizens are not mutually disinterested, they are stewards, or communitarians, or post-
cosmopolitans, and they are concerned with duties rather than rights. This aspect of 
environmental   citizenship   I   found   troubling;   protection   for   minorities,   I   have 
suggested, depends on rights being recognised as well as duties. 
Finally, citizenship was also found to be bound up with theories of justice, and 
with the extent to which it can be assumed that individuals care about the fate of 
future generations. In the abstract I argued that the idea of ecological integrity is a 
better   guide   to   what   present   generations   should   seek   to   maintain   for   future 
169generations, bypassing, as it does, the difficult question of needs and wants, and 
overcoming the difficulty of long-term environmental issues not necessarily being 
addressed if one is only concerned with the fate of generations that overlap with one’s 
own. However, this approach was found to rest on a motivational assumption that 
may not, in fact, prove valid in real world democratic deliberations. Whereas 
Wissenburg’s restraint principle can be argued to be a rational choice insofar as it is in 
an individual’s self-interest, the restraint principle may not protect distant rather than 
overlapping future generations from environmental harms, and is in any case unlikely 
to ensure environmental sustainability to the standard advocated in the previous 
chapter. 
This problem illustrates the difficulty of justifying concern for distant rather 
than overlapping future generations in terms of rational self-interest. However, the 
appeal to a sentimental concern for future generations, which is presumed in the 
environmental sustainability as integrity model, is less secure. In chapter 3 I argued 
that Rorty’s proposal for human rights grounded in a sentimental education would 
seem too weak a foundation for many advocates of human rights. It may reasonably 
be assumed that advocates of environmental sustainability might also wish for a 
stronger foundation than appeals to sentiment seem likely to provide. In the next 
chapter I consider the plausibility of an alternative foundation: environmental human 
rights.   
170Chapter 7: Rights     or     sustainability, rights     and     sustainability   
In the previous chapter I argued that questions of rights ghost issues of 
citizenship, democracy, and justice in green politics. Yet some green theorists, such as 
William Ophuls (1974) and Garrett Hardin (2005) have taken the view that individual 
rights are a potential threat to, or might have to be sacrificed for, environmental 
sustainability. On the other hand, Wilfred Beckerman (1999; 2000) has argued that 
protecting human rights should be prioritised over ensuring sustainability, on the basis 
that the most important thing that the present generation can bequeath to future 
generations is not a sustainable environment, but rather, a fair society. In the first 
section   of   this  chapter  I   argue   that  both   of   these  positions,   those  proposing 
sustainability   over   rights,   and   those   advocating   rights   over   sustainability,   are 
misguided. The position I defend is that, in view of the environmental impacts on 
human   security   attendant   upon   current   patterns   of   economic   globalisation,   a 
commitment to human rights is interdependent with a commitment to environmental 
sustainability. Thus, in the latter part of the chapter, I explore the plausibility of 
uniting environmental sustainability and human rights, in the idea of environmental 
human rights. This is a proposal that has often been made almost casually in the 
literature on both human rights and environmental sustainability, and which I suggest 
has been somewhat under-theorised. While I defend the view that human rights and 
environmental sustainability are not necessarily mutually exclusive, neither are they 
straightforwardly compatible, particularly if environmental sustainability is simply to 
be added to the list of human rights proclaimed in the contemporary human rights 
regime. Environmental human rights, I conclude, are plausible if and only if attention 
is paid to the problems identified with human rights earlier in the thesis. 
7.1 Human rights or environmental sustainability, not both?
Ophuls, writing in 1974, predicted ‘the inevitable coming of scarcity to 
societies predicated on abundance’, and with this, ‘almost equally inevitable, will be 
the end of political democracy and a drastic reduction in personal liberty’ (Ophuls 
1974:47). Ophuls has often been understood to imply that we can either have 
democracy and individual freedom, or we can have sustainability, but we cannot have 
both. Pursuing both would lead to the destruction of the environment to the degree 
where scarcity caused societal breakdown and a return to authoritarianism as a matter 
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published in 1968, laments ‘the tragedy of freedom in a commons’ (Hardin 2005:28). 
The freedom he has in mind is mostly economic, and, in particular, procreative 
freedom. In this regard, he specifically attacks the UDHR right to found a family, 
which is proclaimed in Article 16.1. Writing more than 30 years later, Beckerman 
argued that, rather than trying to predict future environmental demands and protect 
resources accordingly, ‘our most important obligation to future generations is to 
bequeath to them a ‘decent society’ in which there is respect for basic human rights’ 
(Beckerman 2000:22). 
The detail of the argument put forward by Ophuls and Hardin is not quite the 
apology for environmental authoritarianism which it has sometimes been presented 
as. For example, neither embraces authoritarian government as a good way to live. 
Rather, they both suggest that an absence of individual moral responsibility makes 
authoritarianism necessary. Indeed, Hardin states that, ‘The only kind of coercion I 
recommend is mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people 
affected’ (Hardin 2005:34). It is Hardin’s and Ophuls’ pessimism about the possibility 
of encouraging social change towards a morally driven environmental citizenry that 
leads them to conclude authoritarianism is, if not desirable, certainly inevitable. The 
arguments regarding democracy and citizenship discussed in the previous chapter 
suggest a greater degree of optimism among more contemporary greens. 
Nevertheless, it is worth considering the argument that either environmental 
sustainability or human rights should be prioritised, looking firstly at the idea that 
environmental sustainability should be prioritised over human rights. What this might 
mean in practice is that democratic rights to elect representatives who would have a 
say in deciding environmental policies might be waived, or the right to protest against 
unwanted policies might be denied both in terms of freedom of speech and of 
association, or perhaps it would become acceptable for governments to detain without 
charge or trial individuals thought likely to impede environmental sustainability in 
some way. Would this deliver environmental sustainability? Perhaps, if governments 
were led by environmental philosopher-kings, but I suspect that few environmental 
activists would feel confident in surrendering the means of holding governments to 
account on environmental policy. 
Just as human rights can rest on a consensus underpinned by power (as 
discussed in chapter 4), so too can a particular model of sustainability reflect power 
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what he calls ‘the environmentalism of the poor’ suggests that defending the civil and 
political rights of marginalized groups is key to protecting the environment. He argues 
that an important part of the conflict over how sustainability should be conceptualised 
is a conflict over language. The relevant question is therefore, ‘who has the power to 
impose particular languages of valuation?’ (Martinez-Alier 2002: viii). For example, 
an exclusionary tendency can be seen at work in terms of a powerful consensus 
around the idea of environmental sustainability as environmental preservation that 
prevailed in the 1980s and 1990s, and was evident in the creation of wildlife parks, 
which have often justified the exclusion and displacement of indigenous populations 
from their lands, on the grounds that these people did not conform to some externally 
determined notion of environmentally appropriate behaviour (O’Neill 2007: 201-202). 
In these instances, claims to use of the land that do not rest on preserving it as a 
wilderness space are excluded because wilderness preservation has been determined 
to be the appropriate way of valuing the land in question. John O’Neill (2007) 
identifies here a comparison with the logic of colonialism, also justified with 
reference to externally determined standards. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
emphasis on inclusiveness in the green literature on deliberative democracy and 
citizenship runs counter to this exclusive tendency. But what this example suggests is 
that human rights provide important safeguards against a particular conception of 
environmental sustainability being imposed to the disadvantage of some groups. It can 
be concluded from this discussion that prioritising environmental sustainability over 
human rights is not an attractive strategy.
The second option I proposed to consider is that human rights should be 
prioritised over environmental sustainability. Indeed, Beckerman claims that the focus 
of policy makers now should be on bequeathing to future generations a just society 
rather than a green society. What this might mean in practice is that governments 
exempt their countries from global environmental regimes, such as the successor to 
the Kyoto Protocol, on the grounds that, in order for their citizens to enjoy human 
rights to economic security, it is necessary to pursue rapid economic growth. Given 
current levels of technological innovation, so the argument would go, it is necessary 
to burn fossil fuels and emit considerable levels of greenhouse gasses, but this is the 
price to be paid for economic rights. Future generations may find their economic 
rights harder to secure as a consequence of environmental degradation, but, since 
173Beckerman argues that future generations do not have rights, this is not a  rights 
problem.
84  This, in view of my argument above in chapter 5, is not an attractive 
proposition.   Pursuing   economic   development   at   the   price   of   bequeathing 
environmental problems to future generations seems likely to undermine the positive 
impact of bequeathing to future generations societies in which human rights are 
respected. The reason for this is found in Richard Rorty’s argument, discussed in 
chapter 3, that sympathy and security go together. Not always, perhaps; some people 
who enjoy personal and economic security today who clearly have little sympathy for 
those whose rights remain chronically underfulfilled. But I contend that this problem 
would be exacerbated if more people faced threats to their human security as a result 
of increasing environmental degradation. This, I argued in chapter 2, is the probable 
outcome of increasing economic globalisation, which the contemporary human rights 
regime does not necessarily challenge (see Evans and Hancock 1998; Stammers 
1999). 
On the other hand, Beckerman’s (2000) concern that people should not live in 
absolute poverty, and his belief that a fairer distribution of goods would follow from 
the more widespread fulfilment of human rights, is to some extent consistent with my 
argument above and is a position that many greens would endorse. However, in 
chapter 4 I noted a number of problems with the contemporary human rights regime. 
Firstly, the ecological embeddedness of human beings is not recognised. Secondly, 
the contemporary human rights regime is notably state-centric, in that individuals 
have rights against the government of a state. The models of inclusive citizenship 
discussed in the previous chapter, whereby individuals are said to have rights that 
follow the contours of risk, or of ecological harm, suggest the possibility of rights 
against foreign governments. These rights, I noted, were problematic, in that they 
might compromise rights to self-determination, which, in view of the discussion 
above of the possibility of ‘environmental colonialism’, seem also to be important. 
One possible solution to such conflicts is suggested in the idea of ‘appropriateness’ as 
to the level of political decision-making, as discussed in chapter 5, which suggests a 
further threat to the norm of state sovereignty. Human rights have also been said to 
84 Beckerman (1999) does not in fact agree that future generations will have too many problems coping 
with environmental degradation because he argues that should any resource become seriously in danger 
of being exhausted then feedback mechanisms in society and the market will lead to price increases or 
investment in the development of alternative technologies. For a discussion of why I disagree with 
Beckerman’s position on the market, see chapter 5. 
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yet to date states have mostly been unwilling to challenge the sovereign authority of 
governments in the name of humanitarian intervention (see chapter 4). Indeed, Evans 
and Hancock (1998) regard the contemporary international human rights regime as 
being embedded firmly within the sovereignty-based international order. On the other 
hand, human rights are neither fixed nor given. Alternatives to the contemporary 
human rights regime might better facilitate environmental sustainability. In this 
regard, a number of greens have proposed the idea of environmental human rights. If 
Jack Donnelly (2007) is correct in arguing that human rights are tools for protecting 
human dignity, then it seems plausible to suggest that a new model of human rights 
ought to take account of contemporary threats to human dignity. That being the case, 
it follows that if my argument regarding the environmental impact of economic 
globalisation is valid, then an adequate theory of human rights would be one that 
could take account of the environmental threats to human dignity. In short, there 
would seem to be a need for environmental human rights.
7.2 The idea of environmental human rights
A number of scholars make reference to the idea of environmental human 
rights.   Within   the   field   of   human   rights,   Stammers   (1999:992)   identifies 
environmental human rights, along with women’s rights, as one of the areas in which 
there is debate about how the international bill of rights should be extended, while 
Anthony J. Langlois (2001) speculates on the possibility of there being a ‘human right 
to an adequate environment’. Within green theory, Robyn Eckersley notes the 
attractiveness of the rights framework whereby rights ‘trump’ lesser considerations, 
and thus the possibility that environmental rights could guarantee ecological outcomes 
where   interests   compete   (Eckersley   1996:216).   Jan   Hancock   (2003)   and   Tim 
Hayward (2005a) have both undertaken book-length treatments of environmental 
human rights, each assuming that the case to prove is that environmental human rights 
are plausible, taking as given the argument that human rights are both plausible and 
enjoy universal or near universal assent. The arguments advanced in chapters 3 and 4 
of this thesis present a more complicated picture, and on that basis, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the idea of environmental human rights has been under-
theorised in academic writing to date. In particular, there has been little discussion of 
the implications of adopting the traditionally liberal notion of rights with a view to 
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previous two chapters, has often been thought to be in tension with liberal democracy.
There are two possible approaches to articulating environmental human rights. 
Either environmental rights may be derived from existing human rights documents, or 
an entirely new bill of environmental human rights may be argued for in the spirit of, 
but independently from, existing human rights. Hancock takes the first approach, 
while Hayward takes something akin to the second, arguing for a newly defined 
environmental human right to be enshrined in national constitutions. These two recent 
works therefore lend themselves to an analysis of the ways in which the idea of 
environmental human rights has been tackled within green politics. The focus on 
green scholars, rather than human rights scholars, is appropriate, since it is incumbent 
upon green scholars to be aware of the environmental implications of adopting the 
language of liberal democracies, which, Eckersley claims (1996:214-216) human 
rights clearly embody.
Hancock argues that the full realisation of the rights enumerated in currently 
accepted human rights instruments such as the UDHR and the two International 
Covenants   would   require   the   recognition   of   two  environmental   human  rights. 
Although a broader spectrum of environmental human rights might be desirable, ‘to 
guarantee   the   environmental   conditions   required   for   the   enjoyment   of   legally 
stipulated human rights, it is necessary to adopt only two environmental human 
rights’ (Hancock 2003:6); specifically, the right to (1) an environment free from toxic 
pollution and (2) ownership of natural resources (Hancock 2003:1). It is Hancock’s 
contention that, given the threats to human health, dignity, security, and well-being 
posed by environmental harms, these two environmental human rights are necessary 
for the full realisation of such rights as the right to ‘life, liberty and security of person’ 
(UDHR, Article 3), rights to property (UDHR, Article 17), ‘the right to social 
security’ and the right of all to the ‘realization … of the economic, social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity’ (UDHR, Article 22), and perhaps most obviously, 
the right of all to, 
a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
of   his  family,   including   food,   clothing,   housing,   medical   care   and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood 
in circumstances beyond his control. (UDHR, Article 25)
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in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized’, 
and Article 30 states, ‘Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for 
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity … aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein’. 
The argument seems to be not that there should be these two environmental 
human rights, rather, that these rights already exist, insofar as they are implicit in 
existing human rights covenants, and that they should therefore be recognised and 
made explicit. For Hancock, the greatest obstacle to the full realisation of human 
rights (including the two environmental rights) is the capitalist system and, more 
importantly,   the   dominance   of   (neo-classical)   economic   rationality   in   political 
thinking. In light of the pressures of economic globalisation and the dominance of 
economic rationality in political decision-making, Hancock (2003:17) argues that 
governments’ support of human rights reflects a desire to claim and maintain 
legitimacy vis-à-vis their citizens and the international community, rather than a 
genuine commitment to satisfying the needs and protecting the well-being of citizens 
(which, in Hancock’s view, ought to be the test of a government’s legitimacy). 
Hancock’s argument can be summarised as follows; if political decisions are made in 
economically rational terms, then environmental protection is sacrificed; if, however, 
ecological rationality prevails, then the realisation of human rights will be seen to 
necessitate   strategies   of   environmental   protection   (Hancock   2003:17-33).   Such 
strategies  may  be  encapsulated  in  the  two environmental  rights  that Hancock 
specifies.
Hayward’s argument is somewhat different. His book ‘takes as its premise that 
human rights have a justification and legitimacy which precludes their being rejected’ 
(Hayward 2005a:35) and seeks to claim the same status for environmental rights by 
arguing that an environmental human right should be embedded in the national 
constitution ‘of any modern democracy’ (Hayward 2005a:1). Indeed, a number of 
constitutions written in the past twenty years already recognise some form of 
environmental   right(s)   (Hayward   2005a:201)   –   and   consideration   of   these 
developments, as well as moral argument, leads Hayward to propose a general 
environmental human right: namely the ‘right of every individual to an environment 
adequate for their health and well-being’ (Hayward 2005a:1). Hayward finds support 
for his proposed right in the draft principles of the UN Sub-committee on Human 
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Brundtland report (2005a:28-9). Explaining the relationship between the proposed 
environmental human right and the Brundtland idea of sustainable development, he 
goes on to note that rights to social justice and rights of future generations ‘would 
require to be stated separately’ (Hayward 2005a:29). This differs somewhat from 
Hancock’s approach, which sees the realisation of social justice as being dependent 
upon the fulfilment of all human rights, which would in turn mandate the realisation 
of the two environmental human rights he proposes. In short, where Hancock posits 
an inherent inter-relatedness, Hayward allows for the separation of environmental 
rights and other forms of justice, in constitutional law at least. However, Hayward is 
clear that a constitutionally enshrined environmental human right is not, and should 
not be, a panacea for the environmental movement. Rather, he sees it as but one 
strategy in a much broader struggle. 
Hayward’s proposed environmental human right is at once narrowly focussed 
and yet open to the charge that it mandates a multiplicity of rights that may prove too 
extensive to be workable. He devotes a couple of pages to speculating as to which 
specific procedural and substantive rights might be needed to realise a right of all to 
an environment adequate for health and well-being (Hayward 2005a:29-31), then 
steers himself away from committing to any of these more specific rights, noting that 
context would play a role in shaping interpretations, thus making it impossible to be 
prescriptive about what rights would be needed everywhere to protect the proposed 
environmental   human   right.   Hayward   goes   on   to   argue   that   the   ‘declaratory 
formulation’ is in keeping with the style of established human rights (Hayward 
2005a:31). Others, such as Eckersley (1996), have committed themselves to a detailed 
list of the procedural rights needed to underwrite a declaratory right of the kind that 
Hayward proposes. These include what are typically thought to be (environmental) 
citizens’ rights, such as rights to be informed of proposed developments in a particular 
local area, rights to information about environmental impact assessments, and so on. 
It should be noted, however, that Eckersley’s notion of inclusive sovereignty would 
entitle those outside of the citizenry traditionally conceived to these citizen types 
rights (see chapter 6). However, if established, Hayward’s constitutional right to an 
environment adequate for human health and well-being would set a standard whereby 
it would be incumbent upon all governments that adhere to human rights to establish 
and maintain for their citizens access to some version of these procedural rights. 
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human rights. Hancock explains that:
Methodologically, this examination is predicated upon analysis of existing 
human rights texts rather than upon philosophical grounds because of the 
ontologically contested nature of philosophical claims to human rights. 
(Hancock 2003:11)
Hayward, in a footnote to a 2001 article, brackets much of the historical criticism of 
the abstraction, class bias and cultural imperialism of existing human rights, as ‘moot 
points’, but goes on to say that ‘the content and weight of certain specific rights’, is a 
matter that requires further discussion (Hayward 2001:132-3). In his 2005 book, 
which does indeed include further discussion of these issues, he sees the challenge as 
being, on the one hand, to prove that the notion of environmental human rights does 
not ‘overextend’ human rights discourse, and, on the other hand, to ‘defend the 
apparent reduction of environmental concern to a concern with human interests in it’ 
(Hayward 2005a:25). Both Hancock and Hayward therefore take the status of human 
rights as given. Although Hancock wants to see the rationality that informs the 
interpretation  of   human  rights  overturned,  neither  theorist  is  troubled  by  ‘the 
ontologically contested nature of philosophical claims to human rights’. This attitude 
is not uncommon amongst green scholars who have discussed the possibility of there 
being environmental human rights. One possible explanation for this is the prevalence 
of the idea that there is ‘an overlapping consensus’ around the idea of human rights, 
such that support for human rights is ‘near universal’ as Donnelly (1999b; 2003) 
claims. As was discussed in chapter 4, there are those who doubt the integrity of the 
claimed consensus, and one of the points I explore in what follows is whether or not 
that is a serious problem for the idea of environmental human rights. Before turning to 
this question, however, I first consider what advantages and resources the human 
rights framework has to offer the project of realising environmental sustainability. In 
a less than perfect world, it may be that the potential benefits of discussing 
environmental   sustainability   in   terms   of   human   rights   sufficiently   offset   any 
philosophical misgivings.
7.2.1 The merits of environmental human rights 
There are a number of clear strategic advantages in presenting claims for 
environmental justice in the language of human rights. Firstly, there can be little 
179doubt that human rights discourse has come to be the authoritative language in which 
moral claims are presented in the context of both democratic polities and international 
political forums. Reflecting this dominance, the legal codification of human rights has 
developed and multiplied since the 1948 UDHR. Adopting rights language lends 
legitimacy and intelligibility to complex claims that, as Avner de-Shalit (2001:117-9) 
observes, are often poorly understood by the general public. Institutionalising these 
rights   in   international   conventions   and/or   national   constitutions   increases   the 
opportunities for the legal protection of the environment. As Eckersley (1996) notes, 
the rights discourse has its origins in liberal politics, a point also made by Chris 
Brown (1997). For some, this renders it implacably opposed to environmental ends, 
given, for example, the tendency in liberal politics to value the individual abstracted 
from his (social and ecological) environment.
85 Yet one attraction of the rights-based 
approach is that it may afford the opportunity to reshape the terms of human rights. 
Engaging   an   influential   discourse   presents   opportunities   to   challenge   the 
understandings of the terms in which debate is conducted. It is in this spirit that 
Hancock’s concern to ground human rights in ecological rationality might be 
understood. Pointing to the advent of the idea of social and economic rights, 
Stammers (1999) argues that the scope of ‘liberal rights’ (by which he means political 
and civil rights) was extended by nineteenth-century social movements adopting the 
language of rights to further their aims. He sees a central place for social movements 
in driving social change (Stammers 1999:986).
Drawing on Stammers’ work, Eckersley (1996:219-20) observes the success 
of the socialist inspired ‘immanent critique’ of liberal rights and asks whether the 
green movement could achieve something similar. Thus the notions of autonomy and 
justice that Eckersley finds central to the mainstream conception of human rights 
should be understood in broader terms than is currently the case. Vandana Shiva has 
pointed to the indivisibility of so-called ‘first’ (civil and political) and ‘second’ 
(social, economic and cultural) generation rights, arguing that ‘Freedom from hunger 
is no less a human right than freedom of speech. Without the former, the latter does 
not exist’ (Shiva 1999:88). What is needed to ensure the fulfilment of human rights is 
more than their legal protection, it is also the capacity to realise them. The task of the 
human rights advocate is therefore to identify institutions or structures that inhibit or 
85 Eckersley (1996) berates the liberal tendency to abstract the individual from his social context. In 
chapter 5 I argued that this criticism is perhaps over-stated, but endorsed Eckersley’s view that the 
ecological context of human life is typically overlooked.
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human rights. If a sustainable environment were understood to be as much a material 
precondition for the exercise of civil and political rights as food and water are thus 
argued to be, then, contrary to Beckerman’s position, such rights may be thought to be 
‘indivisible’ from environmental rights also, and norms or institutions that threatened 
or undermined sustainability would also be the target of human rights claims. 
Environmental human rights thus understood might well be consistent with Thomas 
Pogge’s institutional model of human rights – indeed, Hayward’s understanding of 
human rights is explicitly derived from Pogge’s model, whereby, in contrast to the 
contemporary human rights regime, the underfulfilment of human rights is taken as 
the relevant standard (see chapter 4).
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A second respect in which environmental human right(s) may be attractive is 
apparent in the logic of human rights. As J.G. Merrills explains in a discussion of the 
conceptual difficulties that arise in linking the environment and human rights, ‘rights 
are a way of marking out a protected area within which the rights-holders are free to 
pursue their goals’ (Merrills 1996:27). The point of claiming environmental human 
right(s) is therefore to promote an adequate environment (Hayward), or the right to 
ownership of environmental resources and an environment free from toxic pollution 
(Hancock), as being beyond the sphere of political compromise. Thus debates about 
whether governments should prioritise the environment over development, or vice 
versa, are easily settled where further development is not essential to the fulfilment of 
other human rights. In this context, the advantage of a rights-based approach is that, 
following Dworkin, ‘it serves to ‘trump’ competing claims for utility maximisation’ 
(Eckersley 1996:216; Dworkin 1984).
Hayward expands upon this line of argument by suggesting that embedding 
environmental rights in national constitutions serves a broader purpose than simply 
providing for the protection of the environment by legal action. One effect of 
environmental human rights would be the mandating  of the procedural rights 
discussed above. Hayward (2005a:125-127) claims that the legal recognition of such 
rights would have a positive impact on the democratic credentials of environmental 
86  That said, Hayward has some reservations about Pogge’s argument, specifically relating to the 
latter’s claim that human rights can be effective as moral rights only. Hayward contends, on the 
contrary, that one of the objects of those claiming moral rights is to have those rights legally recognised 
and protected. Without such legal recognition, Hayward argues, the moral right is weakend (see 
Hayward 2005:38-41). Hence Hayward’s position is in some ways closer to the contemporary 
international human rights regime, in that he is arguing for constitutionally enshrined legal rights. 
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foster an ethic of custodianship, all key aspects of a sustainable society. Another 
positive effect would be to introduce environmental ethics to a wider and younger 
audience wherever citizenship training is part of the national curriculum, and to 
contribute to the environmental education of the general public. Finally, ‘Such effects 
would serve to consolidate the essential aims of environmental protection as being a 
matter of public interest rather than partisan cause’ (Hayward 2005a:126). 
Finally, environmental human rights could be interpreted along the lines 
suggested in Pogge’s institutional model (discussed above in chapter 4). Individuals 
would   then   have   a   negative   duty   not   to   support   human   rights-disrespecting 
institutions, as well as governments being responsible for the legal protection of 
human rights. The individual duty could be readily assimilated as a practice of 
environmental citizenship, at the same time as providing citizens with a means of 
conceptualising the link between actions and environmental impacts. If de-Shalit 
(2000:178) is correct in suggesting that one of the primary obstacles to active 
environmental citizenship is a lack of knowledge and understanding of environmental 
issues, then environmental human rights so understood could prove an important 
educative tool. 
In summary there are (at least) four areas within which advances may be made 
by adopting a rights-based approach to environmental issues. Most straightforwardly, 
opportunities for legal action to protect the environment are increased. Second, and 
perhaps more significantly, the idea of environmental protection and its importance is 
arguably strengthened, made more credible, more easily understandable, and is 
authoritatively   embedded   in   the   legal   and   political   fabric   if   some   form   of 
environmental   human   rights   is   recognised.   Thirdly   and   relatedly,   claiming 
environmental human rights may create opportunities to reshape the understandings of 
key elements of political vocabulary. Finally, environmental human rights understood 
on an institutional model may provide a conceptual tool that would help explicate the 
link between actions and environmental impacts to putative environmental citizens.
7.2.2 Problems with environmental human rights?
On the other hand, there are also a number of reasons for caution with regard 
to the attractiveness of the idea of environmental human rights. One respect in which 
the logic of human rights is potentially problematic for environmentalists is its 
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a human right is to say that there is something morally significant about being human. 
Human rights discourse recognises that individual humans have a right to what they 
need, or a right to pursue their own interests, in a way that individual snails, or giant 
pandas, or (more complicatedly) forest ecosystems do not. Catherine Redgwell 
identifies   ‘a   conceptual   shift   from   conservation   to   ‘ecological   consciousness’’ 
(Redgwell 1996:73) in the last thirty years or so of international conventions 
concerning the protection of the environment generally and threatened species in 
particular. For Redgwell, the advent of environmental human rights would bring 
benefits to the protection of other species, as it would protect human and other 
species’ habitats simultaneously. She therefore argues that the increasing dominance 
in political and legal thought of ‘weak anthropocentrism’, which values nature 
instrumentally as the inalienable context of human life, and thus recognises the inter-
connectedness of human life and that of other species, goes some way to ‘breaching 
the dam of anthropocentrism’ (Redgwell 1996:87). 
Nevertheless, the fact that individuals of other species are not valued in the 
same way as individual humans are in the human rights paradigm does undoubtedly 
elevate humans over other species, and this will be unappealing to ecocentrists. 
Moreover, Hayward acknowledges that, where environmental human rights are 
accepted and there is a conflict between ‘human interests’ and ‘non-human interests’, 
then ‘the human interest will prevail’ (Hayward 2005a:34). With this in mind, Klaus 
Bosselmann proposes an ‘ecological limitation’ to environmental human rights. Such 
a limitation ‘refers to the fact that individual freedom is determined not only by a 
social context – the social dimension of human rights – but also by an ecological 
context’ (Bosselmann 2001:119).
Even  so,  the ecological  context that can  support  human life  need  not 
necessarily be as biodiverse nor be less polluted than it is today. As observed above, 
Wissenburg has suggested that a global Manhattan could be ‘sustainable’ in the sense 
of being adequate to support human life, if people are prepared to accept it. There is, 
therefore, reason for concern about the quality of environmental sustainability a 
rights-based approach could offer. Hayward would acknowledge that even though 
they act as ‘trumps’, rights are not absolute; rights trump utility, not other rights. The 
right of any individual to freedom of speech, for example, is limited by the right of all 
to security, thus the freedom to incite violence is circumscribed. An ecological 
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environmental human rights proposed by Hayward and certainly Hancock, but the 
precise   point   at   which   human   interests   would   ‘trump’   the   imperatives   of 
environmental protection cannot be determined a priori. The fact also remains that 
environmental human rights do not promote the intrinsic value of the biosphere, an 
important goal for many greens. What they do promote is the fundamental value of a 
human interest in the environment, but that may yield a rather weaker vision of 
sustainability than many greens would hope for. On the other hand, an enlightened 
citizenry of environmental stewards could interpret environmental human rights in 
terms of a strong notion of sustainability. As argued in chapter 5, anthropocentrism is 
not necessarily correlated with weak sustainability.
It is unlikely that any one argument would satisfy all greens. The aim here is 
to evaluate the extent to which environmental human rights might be thought to be a 
useful tool in relation to environmental sustainability. If the question is whether, 
strategically – that is, with the aim of effecting widespread political change in a 
democratic manner (if not always in a democratic context) – environmental human 
rights are useful, then the charge of anthropocentrism is not necessarily something 
that should discourage advocates of a rights-based approach. De-Shalit advises that 
the ecocentric approach is often unpersuasive to the public at large, who may be more 
concerned   with   economic   security   than   long-term   environmental   sustainability. 
Hayward points out that the accusation of anthropocentrism does not recognise the 
subtlety of either the anthropocentric or the non-anthropocentric position: The 
anthropocentric position, if ‘weak’ (as above) recognises the inter-connectedness of 
human and non-human life in a way that ‘strong’ anthropocentrism does not, and, 
further, the goal of preserving the ecosystem as a whole is indirectly indicated in 
promoting environmental human rights, even if the motivation is human-centred. On 
the other hand, it is argued that,
[a] human rights approach provides a link to interests and motivation, and 
thus to actual practices, in a way that more abstract notions of a ‘right of 
environment’ or of ‘nature’s intrinsic value’ do not. (Hayward 2005a:35)
Environmental human rights can thus to some extent be defended against the 
charges of inherent liberalism and anthropocentrism. But an important element of a 
weak anthropocentric theory, as discussed in chapters 5 and 6, was concern for the 
welfare of future generations. Environmental sustainability protected by reference to 
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present generation is consistent with seriously degrading the environment that future 
generations will inherit. Hancock’s formulation of environmental rights, promulgating 
the right to live in an environment free from toxic pollution, and the right to 
ownership of natural resources, is arguably more robust, but would nevertheless 
conceivably allow for the overuse of resources that are owned by the present 
generation,   thus   bequeathing   an  impoverished   range   of   resources   to   the   next 
generation. The question therefore arises as to whether future generations can be said 
to have rights, specifically, rights which the present generation has a duty to recognise 
and not infringe, and it is a question that has been much debated in environmental 
ethics. 
Ruth Macklin (1981:151-152) argues that there is no currently identifiable 
subject that can be said to be the future generation-rights holder, a line also taken by 
Beckerman (2000:18). In reply to this Ernest Partridge (1990) offers the example of a 
campsite, which is said to prove that future generations can have certain types of 
rights. The campsite example runs as follows: if I stay at a campsite I am generally 
recognised as having a duty to leave the campsite in as good a state as I found it for 
the next potential user. This holds true whether the next person comes along next 
week or many years after I am dead. Partridge is confident that this proves that future 
generations can have what he calls ‘designative rights’, which are rights correlated to 
duties that are owed to a collective of people who can be described but not identified. 
But there are two problems with this argument. Firstly, it yields a potentially very 
weak version of sustainability, since the duty bearer is obligated to leave the 
environment, or the campsite, only in as good a state as it was found. Secondly, it is 
not clear why it is that future people have rights here. They cannot be said to have 
rights in a contractual or a reciprocal sense, since there is no clear contractual or 
reciprocal relationship. Thus it seems plausible that the duty I have to clear up the 
campsite is closer to the stewardship duties discussed in the previous chapter, which 
do not depend on corresponding rights, but are instead tied to a model of citizenship. 
De-Shalit (1995:114-116) considers the possibility that future generations might have 
rights in virtue of having interests. But this raises the problem that, for a future person 
to have any interest at all, he would have to exist, so he would have an interest in 
existing. Thus if a future person has rights in virtue of his interests, then he has a right 
to exist. This, as de-Shalit notes, is unacceptable, both in terms of the procreative 
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population numbers. These debates indicate that the case for future generations having 
rights does not seem a sufficiently robust basis on which to argue for environmental 
sustainability. 
This casts a further doubt on the direct usefulness of the idea of environmental 
human rights, particularly if they are conceived in the avowedly legalistic terms that 
Hayward proposes. In the previous chapter I argued that Andrew Dobson’s idea of 
post-cosmopolitan citizenship was problematic in that it recognised duties of justice in 
relation to environmental harms that may have been perpetrated by people already 
dead. Environmental human rights might be thought to give rise to the same sort of 
problems. Suppose I am born in a small island state in 2120, and that, when I am two 
years old, life on the island becomes untenable because of rising sea levels. I may 
have the right to live in an environment adequate for my health and well-being, but 
the people who have violated my right are not my contemporaries, they are the people 
and governments of previous generations. Quite obviously, I cannot seek legal redress 
against the dead.
87 
However, I can act as an environmental steward and seek to maintain the 
environment for future generations, and environmental human rights might well help 
me in discharging my environmental citizenship duties. For example, if the right to 
live in an environment adequate for my health and well-being entails, as Eckersley 
suggests, rights to be informed of proposed developments, or rights to access 
environmental impact assessments, then as an environmental citizen I might find these 
rights crucial. Furthermore, such rights would have an impact on some cases within 
the present generation. Not all environmental problems are gradual and incremental. 
The siting of a toxic dump, for instance, can immediately impact on the health and 
well-being of local people, and would be directly captured by either Hayward’s or 
Hancock’s formulation of human rights. Similarly, those who have been made 
environmental refugees in virtue of conservation policies that equated environmental 
protection with wilderness preservation might well argue that the right to an 
87 A related point to be noted here is Derek Parfitt’s well-known ‘non-identity problem’. Parfitt (1984) 
argues that I cannot rationally wish that different decisions had been made before I was born, since it is 
the precise pattern of decisions that were made that led to me being born as the person that I am. Parfitt 
therefore argues that future individuals cannot be said to have been harmed by policies that bring about 
their existence. I suggest that this point makes little practical difference when making decisions about 
environmental policies, since, we can act as environmental stewards independently of the rights or 
claims of future generations (see chapter 6). 
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resources, would mean that they ought not to have been removed from their lands. So, 
although environmental human rights encounter some problems in relation to future 
generations, this does not render the idea of environmental human rights redundant.
What all this suggests is that the idea of environmental human rights is indeed 
plausible, and also has the potential to be useful to environmental citizens. But there 
remain the problems with the contemporary international human rights regime 
identified in chapter 4 and discussed briefly in the first section of this chapter. Thus I 
suggest that environmental human rights merit the endorsement of greens if and only 
if they are conceptualised differently to those rights recognised in the contemporary 
international human rights regime. The standard by which to judge the (in)security of 
environmental human rights is that proposed by Pogge, that is, not whether the rights 
have been directly violated but whether or not they are underfulfilled. This is 
appropriate because it better captures the chronic and systematic nature of some of the 
problems associated with economic globalisation. There is also merit in Pogge’s 
proposal that individuals be responsible for human rights in that they have a negative 
duty to refrain from supporting human rights-disrespecting institutions. As noted 
above, this could be understood in terms of a duty as an environmental citizen. In 
chapter 4 I argued that Pogge fails to insulate himself from the libertarian critique he 
seeks to avoid, because the only plausible way of fulfilling this negative duty in a 
globalised world is to become a hermit, which, in itself is problematic since it is not 
consistent with many people’s conception of a good life. It is also reasonable to argue 
that this negative duty falls foul of some of the doubts I raised in the previous chapter 
about environmental citizenship in that it envisages a more onerous model of 
citizenship than many liberals might be comfortable with and this in turn leaves, at the 
very least, unanswered questions about the division of labour. But it does not 
necessarily entail the identification with community inherent in republican and 
communitarian notions of citizenship discussed in chapter 6. It is closer to the post-
cosmopolitan view of recognising the inevitability of social interaction and human 
interconnectedness, and, with that, the possibility of injustice. 
Doubts about the consensus on human rights, and arguments about conflicting 
values, present further problems for the idea of environmental human rights. Non-
Western critics of human rights have also at times rejected the implicit universalism 
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clear from O’Neill’s and Martinez-Alier’s work that there are reasons to be sceptical 
of environmental standards that are applied without the informed consent of the 
people affected. Human rights are undeniably universalist, and the terms in which 
human rights are defended by political theorists sometimes do little to assuage the 
concerns of those who fear that human rights proponents are opposed to cultural 
difference. But, as argued in chapter 4, it does not follow that cultural relativism 
offers an appropriate guide to action. 
Implicit in my argument in the thesis has been the claim that human rights 
work as a package deal, and that environmental sustainability, being crucial to human 
security, ought to be recognised as such. The view of human rights as a package is 
exemplified in Shiva’s point (above), which is that civil and political rights and social 
and economic rights are interdependent, presumably with environmental rights as 
well. On this basis, it matters very much to the environmentalist if human rights to 
freedom from discrimination are not respected. It might be, for instance, that a 
particular ethnic group is discriminated against in that the land that they live on is 
polluted by toxic waste and the authority does not prevent or correct this. In this 
instance, freedom of speech, to be able to speak out about the injustice, is also 
important. Thus it is easy to see the strength of the package deal approach. But there 
are corresponding weaknesses. The adoption of the human rights framework enjoins 
environmentalists to argue for a package, some elements of which are not universally 
respected, as seen in chapter 4. It may be that environmental issues are more 
amenable to having universal appeal as a human rights issue than freedom from 
discrimination on the grounds of gender, or freedom of religion may have. In this 
case, environmentalists might feel that their case would be enhanced if they argued 
that the right to an environment adequate for human well-being (or whatever the 
chosen formulation) is a more important human right than these other rights with less 
universal appeal. But if it is permissible to cherry-pick which rights are recognised, 
then the whole package begins to unravel. My aim in section 7.1 was to discredit the 
idea that we can have environmental sustainability or human rights, but not both. On 
the contrary, neither is secure without the other. 
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One of the aims of this thesis is to evaluate whether the human rights 
framework is an appropriate one in terms of which to respond to the environmental 
challenges associated with globalisation. This might be thought a misguided project in 
view   of   the   assertions   of   scholars   who   have   endorsed   the   view   that   either 
environmental sustainability, or human rights, should have priority. The justification 
for such views is either that the freedoms associated with human rights will 
undermine environmental sustainability, or that a world in which human rights are 
respected will be of greater value to future generations than a world in which certain 
ecological resources are preserved. Both these positions are flawed. Human rights and 
environmental   sustainability   are   interdependent,   particularly   in   the   context   of 
globalisation as it is currently pursued, where economic activity typically entails 
environmental degradation, which in turn undermines human security. The discussion 
in the previous chapter demonstrated that individual rights are necessary in order to 
guard against the potential for environmental politics to become oppressive. In this 
chapter it was shown that a powerful consensus around a particular model of 
environmental sustainability can also generate circumstances in which fundamental 
rights are ignored and abused, for example where environmental protection was 
understood in terms of wilderness preservation and used to justify the exclusion of 
people from their lands. Thus respect for human rights can be an important corrective 
to the more problematic aspects of the universalism disclosed in environmental 
values. 
But it was also noted in this chapter that, although human rights and 
environmental   sustainability   are   not   mutually   exclusive,   neither   are   they 
straightforwardly nor immediately compatible. Thus the latter part of the chapter 
considered the plausibility and appeal of the idea of environmental human rights. 
Taking the status of human rights as given, and adding environmental rights, is an 
imprudent strategy in view of the problems exposed in the contemporary human rights 
regime. Therefore, insofar as environmentalists wish to institutionalise a right to some 
standard of environmental protection that will have the force of trumping other 
concerns, then it is incumbent upon green theorists to follow up on Eckersley’s 
proposed project of an ‘immanent critique’ of human rights. This might lead to an 
endorsement of something akin to Pogge’s institutional model of human rights, 
which, though not without its problems, is attuned to the criticisms of state-centrism 
189and is directed at the underfulfilment of human rights. The idea of environmental 
human rights has much to recommend it, if, and only if, human rights are not taken as 
they   are,   but   are   instead   reinterpreted   so   as   to   address   the   problem   of   the 
underfulfilment of human rights, and so as to recognise the ecological as well as the 
social embeddedness of human life. 
190Chapter 8: Human rights, environmental sustainability, 
and the inevitability of moral choice
The aim of this thesis has been to examine the dynamic between human rights 
and environmental sustainability in the context of globalisation. It is evident from the 
analyses presented in chapter 2 that economic globalisation as it is currently pursued 
is environmentally unsustainable, and that environmental degradation is a significant 
and growing source of human insecurity. Environmental sustainability is the relevant 
test since a sustainable environment is a precondition for all human activity. Humans 
are ecologically embedded beings. There are a range of positions on the standard or 
quality of environmental sustainability required, and I do not pretend that my 
argument will satisfy all of them. I have, however, followed Bryan Norton in arguing 
that sustainability is best interpreted in terms of ecosystem integrity as the best means 
of bequeathing a range of options and opportunities to future generations. However, 
commitment to such a standard depends on a presumed concern for the fate of future 
generations   over   the   long   term.   Nevertheless,   a   more   minimal   standard   of 
environmental sustainability is also being undermined in the short term. That being 
the case, environmental sustainability is clearly a challenge for human rights. 
In the thesis, I have sought to assess whether the contemporary human rights 
regime provides an adequate and appropriate framework for responding to that 
challenge, and I have argued that it does not, as human rights are currently 
interpreted. There are several reasons for this, not least of which is the problem that 
neither the contemporary human rights regime, nor any of the theoretical justifications 
or expositions of human rights studied here explicitly recognise the ecological 
embeddedness   of   human   activity.   However,   demonstrating   that   humans   are 
ecologically embedded beings is relatively straightforward, whereas demonstrating 
why individuals should act to protect the human rights of others, or to preserve the 
environment for the sake of future generations, proved much more difficult. In this 
concluding   chapter,   I   consider   some   of   the   difficulties   of   universalism,   the 
justification   of  obligations  regarding   human  rights  and  future  generations,  the 
inevitability of moral choice, and the extent to which the human rights framework can 
be said to be an appropriate one for addressing the challenge of environmental 
sustainability. 
1918.1 Universal standards and the inevitability of moral choice
The contemporary human rights regime is, on Jack Donnelly’s argument, 
supported by an overlapping consensus, analogous to that proposed by John Rawls as 
a means of devising domestic principles of justice. But there are also complaints that 
the apparent overlapping consensus on human rights is to some degree coerced, and 
that compliance with human rights standards is in fact ‘a question of political might 
and  realpolitik’   (Hussein   2001:77).  Donnelly’s   proposal   that  human  rights  be 
understood as a standard of civilisation arguably accepts the legitimacy of coercing 
compliance with purportedly universal values, indeed, of using coercive measures to 
universalise a particular set of values. Thomas Pogge’s institutional model of human 
rights, though innovative in focusing on the underfulfilment of human rights rather 
than the legal protection of them, also implicitly accepts the legitimacy coercing 
compliance with a universal standard, and his commitment to human rights appears to 
be premised on the belief that people would naturally prefer human rights to 
alternative standards, such as a world organised according to the principles and values 
espoused in the Qur‘ān. 
The question of coercion is particularly important with respect to Pogge’s 
theory because of his focus on the coerced imposition of an unjust institutional order 
on people as the crucial factor in determining the underfulfilment of human rights. In 
contrasting human rights with the Qur‘ān, Pogge signals his support for the apparently 
coerced global enforcement of human rights standards, but not of Islamic law or 
morality. It would seem, then, that coercion is acceptable if the ‘right’ standards are 
being enfocred. But in a pluralistic world, this is a deeply problematic line to take, and 
indeed, one that has been taken before and used to justify a great deal of oppression 
and injustice in colonial enterprises. In chapter 7, I also highlighted examples of 
enivronmental values, externally defined, being used to justify the violation of rights. 
In view of these past mistakes, as well as the difficulties of present pluralism, it might 
reasonably be argued that coercing compliance with human rights standards is not 
acceptable. 
But such an argument would commit one to the view that where human rights 
are violated by a person who does not recognise human rights, in a society that does 
not recognise human rights, then there is nothing to be done about it. However, as 
Andrew Nathan points out, a neutral line over human rights is not possible, since 
trying to remain neutral in the face of oppression is in effect allowing the oppression 
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regard to environmental sustainability. To delay decision or profess agnosticism as to 
the present generation’s obligations to future generations is to side with those who 
argue that the future will take care of itself, and therefore legitimise bequeathing to 
posterity diminished biodiversity, over-stretched life support systems, exponential 
population growth, and toxic wastes that will last many thousands of years.
Richard Rorty’s solution to this problem is simply to say that it does not 
matter that there are no independent terms available in which to argue the case, liberal 
values just are better (than the  Qur‘ān, or anything else yet to be discovered or 
argued),   but   commitment   to   human   rights   should   be   ironic,   in   the   sense   of 
acknowledging that it might turn out after all that this commitment is misguided. Until 
that is proven, however, human rights are our best bet. Michael Freeman and others 
complain that this leaves human rights as a moral standard considerably weaker than 
many would wish, but I do not see a convincing argument that yields a stronger 
defence of human rights whilst sensitive to the problem of pluralism. Rowan Cruft’s 
idea of individualistically justified human rights is perhaps a candidate, but Cruft 
himself   acknowledges   the   epistemological   difficulties   of   such   approach.   The 
democratising trend in Pogge’s institutional approach, which makes individuals 
responsible for human rights insofar as they are enjoined either not to support human 
rights-disrespecting institutions, or where this is unavoidable, to take compensatory 
measures, perhaps allows for individual judgment about the individual rights of 
others, but I argued in chapter 4 that an institutional model of human rights alone is 
not sufficient; legal protection, as well as collective action to undermine oppressive 
institutions, is required if disempowered groups are to be protected. 
Turning to the inevitability of moral choice about environmental sustainability 
and the fate of future generations, there are plausible grounds for arguing that 
commitment to environmental sustainability need not be so ironic. There is now a 
well-documented scientific consensus on human responsibility for environmental 
problems such as global warming and climate change. It is also clear that, as 
ecologically embedded beings, it is in the interests of all humans that the environment 
be   sustained   at   least   to   the   minimum   standard   necessary   to   support   life. 
Environmental   sustainability   may   therefore   have   the   potential   to   be   a   fairly 
uncontroversial universal value. While some greens have been thought to be ‘anti-
science’   in   view   of   their   hostility   to   increasingly   dangerous   technological 
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engagement with scientific debate. Scientists can advise of the potential risks and 
gains consequent upon any particular development, but citizens must then reflect on 
this information to make judgments about what degree of risk they are willing to 
accept in return for what level of technological development. In short, citizens must 
make choices about what they value, and how much risk or what costs they are 
willing to accept in order realise their goals. Thus the way in which environmental 
sustainability is interpreted makes a significant difference to the extent to which 
environmental degradation is avoided, and the costs incurred in terms of changes to 
patterns of living. In chapter 5 I argued that neither free market environmentalism nor 
ecological   modernisation   were   able   adequately   to   accommodate   both 
intragenerational justice and intergenerational justice, whereas ecological economics, 
though problematic in other ways, offered the possibility of a more robust model of 
environmental sustainability, but required significant changes in global patterns of 
production   and   consumption.   Reflection   on   environmental   decisions   implies   a 
judgment about the extent to which citizens today are willing to export costs to distant 
peoples,   be   they   contemporaries   in   other,   often   poorer,   countries,   or   future 
generations. As argued above, this moral choice is inevitable. It is clear, then, that 
environmental sustainability shares some illuminating features with human rights.
8.2 Concern for distant people and environmental human rights
There is also a parallel discernible in the problem of justifying support for 
human rights and environmental sustainability. Both depend on concern for distant 
people, but it is not always clear what is presumed to be the motivation or the 
justification for individuals to care about distant people. Meanwhile, it is evident, both 
in the environmental externalities attendant upon economic globalisation, and in the 
chronic underfulfilment of human rights, that distant people are generally valued less 
than spatial and temporal contemporaries. A number of possible justifications for 
human   rights   and   environmental   sustainability   were   considered   in   this   thesis. 
Justifications for human rights that are grounded in rationally derived philosophical 
foundations, such as Alan Gewirth’s, imply a model of the human being as a rational 
agent, an assumption shared in certain aspects by neoliberal economics, but this 
individualistic and rationalistic notion is not universally assented to. Gewirth’s 
dialectically necessary method is unable to provide an answer to Michael Perry’s 
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uniquely worthy of a particular standard of moral consideration. Perry suggests that 
the only coherent answer to this question is God. Freeman concluded that a secular 
justification for human rights is ultimately unhelpful, but the plurality of religious 
doctrines, in addition to the existence of atheists and agnostics, suggests that an 
exclusively religious foundation for human rights will not suffice either. 
Moving away from this search for foundational truths, Donnelly proposes a 
Rawlsian overlapping consensus on human rights. This is to some extent an empirical 
claim, but it is also flawed as a justification of universal human rights, since 
consensus is morally neutral – it indicates nothing as to the desirability of the subject 
of the consensus. It is also not a particularly strong basis on which to build support for 
human rights, since consensus now is no guarantee of consensus in the future. A third 
justificatory strategy was found in Rorty’s proposal that human rights be thought of as 
the desirable product of a sentimental education. Here, the justification for human 
rights is based on the assumption not only that individuals care about the fate of 
strangers, but also that they should. Rorty rejects rationalist appeals to universal truths 
and claims that there are no ‘morally relevant transcultural facts’ (Rorty 1993:116), 
but his defence of human rights in fact commits him to the assumption that suffering, 
and humans’ unique capacity for sympathy, are morally relevant transcultural facts. 
Thus there is evidence of a tentative theory of human nature in his argument. 
A more troubling point conceded by Rorty himself is that many will find 
sentiment too weak a foundation for human rights, particularly since, as he argues, 
sympathy has a better chance of moving individuals to act in defence of human rights 
when the individuals in question enjoy relative security. Yet it is human security that 
increasing environmental degradation threatens to undermine. Freeman doubts the 
strength of Rorty’s sentimental basis for human rights, but he ultimately in effect 
takes a Rortyan line when he argues that individuals face ‘a nonrational decision 
either to accept or reject solidarity with humanity’ (Freeman 1994:514). The most 
persuasive justification for human rights rests on the intuition that people do care 
about their fellow human beings, and Rorty therefore proposes that a sentimental 
education be cultivated as the best means to bolster support for human rights, as an 
expression of this ‘care’. Though weaker than appeals to rational foundations claim to 
be, this is consistent with both secular and religious beliefs, insofar as it does not 
address the question of why humans are special, but simply assumes that they are. 
195On the other hand, appeals to rational self-interest can be said to justify 
environmental sustainability in terms of the ‘restraint principle’ proposed by Marcel 
Wissenburg. Here, it is in a first generation’s rational interest to invest in protecting 
the environment as a means to secure the trust of succeeding generations that will 
overlap with the first generation, and, on the basis of these bonds of trust, subsequent 
generations will feel obliged to care for the first generation in their old age. But some 
environmental problems, such as climate change, build up incrementally over long 
periods of time, thus it would be possible for the first generation to degrade the 
environment in ways that will not impact on overlapping generations, but will impact 
several generations hence. Conversely,  a first generation might wish to invest 
significantly in environmental protection to try to reverse environmental damage, thus 
incurring substantial costs and making changes to patterns of living that would impact 
negatively on the relative welfare of overlapping generations, but, if continued, 
benefit distant generations. Thus it is possible that first generation would impose on 
contiguously or immediately overlapping generations substantial costs without the 
promise of benefits within their lifetimes. In this scenario it is only rational for the 
first generation to act as described if it is assumed that overlapping generations will 
care sufficiently about more distant future generations to accept the burden. But this 
moves the argument beyond self-interest. Rational self-interest can only underwrite a 
weak model of environmental sustainability. Green theorists who have promoted the 
idea of environmental stewardship, such as Terence Ball and Robin Attfield, do 
generally seem to assume that most people have a sentimental concern for the fate of 
future generations. As with human rights, it might be thought that sentiment is too 
weak a basis on which to ground arguments for environmental sustainability, but the 
upshot of my analysis is that such arguments are more persuasive than appeals to 
reason. 
However, I do not suggest that sentiment alone is a sufficient basis for 
justifying either human rights or environmental sustainability. What is also needed is 
knowledge of the potential and actual impacts of actions, which in turn is dependent 
upon an understanding of humans as both socially and ecologically embedded beings, 
and in particular an awareness of individuals’ inevitable interconnectedness in the 
context of globalisation. Possible routes to generating such knowledge include 
Andrew Dobson’s notion of post-cosmopolitan citizenship discussed in chapter 6, but 
I argued that the historical approach implied there is ultimately unhelpful to the 
196forward looking task of realising environmental sustainability. On the other hand, a 
reinvigorated   notion   of   ‘environmental   human   rights’,   taking   account   of   the 
ecological embeddedness of human rights and adopting from Pogge’s institutional 
model the focus on the underfulfilment of human rights and on negative duties not to 
support human rights-disrespecting institutions, is in many respects a promising 
proposal. Yet, it is misguided to propose simply adding environmental claims to the 
existing list of human rights, in the hope of capitalising on the pre-existing consensus 
on human rights, or taking the status of human rights as given, as has been suggested 
in the literature on both human rights and environmental politics. Moreover, if the 
assumed sentimental concern for the fate of future generations proves in fact to be 
mistaken, then, even if generally respected and fulfilled, environmental human rights 
are likely to secure a weaker model of sustainability than that which I have endorsed. 
Human rights do not, then, provide a sufficient framework for responding to the 
challenges   posed   by   environmental   sustainability.   Nevertheless,   a   renewed 
understanding of human rights may well prove instrumental in furthering the goal of 
environmental sustainability.
This thesis had as its key aim an assessment of the interaction between human 
rights and environmental sustainability in the context of globalisation, with specific 
reference to the question of the extent to which the challenges of the environmental 
problems associated with economic globalisation could be met within the terms of the 
human rights framework. My investigation has demonstrated the contested character 
of much of the terrain and exposed the inadequacies of many of the arguments 
employed therein. It also supports the conclusion that sentiment, informed by an 
understanding of humans as socially and ecologically embedded beings, though 
perhaps a weaker foundation for either human rights or environmental sustainability 
than many would wish for, nonetheless provides a motivation for (and the best 
available justification of) caring about others, which is key to both human rights and 
environmental sustainability in the context of globalisation.
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